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CRITICAL ESSAY:
THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS IN DEVELOPMENT LAW:
A RECONCILIATION OF OPPOSITES?
RUMU SARKAR*
INTRODUCTION
This Critical Essay will examine certain philosophic implications of
modernization theory and dependency theory, and their impact on development
law. The essay will also identify certain similarities and key differences between
the two theories and explore past histories and future trends of both theories.
Finally, this Essay will propose a means of reconciling the two, thereby ending the
decades-long stalemate between the two theoretical perspectives. If accepted, this
reconciliation may provide common ground for development law practitioners and
specialists to work more harmoniously together into the future. However, before
embarking on a discussion of the theoretical foundations of development law, let
us take a step back and examine why this inquiry should be made.
Development law, as I have defined it, is a subject that establishes a new legal
architecture between developing and advanced nations.' Moreover, development
law, by its nature, is a multidisciplinary study that incorporates aspects of
economics, political theory, philosophy, history, sociology, and even legal
anthropology as well as other subjects. While philosophy may not be as important
in other subjects of law, it is particularly relevant to an understanding of
development law. The theoretical foundation of development law is its
cornerstone, and any change in its philosophic underpinnings has profound
implications with respect to the subject generally.
Indeed, it may be argued that development itself is essentially a political
process. It may be further argued that as a consequence, the political theories,
ideologies, and philosophies that motivate and guide the political process are
vitally important regardless of whether individual political actors acknowledge it,
or are even aware of it. Philosophic orientations and approaches, whether overtly
. This essay summarizes and expands the remarks made by the author at the Denver University College
of Law on March 30, 2005. Dr. Rumu Sarkar is an Adjunct Law Professor at the Georgetown
University Law Center, and the General Counsel for the Overseas Basing Commission (OBC). The
views expressed herein are the author's personal views and do not necessarily reflect the views or
policies of the OBC, or the U.S. Government.
1. RUMu SARKAR, DEVELOPMENT LAW AND INTERNATIONAL FINANCE, CHAPTER 2 (2d ed.
2002, Kluwer Law International); see also Rumu Sarkar, The Developing World in the New
Millennium: International Finance, Development, and Beyond, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L. L. 469
(2001).
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acknowledged or not, tend to describe, define, and differentiate developing nations
from their more advanced counterparts. The post-WW II era has seen a clash of
ideals that has been the genesis of the political thinking and action on both sides of
the "development" equation, between the so-called "haves" and "have nots."
Therefore, a clearer understanding of the philosophic dimensions of this divide
both deepens and broadens the debate.
The second preliminary question that needs to be addressed is why
modernization theory and dependency theory are considered to be rivals.
Modernization theory, discussed below, rose into prominence after the end of WW
II, primarily as a result of the efforts of U.S. economists, political scientists, and
sociologists.2 In contrast, dependency theory achieved its prominence after the
decline of modernization theory in the mid-1970's. 3 It became a discipline that
both stemmed from Marxist political theory, and was adopted by Marxist-
influenced political regimes. This, in my view, led to the unhappy juxtaposition of
the two approaches within the context of the Cold War during the decades that
followed.
A potential reconciliation of opposite views and approaches as discussed in
this Critical Essay is important not simply from the perspective of intellectual
history, but more importantly, in terms of developing a more coherent,
consolidated approach to development theory. If this reconciliation occurs in fact,
this will have far-reaching consequences, and a potentially beneficial impact, on
development law as a whole. In my view, there may be a significant shift
underway in that direction for the reasons discussed below.
I. THE THEORETICAL UNDERPINNINGS OF DEVELOPMENT LAW: MODERNIZATION
THEORY
Modernization theory is based on the assumption that development is the
inevitable, evolutionary result of a gradual progression led by the nation-state that
results in the creation (and ascendancy) 4 of Western-styled economic, political, and
cultural institutions. These institutions rest on three pillars: a free market capitalist
system, liberal democratic institutions, and the Rule of Law.
In this context, modernization theory is anchored by two principal thinkers:
first, Adam Smith's elevation of the 'drive to acquire material wealth to a classical
economic ideal, and second, John Locke's demand that the State protect private
property and individual liberties, thus setting the stage for liberal political theory.5
In other words, the pursuit of one's own personal happiness through the material
acquisition of personal wealth as well as the state's protection of individual
2. Brian Z. Tamanaha, Book Review, 89 AM. J. INT'L L. 470, 471 (1995) (reviewing LAW AND
DEVELOPMENT (Anthony Carty, ed., 1992)).
3. Id. at 477.
4. See e.g., FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, THE END OF HISTORY AND THE LAST MAN (Penguin
1992) (purportedly describing man's "universal history" by arguing that liberal democracy is the "end
point of man's ideological evolution" and thus, the final form of human government. This, in essence,
constitutes the "end of history" beyond which no further evolutionary development should be
expected). See also SARKAR, supra note 1, at 11-12.
5. See generally SARKAR, supra note 1, at 21.
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liberties has become a Western classical ideal. Indeed, the terrifying force of this
ideal may be its universality.
While Western societies developed legal structures over the centuries to
protect private property-such as contract enforcement, mortgages, secured loans,
liens, and bankruptcy proceedings-and to ensure the protection of individual
liberties-for example, passage of a Bill of Rights, due process of law, and jury
trials, non-Western societies did not, for the most part, develop similar institutions.
What revolutionized our world at the end of the last millennium was not the
adoption of a Western classical ideal by the non-Western world, but the adoption
of the Western methodology of achieving this ideal through private property,
democratic governance, and the Rule of Law.
Under modernization theory, there is a clear and pronounced emphasis on
constitutional, legal and regulatory reform. 6  In fact, modernization theorists
created the so-called "Law-and-Development" movement in the 1960's, 7 espousing
the idea that emulating Western legal principles and institutions lays the
foundation for legal development, and therefore, supports the development process
in general. A modernist approach creates a solid foundation for creating a
positivist, normative style of law-making with which most common law
practitioners are familiar.
However, the fundamental character of modernization theory seems to be, for
the most part, overlooked. The theory describes an ahistorical, linear process
based on the experience and cultural values of Western nations. While the value of
this process and the end product that it desires to achieve may be debated, the
inherent, and somewhat negative, drawback to the modernization approach is, in
fact, its ahistorical perspective. The model has been criticized (albeit primarily by
dependency thinkers, but also by modernization scholars themselves) as
"ethnocentric" 8 by steadfastly failing to recognize and acknowledge that it
6. Modernization theory supports the view that, "law is essential to economic development
because it provides the elements necessary to the functioning of a market system. These elements
include a universal rule uniformly applied, which generates predictability and allows planning; a regime
of contract law that secures future expectations; and property law to protect the fruits of labor. In
theory, law assists political development by serving as the backbone for the liberal-democratic state.
Law is the means through which the government achieves its purposes, and it serves to restrain arbitrary
or oppressive government action." Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 473.
7. See generally Francis Botchway, "Good Governance: The Old, The New, The Principle, and
The Elements," 13 FLA. J. INT'L L. 159, 177-180 (2001).
8. See e.g., Ilana Shapiro, Strengthening Transitional Democracies Through Conflict Resolution,
552 ANNALS OF AM. AcAD. POL. & SOC. SC. 14, 20 (1997):
The traditional critiques about Modernization theory's ethnocentric bias are still relevant. The
assumption that Western forms of political, economic, and social organization can provide universal
models requiring only minor adaptations to the cultural and historical contexts of CEE [Central and
Eastern European] countries reflects Western cultural biases. At the same time, this view dismisses the
anthropological conceptions of culture and postmodern understandings of context where systemized
ways of organizing the world are embedded within specific cultural and social systems....
Modernization models are derived from Western cultural and historical legacies. The specific
conditions from which free markets and liberal democracies in the West emerged are not comparable to
those in CEE countries, even those CEE countries that had some prior democratic and free market
2005
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engenders and supports Western forms of economic production, democratic
governance, and laws. As a result, the approach fails to take into account the
differences in cultural values and the legal histories of developing nations.9 This
"one style fits all" approach, in turn, may be perceived as being somewhat
autocratic in its overtones.
Modernization theory thus supports, and perhaps even applauds, the demise of
the former Soviet Union and the creation of Western-styled democracies in Eastern
Europe, the Baltics, the Balkans, and Eurasia along with the profound changes that
have most recently taken place in the Ukraine.' ° Further, the modernization of
Turkey by sacrificing more traditional Islamic-based values in favor of instituting a
modem nation-state, joining NATO, and seeking European Union (EU)
membership" is also a step-by-step path to which a modernist approach would
ascribe. However, the same lack of historicity prevents modernization theorists
from predicting a case like Iran or Taliban-controlled Afghanistan where modernist
principles are eschewed in favor of pre-modern values, practices, and governance.
Modernization theory also creates a nexus between a free market economy
and a liberal democracy. Both are seen as co-equal partners working in tandem to
bring the wealth and prosperity of Western nations to the underprivileged classes
of the developing world. The conceptual framework of both acting in concert is
certainly an ideal to aspire to, but it has been clear for quite some time that the
nexus may not be an absolute predeterminate of successful development.
traditions. Further, Western political and economic systems have undergone massive changes since
their inception so that the current forms barely resemble the early stages. Yet countries in the CEE
region are expected to catch up to conditions that have taken decades to develop in the West. Many
authors have noted that such expectations are a formula for uneven and unpredictable development. In
many ways, the Modernization process in CEE is like trying to rebuild a Skoda into a Mercedes while
speeding down the road at seventy miles an hour." Id. (citation omitted).
9. Even I have tried to mitigate the one-sidedness of this approach by proposing the Janus Law
Principle (JLP) after the Roman God Janus, who looks both forwards and backwards simultaneously.
By this, I simply mean to suggest that there are implicit time and space dimensions to sequencing and
synchronizing legal reforms. The developing country in question should plot out on a time-space axis
for the multi-dimensional legal reforms it is considering. For example, on the time axis, the types of
legal reforms a developing country wishes to make in terms of globalization of law efforts (future)
along with maintaining its own authentic legal traditions worthy of preservation (past) should be plotted
out. On the space axis, the country in question should look to its international national needs (home)
and its need to integrate more fully into the global economy (the world.) One of my students also
suggested that the JLP axis also be used as the legal coordinates for a fuller analysis that could include
economic data and socio-economic criteria. See SARKAR, supra note 1, at 38-43.
10. See Steven Lee Mayers, Ukraine President Sworn In, Promising to Promote Unity, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 24, 2005, at A9; Brian Knowlton, Ukrain'e President Visits Congress A Hero and Asks for
More Help, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at A10.
11. See e.g., Robert Kaplan, Turkey's Precarious Success, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 2001, at A23.
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Again, as an example of its lack of historicity, modernization theory was at a
loss to explain the relative success of "soft" authoritarian regimes or illiberal
democracies that have encouraged capitalist-based economic growth while at the
same time repressing true democratization, respect for human rights, and certain
social and religious institutions. Examples of such economic success stories
include Spain under Franco, Chile under Pinochet, Malaysia, and China.
12
On the other hand, it is possible to have vibrant democratic institutions
without significant economic development as in the case of India until fairly
recently, and in the post-Marco era Philippines. While I am not suggesting that
free market growth be disaggregated from encouraging the growth of
representational democracy and democratic institutions, it is becoming
increasingly clear that one can be achieved without the other. Indeed, "the
marriage between capitalism and democracy, although prevalent in the West, is not
always an easy or happy one."'
13
In the 1970's, modernization fell victim to its own "deep pessimism' 4 in light
of the failure of developing countries to develop economically, and by the
proliferation of authoritarian and military regimes. These events seemed to negate
modernization's own prescriptions for success based on capital market
development and democratization. By 1974, less than a decade after it had begun
in earnest, the modernization movement was "in crisis" 15 leading to its apparent
collapse, despite subsequent attempts to reform it.'
6
Modernization theory has certainly enjoyed a broad-based resurgence after
the collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989, and related historical events. The recent
rhetoric of globalization is, in fact, grounded in modernization theory. Indeed, the
introduction of democratic reforms in the Middle East is breaking new ground for
modernists. While elections in Afghanistan, Palestine, Iraq, and forthcoming
elections in Lebanon, Egypt and Saudi Arabia signal significant, and even
12. See e.g., Larry Rohter, Chile's Retirees Find Shortfall in Private Plan, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 27,
2005, at Al; Joseph Kahn, Democratic Hopes Test China's Political Limits, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2003,
at Final 3.
13. Shapiro, supra note 8, at 21.
14. Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 472.
15. See David Trubek and Marc Galanter, Scholars in Self-Estrangement: Some Reflections on the
Crisis in Law and Development Studies in the United States, 1974 Wis. L. REv. 1062 (1974). These
commentators proposed an "eclectic critique" that criticized the law and development model based on
modernization theory as "ethnocentric and naive." Id. at 1080. They argued that this modernist view of
developing a legal infrastructure did not reflect the realities of developing countries, and was potentially
dangerous by attempting to export legal forms and institutions that could too easily be manipulated by
and for the purposes of the controlling elites in the countries in question. Id. at 1099.
16. "These Modernization revisions included: (1) a greater focus on the role of tradition in
processes of social mobilization and change; (2) an expanded methodology of case studies and
historical analyses; and (3) a more sophisticated analysis of change that examined the role of multiple
institutions, multilinear paths toward development, and the interaction of internal and external factors
influencing change." Shipiro, supra note 8, at 16 (citation omitted). Most importantly, modernization
thinking has been revised to move away from nation-state directed growth (top-down approach) and
towards civil society development (bottom-up approach).
2005
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impressive, reforms, 17 the question of whether modernization theory will prevail in
these societies is an open-ended one. Clearly, these are all works in progress.
Yet, one possible unexpected, and dismaying, result does come to mind. In
the end, the transformative power of democratization, a pillar of modernization
thought, may be its ability to give voice to and thus, legitimize minority views and
political perspectives. This may mean that "terrorists" will de facto become
legitimate political actors within the democratic fabric. Intimations of this are
already apparent in the express political ambitions of Hamas in Palestine,
Hezbollah in Lebanon and Syria, and Al Sadr in Iraq,18 all of whom are seeking to
be political representatives in the legitimate governance of their respective
countries. However, it may be wise not to draw any hasty conclusions at this point
while this story is still unfolding.
II. A CONTRARIAN VOICE: DEPENDENCY THEORY
While modernists were floundering in the 1970's, dependency theorists
dominated the conversation about development. In contrast to modernization
theory, dependency theory is not a descriptive process of change leading to broad-
based economic development, but a historical analysis and critique of the root
causes of underdevelopment-on this level, a comparison of the two theories has
always seemed inapt.
In any case, dependency theory considers the historical nature, causes, and
implications of colonialism and its aftermath. Perhaps the most important work
contributed by dependency thinkers was an analysis of neo-colonialism that argued
that newly independent developing countries were entering global markets at their
own peril. The legacy of colonialism, they argued, left these countries without the
necessary infrastructure of commerce, transportation, trade, and communications
as well as supporting social, educational, and political institutions.
Apart from its historical analysis, dependency theorists also argued that
developing nations were trapped in self-perpetuating "dependency" relations with
advanced nations by continually having a net deficit in capital, technology, and
educational opportunities necessary to create an educated workforce. Moreover,
international laws and practices of commerce, trade, and investment were all
created by and thus, skewed in favor of, industrialized nations leaving developing
countries in a declining state of impoverishment and "underdevelopment."'
' 9
17. See e.g., Mona AI-Naggar, Egypt: Anti-Mubarak Rallies in 3 Cities, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 31,
2005, at A13.
18. Steven Erlanger, Hamas Will Take Part in Vote for Palestine Legislature, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
13, 2005, at Final 1; Michael Young, Can Hezbollah Go Straight?, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at A25;
Hassan Fattah, Pro-Syria Party in Beirut Holds a Huge Protest, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at Al. See
Robert Killebrew, Al Qaeda: The Next Chapter, WASH. POST, Aug. 8, 2004, for a theoretical
perspective on the assimilation of terrorists into the governance of Middle Eastern countries.
19. While the relative merits of this critique lies outside the scope of this Critical Essay, it is
important to note that this theory formed the basis of certain economic models used by developing
countries, the most prominent being import substitution. In another contrast with modernization,
dependency theorists did not describe a single "process of development" but rather several models of
development.
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For dependency theorists, law was secondary to economics in accordance
with Marx's thinking that law constitutes the superstructure to the underlying
structure of economics. 20 Nevertheless, dependency theory was the genesis of the
so-called "international law of development" that underscored U.N. initiatives such
as the New International Economic Order (NIEO). 21 For example, the NIEO
agenda advocated giving preferential trade and investment treatment to developing
countries, debt relief and grants-based assistance, access to technology transfers,
and the recognition to the right to development.22
Ironically, while the various U.N. resolutions and other actions taken may
have lacked legal effect, the NIEO-based agenda has, nonetheless, been partially
successful in practical terms. For example, the World Bank and other multilateral
and, on a limited scale, bilateral institutions are implementing large-scale debt
relief,23 moving away from loans and towards grants, and facilitating certain
environmental technology transfers to developing countries. 24  In addition,
dependency legal theorists countered the "ethnocentrism" of modernists by
espousing the intrinsic worth of preserving the legal values, histories, institutions,
and practices of developing nations.
One persistent theme that has emerged from dependency theorists is the legal
concept of equity-based relations in international law now referred to as "common
but differentiated responsibility (CBDR)." While the term may be fairly new, the
concept is not, as it dates as far back as the Treaty of Versailles (1919).25 Non-
uniform, differentiated, non-reciprocal treatment can be found in trade26 as well as
environmental regimes.
However, the CBDR legal standard has imposed non-uniform legal
obligations on contracting parties and has been most prevalent and systemic in
20. Tamanaha, supra note 2, at 479.
21. Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, G.A. Res. 3201 (S-
VI), § 4e, U.N. GAOR, 6' Spec. Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974).
22. See generally SARKAR, supra note 1, ch. 7.
23. See e.g., the World Bank's Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor Countries Initiative (HIPC), at
http://web.worldbank.orgWBSITE/EXTERNAL/TOPICS/EXTDEBTDEPT/0,,cfntentMDK:20260411
-menuPK:528655--pagePK:64166689-piPK:64166646-theSitePK:469043,00.html. Widespread debt
relief has not always met with approval even from a developing country perspective as there is an
implicit "moral hazard" to debt relief insofar as recipient nations may appear uncreditworthy and
unattractive to investors. See e.g., Barbara Crossette, Ex-Premier of Singapore See Pitfalls in Debt
Relief N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 2000, at Final 4.
24. See e.g., the UN Environmental Programme's website discussing technology transfers, which
is available at http://www.unep.or.jpfIetc/EST/Index.asp. See also 15 U.S.C. § 4728(a) (2004) (stating
in relevant part: "it is the policy of the United States to foster the export of United States environmental
technologies, goods and services. In exercising their powers and functions, all appropriate departments
and agencies of the United States Government shall encourage and support sales of such technologies,
goods and services.").
25. See Christopher D. Stone, Common But Differentiated Responsibilities in International Law,
98 AM. J. INT'L L. 276, 278 (2004).
26. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) added nonreciprocal trade provisions in
favor of developing countries in 1979, by permitting "differential and more favorable" tariff treatment.
Stone, supra note 25, at 278.
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international environmental legal agreements stemming from the three "earth
summits." The first of these summits was the landmark Stockholm Declaration of
the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment (1972) that took "into account
the circumstances and particular requirements of developing countries and any
costs which may emanate from their incorporating environmental safeguards into
their development planning and the need to make available to them, upon their
request, additional international technical and financial assistance for this
purpose.,
27
The second summit held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992 also produced detailed
international legal agreements such as the Rio Declaration of Principles,28 the
Statement of Forest Principles, 29 the Convention on Biodiversity,30 and Agenda
21,31 that all contained the CBDR principle in some form. These principles were
reaffirmed at the third earth summit held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002.32
A successful example of the use of CBDR is the Montreal Protocol (1987)
which took effect on January 1, 1989. 3 The Protocol required a 50 percent
reduction in the production and use of ozone-depleting substances. The Protocol
led to the adoption of the Helsinki Declaration and the London Amendments of
1990, which led to the virtual elimination of ozone-depleting substances by
January 2000. Article 2(9)(c) of the Montreal Protocol required a two-thirds
majority vote of the participating nations representing at least 50 percent of the
total worldwide consumption, giving veto power, in effect, to both developed and
developing nations.
34
The Montreal Protocol's common but differentiated responsibility standard
created an equity-based legal regime persuading China, India, and Brazil to join
the Protocol. The significant features of the Protocol included: (1) a ten year delay
in reducing emissions permitting short-term increases in the production of ozone-
depleting substances by developing countries; (2) a multilateral fund to facilitate
compliance among developing countries; and (3) facilitated transfers of
27. Stockholm Declaration of the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment,
Stockholm Declaration, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.48/14, princ. 12 (1972), reprinted in 11 I.L.M. 1416, 1419
(1972).
28. See Report of the U.N. Conf on Environment and Development: Rio Declaration on
Environmental Development, U.N. GAOR, Annex I. Vol. I at 8, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (1992).
29. See Report of the U.N. Conf on Environment and Development: Non-legally Binding
Authoritative Statement of Principles for a Global Consensus on the Management, Conservation and
Sustainable Development of All Types of Forests, U.N. GAOR, 47
th Sess., Annex 3, Vol. III at 111,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (1992).
30. See U.N. Environmental Programme: Resolutions of the Conference for the Adoption of the
Agreed Text ofthe Convention on Biological Diversity (May 22, 1992), in 31 I.L.M. 842 (1992).
31. See Report of the U.N. Conf. on Environmental Development: Agenda 21, U.N. GAOR, 47th
Sess., Annex 2, Vol. 1, at 14, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 151/26 (1992).
32. See Report of the World Summit on Sustainable Development, U.N. Commission on
Sustainable Development, U.N. Doc. A/Conf. 199/20 (2002).
33. The Montreal Protocol is available at the U.N. Environmental Programme Ozone Secretariat's
website at http://www.unep.org/ozone/Montreal-Protocol/Montreal-
Protocol2000.shtml#_Toc483027784 [hereinafter Montreal Protocol].
34. Montreal Protocol, supra note 33, art. (2)(9)(c).
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environmentally-friendly technologies. The Protocol has led to the virtual
elimination of ozone-depleting substances.
Perhaps the most well known legal document containing a CBDR principle is
the so-called Kyoto Protocol 35 that specifically states in Article 3(1) that: "the
Parties should protect the climate system... on the basis of equity and in accordance
with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. 36
The Kyoto Protocol 37 requires Annex I countries (i.e., advanced nations
belonging to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development) to
reduce their collective greenhouse emissions by at least 5 percent below 1990
levels by the years 2008 to 2012. However, non-Annex I countries, including
India and China, are under no similar obligation-this, in large part, fueled the
United States objection to the treaty.38 Further, Art. 3(5) and 3(6) of the Protocol
provide that "economies in transition" listed in Annex I may choose their base
year, other than 1990, to make their emissions reduction burdens less onerous.
Although the CBDR standard in the Kyoto Protocol mirrors the approach
taken by the Montreal Protocol by imposing different legal standards and timelines
for compliance on the signatory nations, it has been widely criticized. From one
perspective, the differential treatment implicit in the Protocol seems patronizing in
character, implying that developing nations lack the financial, scientific, and
administrative capability to address global warming. From another perspective, it
seems that onerous burdens are being placed on advanced nations while other
nations, who do emit greenhouse gases, are not being asked to change their current
practices or assume any financial burdens for achieving a worldwide reduction in
greenhouse gas emissions.
Yet, the CBDR standard may hold the key to reconciling the two theories, as
discussed below.
1I. A RECONCILIATION OF OPPOSITES?
It is clear that modernization theory is undergoing a resurgence, especially in
the context of the recent and ongoing Global War on Terror initiated by the
35. See U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change, May 9, 1992, in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992)
[hereinafter Framework Convention]; Conference of the Parties to the Framework Convention on
Climante Change: Kyoto Protocol, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. No. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add.1, in 37
I.L.M. 32 (1998) [hereinafter Kyoto Protocol].
36. Kyoto Protocol, supra note 35, art. 3(l).
37. The Kyoto Protocol entered into effect on February 16, 2005 following its ratification by the
Russian Parliament on November 5, 2004. Article 25 of the Protocol specifies that ratification by 55
countries representing 55 percent of the total worldwide greenhouse gas emissions is necessary in order
for the accord to take legal effect. See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 35, art. 25. Notably, the United
States and Australia have not ratified Kyoto. See Gary Thomas, Global Warming Accord Takes Effect
Minus US, Australia, VOICE OF AMERICA, Feb. 14, 2005, available at
http://www.voanews.com/english/2005-02-14-voa52.cfm; see also the official website of the Australian
Government, at http://www.greenhouse.gov.au/intemational/kyoto/.
38. While the Kyoto Protocol excludes developing nations from making emissions reductions,
Art. 12 of the Protocol establishes a Clean Development Mechanism to provide incentives to
industrialized countries to finance emissions reduction projects in developing countries (e.g., emissions
trading, carbon sinks). See Kyoto Protocol, supra note 35, art. 12.
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unprovoked attacks launched on September 11, 2001 on the United States.
Modernization theory has incorporated a fresh new perspective, and now has a re-
energized commitment to stem the flow of fundamentalist Islamic-based terrorism
by introducing the elements of representational democracy and economic growth,
and benefits that flow therefrom, to societies harboring such terrorists.
3 9
This is a very significant development since modernization theory now is
becoming a backdrop to overarching strategic geopolitical considerations,
international diplomacy, and even the prosecution of a global war on terror. This
may come as a surprise to the U.S. military, intelligence, and national security
communities since development issues have simply not been on their agendas
heretofore, at least not in any truly significant way.
The reason this development is so interesting is that it links, however
tentatively, the root causes of endemic poverty and political disenfranchisement to
the downstream effects that may ultimately lead to terrorist activities, political
destabilization, and the emergence of asymmetric threats against the West,
particularly the United States. Perhaps over time, this linkage will become clearer
and better understood, so that the causes and effects of global poverty will be more
fully integrated into geopolitical considerations that go into the formulation of
national security, defense, and military strategies.
The relative "symmetry" of the Cold War that held two superpowers in a
delicate balance has been replaced with an asymmetric world of unpredictable and
diffuse threats posed by failed and collapsed states and non-state actors. Threats
include, for example, terrorism, the acquisition and use of weapons of mass
destruction as well as biological and chemical agents by rogue states and terrorists,
and political destabilization posed by insurgencies, military coups, and genocidal
acts. Natural disasters, famine, and HIV/AIDS along with other pandemics are
also destabilizing factors affecting global security. In fact, the HIV/AIDS
pandemic has been described as "not only an unprecedented humanitarian
catastrophe, but a political and security threat to both U.S. and global interests." 4 o
If the spectrum of geopolitical considerations were widened to include not only
HIV/AIDS but also endemic poverty and its causes, that would be impressive
indeed.
In contrast, dependency theory is not undergoing a resurgence, but the
persistent and recurring theme of the CBDR principle has remained on the
international legal scene. In essence:
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities requires us to
recognize that because of historical circumstances, countries at different stages
39. Neil MacFarquhar, Unexpected Whiff of Freedom Proves Bracing for the Mideast, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 6, 2005, at FINAL 1; Todd Purdum, For Bush, No Boasts, but a Taste of Vindication, N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 9, 2005, at AI0; Thomas Freidman, Arabs Lift Their Voices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 7, 2005, at
A23.
40. See Council on Foreign Relations and Milbank Memorial Fund, Addressing the HIVAIDS
Pandemic: A U.S. Global AIDS Strategy for the Long-Term (May 2004), http://www.cfr.org/pdf/HIV-
AIDS.pdf.
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of development have different capacities, and consequently, different levels of
and kinds of responsibility for dealing with international environmental issues...
The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities recognizes the
importance of taking responsibility for past actions. As well, differential
responsibility is consistent with recognition of the varied needs and capacities of
individual and states.
41
While the name of the underlying concept, Common But Differentiated
Responsibility, implies that a differential legal norm (i.e., providing a more
advantageous set of legal standards to one group over another) is being applied, it
may be argued that the legal norm is actually contextual in nature (i.e., providing
the same legal treatment but permitting different applications that vary based on
certain factors.) A contextual norm has been described as:
A norm which on its face provides identical treatment to all States affected by
the norm but the application of which requires (or at least permits) consideration
of characteristics that may vary from country to country. The application of a
contextual norm thus typically involves balancing multiple interests and
characteristics.
42
Thus, if the CBDR concept could shift from common but differentiated to
common and contextual responsibility (CACR), perhaps some of the divisive
rhetoric can be avoided. This shift is permitted under the historical approach and
analysis of dependency theory, but not under the ahistorical approach of
modernization theory. However, a shift in analysis permits both the introduction
of the legal concept of equity as well as the dimension of historicity missing from
modernization theory. The element of equity tends to level an unequal playing
field by imposing the same legal obligation to comply with international
commitments, but differentiating the means by which such compliance is sought.
Recognizing the past inequities among nations, and imposing different legal
obligations as a result, is a difficult transition for traditional modernists to make. It
requires an acknowledgment of a non-Western history and creates a result based in
equity, rather than strictly in law. However, it may be argued that such a shift has
already taken place de facto (but not de jure) with regard to practices related to
debt relief, preferential borrowing practices, and other issues discussed above.
Perhaps it is time to take a leap of faith.
Law and equity are certainly interrelated concepts, and equity tends to
mitigate the harshness of law by taking notions of fundamental fairness into
account. By recasting differential norms as contextual norms, the elements of
equity and historicity that are notably absent from modernization theory, are
41. Graham Mayeda, Where Should Johannesburg Take Us? Ethical and Legal Approaches to
Sustainable Development in the Context of International Environmental Law, 15 COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL.
L. & POL'Y 29, 50 (2004).
42. David Magraw, Legal Treatment of Developing Countries: Differential, Contextual, and
Absolute Norms, I COLO. J. INT'L ENVTL. L. & POL'Y, 73, 74 (1990).
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introduced to it. Modernists should not fear that this will weaken or dilute their
theoretical approach. Indeed, by incorporating a missing dimension,
modernization theory will be greatly strengthened. Just as law is truly balanced by
equitable principles, so modernization theory can be balanced by dependency
theory.
In the end, modernization theory's "autocratic" edges may be softened by
making it more inclusive, more representative, and therefore, more effective in the
long run. In addition, it would be well to remember that contextual norms for
nations are on a sliding scale insofar as the nations themselves are dynamic and
constantly changing. The international scene is constantly in flux and as the
circumstances of developing nations change, so too will the legal standards that
will be applied to them. Indeed, the entire point of the development process is to
actually achieve development.
IV. A SUMMATION
So, we return to the first question posed by this Critical Essay, that is to say,
why should we revisit and attempt to reconcile two theoretical perspectives on
development law? Modernization theory is already taking on new dimensions of
analysis, yet the equity-based differential treatment of developing nations has
remained as a constant theme over the past three decades. Rather than continuing
a stalemate between the two theoretical approaches, a slight shift in the analysis of
modernization theory permits the reconciliation of the two. The merit in doing this
is to create a coherent theoretical approach that reconciles the differences between
the two while acknowledging the strengths and shortcomings in both.
As a concluding note, it should be clear that this reconciliation is one of two
Western-based theories. The truly absent voice in development law is from the
developing countries themselves. Perhaps the final frontier is an exploration of the
contributions that the historical experience, legal histories, and traditions that
developing countries have to make in this regard. The role of consensual decision-
making, conflict resolution, and truth and reconciliation of differences seem full of
possibilities. As the theoretical dimensions underlying development law evolve in
the future, it may lead to seeking new avenues that are more process oriented, that
establish contextual relationships and legal norms, and that emphasize more
cooperative and collaborative relationships.
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The discussion here will be limited to intergovernmental organizations. The
topic is timely, for there remain ambiguities regarding the accountability of such
organizations to their members or third parties, or the accountability of the
members of these organizations and third parties to the organizations, and the
necessary mechanisms and procedures to ensure such accountability.
The issues this topic raises have been subjected to recent scrutiny and debate
by international lawyers,' but more scholarly analysis is needed to clarify the
issues further and provide firm guidelines for action. First, however, we must
distinguish between accountability, responsibility, and legal liability. The
definitions are not clear. Second, as the mandate and the role of international
organizations (1Os), and thus the range and scope of their activities, differ among
them, these variables must be considered in determining their accountability.
Third, we must answer broadly the question, "accountability to whom?" Those
addressed should include lOs and their staff, both member-states and non-
members, international and domestic courts, national parliaments,
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) and private parties (including legal
persons). Fourth, we need to further explore the existing mechanisms and
procedures for holding international organizations accountable and, as required,
new mechanisms and procedures should be fashioned. And, finally, we need to
consider perhaps the most difficult issue: who can and should determine the
question of the validity of the U.N. Security Council's actions? And, assuming the
action is deemed to have exceeded the Security Council's mandate and powers,
can it be invalidated-by whom and with what outcomes?
Let me illustrate the controversies and ambiguities that abound as we study
this subject. Questions have arisen about the accountability, responsibility, and
legal liability of the United Nations or its constituent organs, such as the Security
Council, the U.N. member states, and individuals for alleged violations of human
rights and humanitarian law regarding U.N. peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and
peace-building operations, as well as economic sanctions imposed by the Security
* John Evans University Professor, Thompson G. Marsh Professor of Law and Director, International
Legal Studies Program, University of Denver. This is an adapted version of an address presented at the
International Law Association-American Branch's International Law Weekend in New York, October
2004.
1. Recent studies have been undertaken by the International Law Association and the American
Society of International Law, and the International Law Commission has the topic on its agenda for
consideration.
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Council. Who is responsible and to what extent for tortious acts? Privileges and
immunities accorded to the United Nations are implicated. However, normally,
prior to the commencement of such operations, the United Nations also negotiates
a more comprehensive agreement on privileges and immunities directly with each
host state.
Similar questions have been raised concerning alleged ordinary tort and
breach of contract claims as well as claims related to alleged human rights
violations against other 1Os. Also, critics of globalization continue to demonstrate
and shout that there is a lack of openness and transparency in World Trade
Organization (WTO) decisionmaking, especially its dispute resolution
mechanisms, which they find undemocratic and unacceptable. The arbitration
process and its outcomes in investor disputes in the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA) setting under its chapter 11, which have been subjects of
discussion in several recent international law conferences, have been similarly
denounced for the lack of transparency in NAFTA's decisionmaking, especially its
dispute resolution processes.
In this address, I will confine my remarks first to addressing briefly the U.N.
issues pertaining to peacekeeping, peace-enforcement, peace-building, and
economic sanctions; next, to commenting on the accountability of other
international organizations; and finally, to reporting on the recently concluded
study of the International Law Association on the subject.
II. THE U.N.-RELATED ACTIVITIES
A. U.N. Peacekeeping and Enforcement Operations
In the aftermath of the Cold War, as the U.N. peacekeeping operations
expanded in size, scope, and diversity of functions they perform, the application of
international humanitarian law to such operations is increasingly recognized as
necessary and important. The United Nations acknowledged this necessity by
entering into status of forces agreement with the host state Rwanda in 1993,
Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda,
under which the "principles and spirit" of the pertinent international human rights
instruments, inter alia, the four Geneva Conventions of 1949, the two Additional
Protocols of 1977 to these conventions, and the Hague Convention on the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict of 1954 are to be
fully respected by U.N. forces.
2
2. Agreement on the Status of the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda, Nov. 5, 1993,
U.N.-Rwanda, 1748 U.N.T.S. 3. The four conventions are: Convention [I] For the Amelioration of the
Condition of the Wounded and Sick in the Armed Forces in the Field, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75
U.N.T.S. 31; Convention [II] For the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick or Shipwrecked
Members of Armed Forces at Sea, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S. 85; Convention [III]
Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, Aug, 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3116, 75 U.N.T.S. 135;
Convention [IV] Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Times of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6
U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287. The two Protocols are: Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions
of 12 Aug 1949 and Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; and Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 Aug 1949 and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts, June 8, 1977, 1125
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The United Nations entered into similar status of forces agreements in its
subsequent peacekeeping and peace-enforcement operations. This broad statement,
that of fully respecting the "principles and spirit" of the norms, needed further
elaboration since there were no guidelines on how to translate it to address
practical issues such as the legal status of combatants and other detainees by U.N.
forces, the kind of weapons permissible and prohibited to use, and the legal status
of U.N. forces who might be taken as hostages. In 1995, the International
Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) brought together experts to address these
challenges and presented to the U.N. Secretariat a draft of basic norms of
international humanitarian law to be applied to peacekeeping and enforcement
activities.
Based upon the ICRC work, the U.N. Secretary-General issued the Bulletin on
the Observance by United Nations Forces of International Humanitarian Law on
August 6, 1999, which came into force six days later.3 The Bulletin is "applicable
to United Nations forces conducting operations under Untied Nations command
and control," 4 and specifies provisions of international humanitarian law that
would be respected by the United Nations. Its principles apply to U.N. forces when
they are actively engaged in situations of armed conflicts as combatants "to the
extent and for the duration of their engagement," and engaged in "enforcement
actions, or in peace-keeping operations when the use of force is permitted in self-
defense." 5
There are still ambiguities in the application of these guidelines. For example,
the Bulletin does not differentiate between U.N. operations undertaken in
peacekeeping activities and those in enforcement. Also, it does not differentiate
between the peacekeepers' status "as civilians" and "as combatants." Even more
important, as the Bulletin applies to forces under U.N. command and control, they
are not applicable to U.N. "Associated Personnel," or those operations authorized
by the United Nations but conducted under national or regional command. In the
latter setting, the concerned states or regional organizations responsible for the
operations are to ensure that international humanitarian law is applied.
As to the remedies available to the one seeking damages arising out of the
U.N. peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations, or post-conflict U.N.
operations aimed at peace-building, it should first be noted, that the United Nations
and its officials working in official capacity are granted "functional immunity"
from legal process. The Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United
Nations6 limits the privileges and immunities of the U.N. officials to those
"necessary for the independent exercise of their functions in connection with the
Organization." However, under one of the provisions of the Convention, when the
U.N.T.S. 609.
3. Secretary-General's Bulletin, Observance by United Nations Forces of International
Humanitarian Law, U.N. Doe. ST/SGB/1999/13 (1999), reprinted in 38 I.L.M. 1656 (1999).
4. Id. § 1.2.
5. Id. §1.1.
6. U.N. Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Feb. 13, 1946, 21
U.S.T. 1418, 1 U.N.T.S. 16.
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United Nations or one of its officials enjoying immunity is a party to a dispute of a
private-law character, the United Nations is obliged to provide for appropriate
means of settlement in such a dispute.
As the United Nations undertook an expanded role for peacekeeping and
enforcement operations, the need to limit U.N. financial obligations arose. The
triggering event was a claim by Bosnia and Herzegovina against the United
Nations for $70 million, most of it for damage caused by U.N. vehicles for the
normal use of roads and bridges, etc. Concerned about the impact of such claims
on the financial health of the organization, the General Assembly adopted a
resolution calling upon the Secretary-General to explore ways to limit U.N.
liability vis-a-vis third parties.8 The limitations established were both financial and
temporal.9 Regarding financial limitation, compensation for personal injury, illness
or death must not exceed the amount of fifty-thousand dollars. Compensation for
property loss or damage was also set at a reasonable level to be measured by costs
of repair or replacement of the property damaged, or fair rental value or repair
costs. 10 However, the United Nations is entitled to seek reimbursement from the
members of the force or from the state contributing troops." Also, the host country
in whose territory a peacekeeping operation is undertaken gives consent for such
an operation and is hence assumed to share with the United Nations the burden of
financial claims the U.N. peacekeepers' presence may cause. The temporal limit
was set at six months.
In case of "operational necessity," which is analogized to "military necessity,"
the United Nations assumes no tortious liability. Regarding the damage caused by
gross negligence or willful misconduct on the part of the United Nations, the
Organization assumes liability for full compensation.
B. Post-conflict U.N. Operations
It is generally accepted that the post-conflict U.N. operations in Bosnia and
Herzegovina (Bosnia), Rwanda, Somalia, and Mozambique, among others, and
territorial administrations from Cambodia to Kosovo and East Timor, have
suffered from excesses and serious human rights violations and abuses allegedly
committed by peacekeepers. Questions have been raised about the lack of U.N.
accountability for such violations. The situations in Bosnia and Kosovo will be
briefly mentioned here.
7. Id. art. 29
8. See Gen. Ass. Res. 50/235, U.N. GAOR, 50th Sess., Supp. No. 49. Vol. 2, at 33, U.N. Doc.
A/50/49 (1996); Gen. Ass. Res. 51/13 (1996).
9. For a detailed analysis, see Daphna Shraga, CURRENT DEVELOPMENT: UN Peacekeeping
Operations: Applicability of International Humanitarian Law and Responsibility for Operations-
Related damage, 94 AM. J. INT'L L. 406, 410-12 (2000).
10. See Report of the Secretary-General, Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing
of the United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations: Financing of the United Nations' Peacekeeping
Operations, U.N. Doc. A/51/903 (1997), paras. 30-36.
11. For a Model Contribution Agreement between the U.N. and the state contributing resources to
the U.N. peacekeeping operations, see Note by the Secretary-General, Reform of the Procedures for
Determining Reimbursement to Member States for Contingent-Owned Equipment, U.N.Doc. A/50/995,
annex (1996), art. 9.
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In Bosnia the U.N. civilian police have been accused of participation in the
trafficking of women-buying and selling women, conspiring with criminal groups
to recruit and smuggle women into brothels, and patronizing brothels in which
trafficked women were abused. 12 There was no accountability for these human
rights violations on the part of individual peacekeepers, peacekeeper-contributing
states, or the United Nations itself.'3
Similarly, in Kosovo, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
allegedly abusing his authority was accused of continuing to use Executive Orders
to unlawfully detain suspected criminals. 14 Although an ombudspersons' office,
aimed at promoting and protecting "the rights and freedoms of individuals and
legal entities,"' 5 was established, it had limited jurisdiction over the U.N. Kosovo
force and institutional checks were inadequate to ensure effective protection of
human rights.' 6 Accountability was lacking.
C. Economic Sanctions Imposed by the Security Council
17
Economic sanctions are considered a blunt but nonetheless necessary
instrument,' s aimed at modifying the target state's behavior. However, as is
evidenced by the adverse impact of economic sanctions on the vulnerable civilian
population in Iraq-malnourishment and increased fatalities among children,
women and the elderly-it is often not the regime, but those weakest in societies
who suffer the most. This has led to deep concern about the use and impact of
economic sanctions expressed by not only NGOs, especially human rights groups
12. See Jennifer Murray, Note: Who Will Policy Peace-Builders? The failure to Establish
Accountability for the Participation of U.N. Civilian Police in the Trafficking of Women in Post-
Conflict Bosnia and Herzegovina, 34 COLUM. HUM RTs. L. REV. 475, 477 and nn. 10-12, 503 no. 150-
58 (2003).
13. See id. at 505-06 and nn. 159-64.
14. See Elizabeth Abraham, Comment: The Sins of the Savior: Holding the United Nations
Accountable to International Human Rights Standards for Executive Order Detentions in its Mission in
Kosovo, 52 AM. U. L. REV. 1291, 1296 n. 17 (2003).
15. See On the Establishment of Ombudsperson Institution in Kosovo, UN MIK Regulation
2000/38, at 1.1 (June 30, 2000).
16. See generally Abraham, supra note 14, at 1322-37.
17. For an insightful analysis, see August Reinisch, Note and Comment: Developing Human
Rights and Humanitarian Law Accountability of the Security Council for the Imposition of Economic
Sanctions, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 851 (2001)
18. In his Supplement to an Agenda for Peace, Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
acknowledged that an economic sanction is a "blunt instrument," Supplement to an Agenda for Peace,
U.N. Doc. A/50/60-S/1995/1, para. 66 (1995). Hence he called for providing humanitarian assistance to
the potential victims of economic sanctions and, prior to the imposition of such sanctions, to undertake
their impact assessment. Id. para. 70.
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and human rights activists and scholars, 19 but by the United Nations, U.N. organs
and U.N.-related agencies as well, arguing that economic sanctions adversely
affect human rights of civilians in targeted states.
For example, the General Assembly had started adopting resolutions critical
of "unilateral coercive economic measures" in 1989.2° In 2000, the U.N. Human
Rights Commission's Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human
Rights adopted a resolution suggesting that the Security Council permit the import
of food, medical, and pharmaceutical supplies in Iraq.21 The same year a working
paper prepared for the Sub-Commission criticized the U.N. sanctions against Iraq
as "unequivocally illegal" under existing international human rights law and
humanitarian law.22 Also, the monitoring body for the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, its Committee on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights, has expressed concern in its general comments about the impact of
economic sanctions on the enjoyment of human rights.23
The two pertinent questions for discussion here are: (1) while imposing
economic sanctions, what is the accountability of the Security Council to comply
with international human rights law and international humanitarian law? and (2)
what remedies and what mechanisms for the settlements of disputes are available
to the civilian victims of these sanctions?
Regarding the accountability of the Security Council, a literal interpretation of
the U.N. Charter does not provide a clear answer to the question raised about the
obligation of the Security Council to be bound by general international law while it
takes action to maintain or restore international peace and security under its
Chapter VII powers. While the Charter specifies no explicit limitations on the
Security Council's powers acting under Chapter VII, one could argue that the
activities undertaken by the Security Council must be in accord with the purposes
and principles of the U.N. Charter as contained in Article I, combined with the
human rights provisions in the Charter (Preamble, and Articles 1 and 55).
19. See, e.g., Felicia Swindlls, Note: U.N. Sanctions in Haiti: A Contradiction under Articles 41
and 55 of the U.N. Charter, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L. J. 1878 (1997); Joy K. Fausey, COMMENT, Does
the United Nations' Use of Economic Sanctions to Protect Human Rights Violate its own Human Rights
Standards, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 193 (1994); Rene Provost, Starvation as a Weapon: Legal Implications
of the United Nations Food Blockage Against Iraq and Kuwait, 30 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 577
(1992).
20. The first General Assembly resolution criticizing unilateral coercive economic measures was
G.A. Res. 44/215, Dec 22, 1989.
21. U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, Human Rights and Humanitarian Consequences of Sanctions Including Embargoes,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/1 (2000).
22. See U.N. Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of
Human Rights, The Adverse Consequences of Economic Sanctions on the Enjoyment of Human Rights,
U.N. Doc. ECN.4/Sub.2/2000/33 para. 6 (2000). [hereinafter Working Paper].
23. See U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Economic Rights, The Relationship Between
Economic Sanctions and Respect for Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, GENERAL COMMENT 8,
U.N. Doc. E/C.12-1997/8; U.N. Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, The Right to the
Highest Attainable Standard of Health, GENERAL COMMENT 14, U.N. Doc. E/C.12/2000/4 (2000).
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Also, one could make a sound argument that as the United Nations is a
subject of international law, one of its main organs, the Security Council, must
itself be subject to international law, including customary international law and
general principles. Granted that the United Nations, like other international
organizations, is not bound by treaty law to comply with human rights and
humanitarian law because none of these organizations is a party to any human
rights law treaty or humanitarian law treaty. However, in imposing economic
sanctions, the Security Council and its Sanctions Committee cannot derogate from
those international law norms that have acquired the status ofjus cogens, and must
as well comply with customary international law and general principles,
embodying human rights and humanitarian law norms.
Based upon these arguments, the Security Council must ensure that its
imposition of economic sanctions does not adversely affect the enjoyment of
human rights of people in the targeted states. For the Security Council and the
Sanctions Committee which administers sanctions, specific human rights norms
include the right to life, the right to health, and the right to an adequate standard of
living, including the basic human needs such as food, clothing, housing, and
medical care. These norms are contained in several human rights instruments,
primarily among them the International Bill of Human Rights-the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights and the two covenants, the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, and the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights.
Regarding compliance with international humanitarian law, it should be noted
at the onset that the instruments embodying the pertinent international
humanitarian norms-the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the two
Additional Protocols of 1977-apply only in the context of armed conflict and do
not explicitly address economic sanctions. However, as the civilian population's
protection underlies international humanitarian law, humanitarian law norms could
be considered applicable to limit the use of economic sanctions.24
Discussion regarding compensation for damages caused by economic
sanctions imposed by the Security Council have occurred only in the context of
Article 50 of the U.N. Charter, under which any state "confronted with special
economic problems arising from the carrying out of [preventive or enforcement
measures taken by the Security Council] shall have the right to consult the Security
Council with regard to a solution of those problems., 25 However, the working
paper on sanctions mentioned above recommended that claims for damages be
brought before national courts, U.N. or regional human rights organizations, or
even the International Court of Justice. 6 Although there are procedural difficulties
24. For a detailed discussion of both the application of human rights and humanitarian norms, see
Reinisch, supra note 17, at 860-63.
25. See id. at 864.
26. See Working Paper, supra note 22, para. 106
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in invoking the jurisdiction of any of these bodies, especially the International
Court of Justice, we need to explore all available alternatives including mediation
and arbitration. 27 This recommendation applies equally to claims for damages
caused by U.N. peacekeepers.
III. OTHER INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Just as the United Nations enjoys immunity from jurisdiction, most other
international organizations enjoy similar immunity. I will illustrate this point by
referring to arguments before the European Court of Human Rights that a domestic
court had violated the European Convention on Human Rights by granting
immunity from suit to an international organization, the European Space Agency
(ESA).25
The applicants had brought the section before the European Court after their
petition to the European Commission, based on the argument that the German
courts had denied them access to a court to resolve their dispute with the ESA,
which was their right under German labor law. They were actually employees of a
number of British, Irish, French, and Italian companies who had been working for
several years at the European Space Operation Center in Germany at the behest of
their actual employers. Before the German courts they had sought recognition that
pursuant to the applicable German labor laws, they had acquired the status of
employees of the ESA. The German courts had dismissed their actions on the
ground that ESA was immune from jurisdiction pursuant to the ESA Convention.
The European Court first interpreted the pertinent provision of the European
Convention implicated, Article 6(l), which provides: "In the determination of his
civil rights and obligations against him, everyone is entitled to a fair and public
hearing within a reasonable time by an independent and impartial tribunal
established by law." The Court recognized that this article "embodied the right to a
court" and went on to determine whether the German courts' decisions to dismiss
their actions were sufficient to secure the applicants' right to a court.
The Court found no violation of Article 6(1) of the Convention, based upon
its twin reasonings. Initially, it said that to ensure the proper functioning of
international organizations so that they could be free from interference by
individual governments, the immunity from suit enjoyed by international
organizations was a legitimate purpose in restricting the right of access to court.
Second, the Court held that "a material factor in determining whether granting
ESA immunity from German jurisdiction is permissible" was whether "the
applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively
their rights under the Convention." Since the ESA Appeals Board, which has
jurisdiction "to hear disputes relating to any explicit or implicit action taken by the
27. See Reinisch, supra note 17, at 863-69 for a thoughtful discussion on remedies for victims of
U.N. sanctions.
28. See August Reinisch, INTERNATIONAL DECISION: Waite and Kennedy v. Germany
Application No. 26083/94; Beer and Regan v. Germany, Application No 28934/945. European Court of
Human Rights, Feb. 18, 1999, 93 AM. J. INT'L L. 933 (1999). For a detailed discussion, see id. at 933-
38.
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Agency and arising between it and staff members," provided an adequate
alternative forum, the Court found that the test of proportionality, that is, that there
be a reasonable relationship between the means employed and the goal sought to
be accomplished, was met.
IV. 2004 REPORT OF THE ILA COMMITTEE ON THE ACCOUNTABILITY OF
INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
29
In May 1996, the ILA established a committee with the mandate: "to consider
what measures (legal, administrative or otherwise) should be adopted to ensure the
accountability of public international organizations to their members and to third
parties, and of members and third parties to such organizations., 30 After eight
years of work the committee presented its final report in 2004 at the ILA's Berlin
Conference, in which it discussed lOs at three levels:
[First level] the extent to which international organizations, in the fulfillment of
their functions as established in their constituent instruments, are and should be
subject to, or should exercise, forms of internal and external scrutiny and
monitoring, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability and/or
responsibility;
[Second level] tortious liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts or
omissions not involving a breach of any rule of international and/or institutional
law (e.g. environmental damage as a result of lawful nuclear or space activities);
[Third level] responsibility arising out of acts or omissions which do constitute a
breach of a rule of international and/or institutional law (e.g. violations of human
rights, or humanitarian law, breach of contract, gross negligence, or as far as
institutional law is concerned acts of organs which are ultra vires or violate the
law of employment relations).
3 1
29. The report, presented at the 2004 Berlin Conference of the ILA, can be found at
http://www.ila-hq.org/html/layout-committee.htm. Members of the Committee were: Chair Sir Franklin
Berman (UK), Co-Rapporteur Professor Malcolm Shaw (UK), Co-Rapporteur Professor Karel Wellens
(Netherlands), Mr. Dapo Akande (UK), Mr. Tal Becker (Israel), Dr. Niels Blokker (Netherlands), Mr.
Daniel B. Bradlow (USA), Judge Carl-August Fleischhauer (Germany), Professor Vera Gowlland-
Debbas (UK), Dr. Gavan Griffith (Australia), Judge P.H. Kooijmans (Netherlands), Dr. Edward
Kwakwa (HQ), Professor Tiya Maluwa (HQ), Professor Ved P. Nanda (USA), Professor Ki-Gab Park
(Korea), Dr. Mieczyslaw Paszkowski (Poland), Professor August Reinisch (Austria), Professor David
Ruzie (France), Dan Sarooshi (UK), Professor Sabine Schlemmer-Schulte (Germany), Professor Erik
Suy (Belgium-Luxembourg), Professor Jerzy Sztucki (Sweden), Professor Toshiya Ueki (Japan), and
Dr. Eduardo Valencia-Ospina (HQ). Alternates: Ms. Rae Lindsay, Dr. Wolfgang Munch, and Professor
N.D. White.
The Committee had earlier presented its reports in 1998 at the Taipei ILA Conference, in 2000 at its
London Conference, and in 2002 at its New Delhi Conference. See id. at 4.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 5-6.
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The format the committee used to present its report was to provide a set of
"Recommended Rules and Practices" (RRPs) accompanied by commentaries. It
noted at the outset that the RRPs "do not necessarily reflect a legal obligation for
each 10. They are derived from common principles, objectives and notions related
to the accountability of lOs and reflect considerable practice."
32
On the first level, RRPs common to all 1Os include: the principle of good
governance (characterized by, inter alia, transparency in both the decision-making
process and the implementation of institutional and operational decisions,
participatory decision-making process, access to information, a well fumctioning
international civil service, sound financial management, and appropriate reporting
and evaluation mechanisms), the principle of good faith, the principles of
constitutionality and institutional balance, the principle of supervision and control,
the principle of stating the reasons for decisions for a particular course of action,
the principle of procedural regularity, the principle of objectivity and impartiality,
and the principle of due diligence. 33 RRPs on the relationship between 1Os and
NGOs include establishing appropriate relationships by the lOs with NGOs active
within their field of competence, including establishing an NGO liaison service
and holding briefings with their representatives.34
On the second level of accountability, addressing liability and responsibility
issues, the Committee noted first the International Court of Justice's advisory
opinion, which stated that: "international organizations are subjects of international
law, and as such are bound by any obligations incumbent on them under general
rules of international law. 35 The Committee also stated:
A transfer of powers to an 10 cannot remove acts of the 10 from the ambit of
control mechanisms established by particular treaties nor can it exclude the
responsibility of States who transferred power to an 10. States should "make
provision that a potential jurisdictional gap concerning the control of the
exercise of such transferred powers do not arise."
' 36
The Committee stated that where an IO's acts caused personal injury to state
officials or damage to state property, international law governs the tortious liability
of the 1O. As to personal injury to a non-state party or damage to such a party's
property, local law is to govern unless the activity constitutes a breach by the
organization of an applicable rule of international law. 3 7 The international
organization "should assess the potential damage" which its activities may cause;
the 1O should also take appropriate precautionary measures to prevent unnecessary
damage and should use precautionary principles before undertaking operational
activities involving a risk of causing significant harm to the environment. 31 In the
32. Id. at 9.
33. Id. at 9-18.
34. Id. at 20.
35. Id. at 21 (quoting Interpretation of the Agreement of 25 March 1951 between the WHO and
Egypt, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1980, at 73, 90).
36. Id. at 22 (citations omitted).
37. Id. at 25.
38. Id. at 25-27.
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ACCOUNTABILITY OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
Committee's RRP stating that 1Os "should comply with basic human rights
obligations," the commentary adds that lOs should observe basic human rights
obligations in their decisions such as "designing structural adjustment programmes
and development projects," and that in their decisions "concerning the use of force,
temporary administration of territory, imposition of coercive measures, launching
of peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operations lOs should observe basic human
rights obligations and applicable principles and rules of international humanitarian
law.
, ,39
On the third level of accountability, the Committee noted the current state of
international law, which presents dilemmas in establishing a responsibility regime
for IOs. 40 However, it does provide guidelines on the international legal
responsibility of IOs. 41 It also discusses attribution of wrongful acts to lOs and
responsibilities of states for defaults or wrongful acts of an 10 and such attribution
and responsibility in situations of delegation and authorization.42
The Committee provides detailed RRPs on remedies against international
organizations. It moves from general features of remedies and the pertinent
question, "remedial action against whom?" to the potential outcome of remedial
action.43 It then discusses the procedural aspects of remedial action against IOs-
by states, staff members, and private claimants, including contractual liability
claims and tort liability claims-and claims against officials and experts.44 It
specifically states that lOs should establish an insurance mechanism to address
third-party liability claims.45 It also addresses the issue of jurisdictional immunity
of lOs and states that lOs' duties entail "an obligation to disclose information and
documents directly held by it.
' 46
The Committee discusses substantive outcomes of remedial actions by lOs
and provides guidelines on non-judicial remedial action and judicial remedial
action, specifically detailing the role of international administrative tribunals,
domestic courts, and arbitration proceedings.47 The only issue on which the
Committee was not unanimous was the role for the International Court of Justice
(ICJ).
While some members were strongly in favor of the ICJ having a role to ensure
accountability, others did not consider it to be practical or even desirable. 48 Thus,
the Committee included the proposals on the ICJ in the appendix.49
39. Id. at 27-28.
40. Id. at 31-33.
41. Id. at 33-34.
42. Id. at 34-38
43. Id. at 40-44.
44. Id at 45-49.
45. Id. at 48.
46. Id. at 51.
47. Id. at 53-59.
48. Id. at 59-60.
49. Id. 61-63.
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V. CONCLUSION
The last few years have witnessed an increasing demand and some movement
toward ensuring that lOs take concrete steps to ensure their accountability. The
work of professional and scholarly organizations such as the International Law
Association and the American Society of International Law has provided valuable
guidance on the difficult issues implicated in the accountability debate. The next
important step will be for the U.N. International Law Commission to provide a
detailed study on the subject.




Since the U.S.-led "coalition of willing"' invaded Iraq and toppled the
Saddam Hussein regime, Iraq has effectively been under the control of the
Coalition forces.2 One can argue that the Iraqi territory is under belligerent
occupation pursuant to international law.? As an occupying power, the United
States and its allies are vigorously attempting to reconstruct Iraq and eradicate the
sources of threat to international peace and security.4 Among politicians and
academics around the world, the legality of the war in Iraq was perhaps the single
most controversial issue in the year 2003.5 States opposing the attack on Iraq
invoked the principles of the U.N. Charter,6 while those supporting the cause of the
war based their arguments on numerous U.N. Security Council7 resolutions and the
* Partner with Woo, Yun, Kang, Jeong & Han (Seoul, Korea). LL.M, JSD, Seoul National University
College of Law; LL.M, JSD, Yale Law School. He is a member of both Korean and New York Bar
Associations. He was associated with Steptoe & Johnson (Washington, DC) and taught at Georgetown
Law School. He also worked at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade and regularly advises the
Korean government on international trade issues. He is very grateful to invaluable comments from
Dong Soo Chung, Esq. and Jun-Shik Whang. He can be reached at yjjung@wooyun.co.kr
1. See Steve Schifferes, US Names 'Coalition of the Willing,' BBC NEWS, available at
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/2862343.stm (last visited Jan.7, 2003) The United States'
government lists forty eight countries in their "Coalition of the Willing. Coalition Members, at
http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2003/03/20030327- 10.html. (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
2. See Jordan J. Paust, ASIL Insights: The U.S. as Occupying Power over Portion of Iraq and
Relevant Responsibilities Under the Laws of War, at http://www.asil.org/insights/insighl02.htm (last
visited Jan. 7, 2004).
3. See Id. (explaining the primacy of fact as the test of whether or not occupation exists). The
regulations concerning the laws and customs of war on land annexed to the Hague Convention of 1899
stipulate that territory is considered occupied when it is actually placed under the authority of the
hostile army.
4. Dana Milbank & Robin Wright, Off the Mark on Cost of War, Reception by Iraqis, WASH.
POST, March 19, 2004, at Al.
5. The debates mainly concern the interpretation of relevant U.N. resolutions and the legality of
pre-emptive self-defense. See generally Thomas M. Franck, What Happens Now? The United Nations
After Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 607 (2003); Michael Kelly, Time Warp to 1945 - Resurrection of Reprisal
and Anticipatory Self-Defense Doctrines in International Law, 13 J. TRANSNAT'L L. & POL'Y 1 (2003);
Ronald C. Santopadre, Note, Deterioration Of Limits On The Use of Force and Its Perils: A Rejection
Of The Kosovo Precedent, 18 ST. JOHN'S J. LEGAL COMMENT. 369 (2003); Miriam Sapiro, Iraq: The
Shifting Sands of Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 599 (2003); Ruth Wedgwood, The Fall of
Saddam Hussein: Security Council Mandates and Preemptive Self-Defense, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 576
(2003); John Yoo, International Law and the War in Iraq, 97 AM. J. INT'L L. 563 (2003).
6. See, e.g. Franck supra note 5, at 611-12 (rejecting the U.S. arguments that the invasion of
Iraq was authorized by Security Council resolutions).
7. See id. at 608.
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allegedly imminent threat of the Hussein government that justified the use of force
in self-defense.8 It is even suggested that international law should accept a new
paradigm of "collective duty" to prevent unruly regimes from threatening global
security with weapons of mass destruction (WMD). 9
However, there is another important question that one needs to address: how
to end the war. There seems to be a long way to go before peace and stability
replace the current turmoil in Iraq, and the intermittent violence directed against
the occupying powers ceases. 10 Nevertheless, the challenge of restoring public
order and safety has come to the forefront, which appropriately leads to question,
"How does the Coalition end the war?"
The main motivation for the United States and its allies was to remove the
"alleged threat" to international peace and security posed by the former Iraqi
leader, Saddam Hussein, in the form of his ostensible WMD programs. 1 No one
would deny that the future reconstruction of Iraq should be aimed at enabling the
Iraqi people to freely pursue freedom and economic recovery. Moreover, the new
Iraq needs to address the issue of the long-standing divisions among diverse
internal sectarian groups, the Shi'ites, the Sunnis, and the Kurds, in order to build a
stable social and political structure serving the peoples' needs. 12 Therefore, the
dual tasks of (1) completely eliminating all sources of threat and (2) reconstructing
Iraq to serve the interest of its people are fundamental issues to address. The
answer to the question "how to end the war?" may be found by undertaking a
thorough analysis of the legal implications of belligerent occupation. This is
appropriate since the current occupation is at a critical phase during which a new
foundation for the political and social systems will soon be established in the
devastated country.
The law of belligerent occupation provides a basic framework to determine
how, and to what extent, the rights of the Iraqi people should be protected as the
war nears its end. As the occupying power builds a new political and social
structure for Iraq, close attention must be directed to the Iraqi people's choices and
preferences. This U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1511 on October 16,
8. See Wedgwood, supra note 5, at 578-82 (supporting the exercise of the right of preemptive
self-defense against Iraq); Yoo, supra note 5, at 567-74.
9. See Lee Feinstein & Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Duty to Prevent, FOREIGN AFF., Jan./Feb. 2004,
at 136 (proposing a collective "duty to prevent nations run by rulers without internal checks on their
power from acquiring or using WMD").
10. See The Tyrant in Chains, THE ECONOMIST, Dec. 16, 2003, at
http://www.economist.com/opinion/PrinterFriendly.cfm? StoryID=2295809 (explaining that, although
Saddam Hussein was captured by the United States, the violence shows no sign of abating).
11. See BOB WOODWARD, BUSH AT WAR 349-52 (2002).
12. See Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi 'ites and the Future of Iraq, FOREIGN AFF., July/Aug. 2003, at 17
(explaining the history of Iraq, with a focus on the political division between the Shi'ites and the
Sunnis); Middle East: Iraqi Sunnis Feel Marginalized Under New U.S. Order, IPS-INTER PRESS
SERVICE, Dec 23, 2003, available at LEXIS, News Library, IPS-Inter Press Service file (explaining the
composition of the 25-member interim Iraqi Governing Council (IGC) is already raising a




2003.13 The Resolution reaffirms the "right of the Iraqi people freely to determine
their own political future and control their own natural resources."' 4 Although the
Resolution does not explicitly mention the term 'self-determination,' it strongly
implies that self-determination is at issue. 5 In other words, one is faced with the
question of how to accommodate the right to self-determination within the context
of belligerent occupation.
The concept of self-determination was not salient at the time of conclusion of
the Hague' 6 and the Geneva Conventions 7 concerning the laws and customs of
war, which sought to regulate the status of the occupying powers.' 8 In fact, the
self-determination theory was once denounced as political rhetoric.' 9 Throughout
the twentieth century, however, the international community has gradually
accepted this theory as one of the most robust principles of international law.20 It
is even believed to constitute a part ofjus cogens.2' Therefore, one needs to raise
and answer the question of self-determination in every belligerent occupation
context.
This article examines the rules of belligerent occupation and the status of the
right to self-determination in the contemporary era, focuses on their mutual
relationship at a normative level, and proposes that the right to self-determination
should be regarded as an important factor when applying the laws of belligerent
occupation. The article also argues that the right of the people to self-
determination will limit the options of the occupying powers in managing the
political process in the occupied territory.
13. S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 4844th mtg. at 1, U.N. Doc. S/Res/1511 (2003).
14. Id.
15. See Thomas D. Grant, The Security Council and Iraq: An Incremental Practice, 97 AM. J.
INT'L L. 823, 841-42 (2003).
16. See generally Hague Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land, Annex,
Oct. 18, 1907, 36 Stat. 2277 [hereinafter "Hague Convention of 1907].
17. See generally, Geneva Convention, Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons
in Time of War, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516 [hereinafter the "Geneva Convention of 1949"].
18. Halim Moris, Self-Determination: An Affirmative Right Or Mere Rhetoric? 4 ILSA J. INT'L
& COMP. L. 201, 202-03 (1997) (describing the major emergence of self-determination theory in 1916,
after the conventions of 1899 and 1907).
19. Id. at 202; Deborah Z. Cass, Rethinking Self-Determination: A Critical Analysis of Current
International Law Theories, 18 SYRACUSE J. INT'L L. & COM. 21, 26 (1992).
20. Mitchell A. Hill, What The Principle of Self-Determination Means Today, I ILSA J. INT'L &
COMP. L. 119, 120-23 (1995).
21. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10, at 207-
08, U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001).
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II. STATUS OF BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
1. Modern rules relevant for belligerent occupation
The earliest government codification of the laws of the war was the famous
Lieber Code, which was issued by the U.S. government in 1863.22 Modem
international law on belligerent occupation can be found in the 1907 Hague
Convention IV,23 "[r]especting the Laws and Customs of War on Land" together
with its Regulations, and the 1949 Geneva Convention (W),24 along with the 1977
Geneva Protocol 1.25 The Hague Peace Conferences in 1899 and 1907 resulted in
the conclusion of the Hague Conventions, which serve as "a general rule of
conduct for the belligerents in their mutual relations and in their relations with the
inhabitants. 26 The Hague Regulations annexed to the Convention also contain
provisions regulating belligerent occupation.27
World Wars I and II made it clear that a more comprehensive set of
international laws was necessary in order to prevent atrocities aimed at civilians
from occurring during hostilities.28 The Fourth Geneva Convention reflected such
an awareness of the international community.29 Today, the Convention is said to
apply universally as part of general international law.30 Although human rights
law was not a main theme of international law at the time the Fourth Geneva
Convention was concluded, the Convention is generally known as a "bill of rights"
for the people in occupied territories because it focuses on the protection of
civilians, rather than on the rights of the states engaged in war.
31
Article 3 provides for the minimum guarantee for fundamental human
rights,32 and Articles 27 through 34 specifically provide for the rights of
individuals.3 3 The rules in the Convention that relate to occupied territories also
reflect the need to protect civilians in such territories.34
22. Burrus M. Carnahan, Lincoln, Lieber and the Laws of War: The Origin and Limits of the
Principle of Military Necessity, 92 AM. J. INT'L. L. 213, 213 (1998); PETER MALANCZUK,
AKEHURST'S MODERN INTRODUCTION TO INTERNATIONAL LAW 344 (1997); Ardi Imseis,
On the Fourth Geneva Convention and The Occupied Palestinian Territory, 44 HARV. INT'L L.J. 65,
87 (2003).
23. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, § 1, Ch. 1, art. 1-3, 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T.
LEXIS 29, at 17-18.
24. Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 17, part 1, art. 2, 6 U.S.T. 3516,, at 1949 U.S.T.
LEXIS 484, at 2.
25. Imseis, supra note 22, at 89-92; Davis P. Goodman, The Need for Fundamental Change in the
Law of Belligerent Occupation, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1573, 1577 (1985).
26. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, pmbl., 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at
4.
27. Id. § III, arts. 42-56.
28. Imseis, supra note 22, at 89.
29. MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 113.
30. Id.
31. Suzanne Nossel, Winning the Postwar, LEGAL AFF., May/June 2003, at 18, 20. (explaining
that the Geneva Conventions of 1949 were intended to empower the local population under occupation).
32. Paust, supra note 2.
33. Id.
34. Geneva Convention of 1949, supra note 17, §111, art. 27-34, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 1949 U.S.T.
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DOES SELF-DETERMINATION MAT'IER?
What underlies the law of belligerent occupation is the idea that belligerent
occupation is a temporary condition, during which the belligerent occupant acts
only as the de facto administrative authority. 35 This thought is in line with the
Rousseau-Portales doctrine, which asserts that war is about sovereigns and armies,
not about subjects and civilians.36 Article 43 of the Hague Convention reiterates
the provisional nature of belligerent occupation because it obligates the occupant
to respect the laws that are in force in the occupied country.3 7
Belligerent occupation does not bring about any changes in sovereignty. The
ousted sovereign still retains de jure sovereignty.38 The occupant assumes only de
facto control over the occupied territory without acquiring any sovereign rights or
entitlement.39 The Hague Convention envisaged short-term occupations before the
conclusion of a peace treaty. 4° The occupying power should respect and maintain
the existing laws in force in the occupied territory. 41 According to Article 55, the
occupying state is to be "regarded only as administrator and usufructuary of public
buildings, real estates, forests, and agricultural estates belonging to the hostile
State, and situated in the occupied country. ' ' 2
Since the Fourth Geneva Convention was not intended to replace the Hague
Conventions, the Hague rules continue to apply to belligerent occupation.4 3 Article
4 of Protocol I to the Geneva Convention reaffirms that the occupation of a
territory does not affect the legal status of the territory in question. 44 Modem
international law has established rules on the comprehensive prohibition of the use
of force, but the law of belligerent occupation is still valid. Furthermore, it is
suggested that Hague and Geneva Conventions declare and constitute customary
international law.45 Irrespective of the legality a particular instance of the use of
force, the laws of war and belligerent occupation reflected in such Conventions are
binding on all parties to armed conflicts.46
2. Belligerent Occupation: An analogy with overthrowing a legitimate
government
In considering the rights of the people under belligerent occupation, two
possibilities for comparison come forward. One is the accession of power by a de
LEXIS 484, at 21-24.
35. Goodman, supra note 25, at1581; Imseis, supra note 22, at 91.
36. Goodman, supra note 25, at 1579.
37. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, T.S. No. 539.
38. Goodman, supra note 25, at 1580.
39. Id.
40. Nossel, supra note 31, at 18 (explaining the temporary nature of the belligerent occupation).
41. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, art. 43., 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29,
at 37.
42. Id.,art. 45, 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at 37.
43. Imseis, supra note 22, at 89-90.
44. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol 1, June 8, 1977, art. 4, 1151 U.N.T.S.
423.
45. IAN BROWNLIE, PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW 12-13 (4th ed. 1990).
46. See MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 342-46.
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reie 47 Teohri elgrnfacto government after dismantling the previous regime. The other is belligerent
occupation and accession of power by a de facto government involving the
subversion of the existing regime.48 Another useful comparison treats belligerent
occupation similar to colonial rule. This comparison works because colonial rule
entails foreign domination, as it was practiced in Asia and Africa during the early
twentieth century, in a manner akin to a belligerent occupying force.
These comparisons lead us to focus on the issue of self-determination as such.
A de facto government implies the notion of "internal" self-determination,49 since
the government in question often assumes that there has been a change of political
power, although on an unconstitutional basis. Constitutionality is not an absolute
or a dominant standard by which the will of people is to be measured, but such a
change of political power begs the question: what do the people desire? Colonial
rule is related to "external" self-determination, a principle by which a people's
status in, and relations with, the international society should be determined on its
own. The modem principle of self-determination was formulated as a result of the
global process of decolonization after World War 1. 50 Thus, political conditions
similar to those of people under colonial rule should be examined in the context of
self-determination.
When the law of belligerent occupation was codified in the international
forum during the early twentieth century, 51 the principle of self-determination had
yet to be recognized as a legal right. It was only after numerous resolutions by the
U.N. General Assembly that the self-determination principle seemed to have
gained the minimum level of opinio juris.52 The laws of belligerent occupation
and the right of self-determination developed independently of each other in
different historical and legal contexts. No matter how temporary belligerent
occupation is in nature, it denies the people the right to their own government.
Those occupied people have not given their prior consent and, therefore, the
consideration of the principle of self-determination in this context is relevant.
Before looking into the possible nexus between belligerent occupation and self-
determination, it is necessary to examine the modem position of law on the latter.
47. A de facto government here, as opposed to de jure government, refers to a situation where
state power goes through abrupt changes by unconstitutional process such as military coup d'etat or
revolutions.
48. Belligerent occupation is regulated by the rules in The Hague Conventions and Regulations
and the Geneva Conventions, while de facto government is related to the law of recognition of
government and the principle of non-intervention into domestic affairs. BROwNLIE, supra note 45, at
90-92.
49. Internal self-determination is about people's choice of their own political system within
national boundaries. See ROSALYN HIGGINS, PROBLEMS & PROCESS: INTERNATIONAL LAW AND How
WE USE IT, 117 (1994).
50. Lung-Chu Chen, Self-Determination and World Public Order, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1287,
1288 (1991).
51. See Goodman, supra note 25, at 1577-79 (describing how the modem rules of belligerent
occupation have evolved in international law).




The principle of self-determination, with its historical origin in the making of
nation-states, 3 is a relatively new concept in international law.54 Only after the
nineteenth century was the principle of self determination recognized as a
substantial political right on the global stage.55 At the end of the World War I,
Woodrow Wilson emphasized the importance of self-determination as a
fundamental principle for establishing long-lasting peace.5 6 The principle of self-
determination, however, did not receive widespread recognition at that time.57 The
League of Nations did not mention the principle of self-determination and refused
to apply this principle to the territories which were under Allied occupation after
World War 1.58 Furthermore, in the Aaland controversy, the International
Commission of Jurists issued an advisory opinion contending that "the right of
national groups... to separate themselves from the state" did not form part of
positive international law.59
After World War II, the U.N. Charter explicitly referred to the "principle of
equal rights and self-determination of peoples." 6 Through Articles 1 and 55 of the
Charter, self-determination together with the equal rights of peoples, constitute a
common principle but, as Rosalyn Higgins contends, the U.N. Charter does not
confer self-determination with an absolute status.6 ' The Charter is concerned
about the "rights of the peoples of one state to be protected from interference by
other states... .'62 However, the articles on non-self-governing territories and
international trusteeship do not contain the phrase "self-determination. 63  Self-
53. Chen, supra note 50, at 1288 (explaining that the concept of self-determination was born in
the 16th century with the emergence of the nation states).
54. In the nineteenth century, John Stuart Mill, in his essay "A Few Words on Non-Intervention,"
defended the self-determination of a community, probably on the same premises concerning personal
autonomy and freedom. See Michael J. Glennon, Self-Determination and Cultural Diversity, 27
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 75, 75-76 (2003) (stating that the defense of community autonomy may
actually undermine the personal autonomy when an oppressive community is protected against outside
intervention).
55. Eric Kolodner, The Future of the Right to Self-Determination, 10 CONN. J. INT'L L. 153, 154-
55 (1994) (explaining that, as the principles of the new international order became more developed after
the formation of the United Nations, self-determination attained the status of an international legal
right).
56. Hill, supra note 20, at 121-22.
57. Id. Wilson's effort resulted only in "allowing for the adoption of special treaties for the
protection of minorities." J. Oloka-Onyango, Heretical Reflections on the Right to Self-Determination:
Prospects and Problems for a Democratic Global Future in the New Millennium, 15 AM. U. INT'L L.
REv. 151, 159-60 (1999).
58. Hill, supra note 20, at 122.
59. Ved P. Nanda, Revisiting Self-Determination as an International Law Concept: A Major
Challenge in the Post-Cold War Era, 3 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 447 (1997) (quoting LEAGUE OF
NATIONS O.J., Spec. Supp. 1, at 5 (1920)).
60. U.N. CHARTER art.l, para. 2 and art 55.
61. Higgins explains that the concept of self-determination in the U.N. Charter did not include a
right of dependent peoples to independence. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 112.
62. Id.
63. There is only a reference to 'self government;' it is sometimes said that the U.N. Charter
'implicitly' recognized the right to self-determination of peoples under colonial rules but such an
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determination was neither about a legal right nor about dependent peoples. Many
jurists and governments seem to view self-determination, though enshrined in the
Charter, as a political fagade.64
The practice of the U.N. bodies made self-determination a part of the law of
the United Nations. 65 In the 1950s, the U.N. General Assembly began to accept
self-determination as a right of the people. 66 The rise of self-determination to a
status of an enforceable legal right of "peoples" materialized as a result of the
decolonization process. 67 The "Declaration on Granting Independence to Colonial
Countries and Peoples" was adopted by the U.N. General Assembly as a non-
binding resolution in 1961.68 That Declaration provided that all people under
colonial rule have the right to "freely determine their political status," which is
essentially the right to self-determination. 69  The 1960 Declaration, while
acknowledging the right to self-determination, emphasizes the territorial integrity
of states.70 Although the colonial powers resisted the idea of self-determination as
a legal right, the right of people to decolonization became widely pervasive.71
Resolutions adopted by the U.N. General Assembly are not legally binding on
member states but can be accepted as constituting or evidencing opinio juris.
Moreover, in one academic opinion, the Declaration of 1960 serves as "an
authoritative interpretation of the Charter."
72
It should be noted that self-determination became a right of the people and not
of a state. This distinction is clearer in the development of human rights law. The
two human rights covenants of 1966-the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights and the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural
Rights-include the right to self-determination in their respective first articles.73
This inclusion implies that self-determination is a human right existing outside of
the specific historical context of decolonization.74
interpretation seems to be based on what Higgins refers to as an incorrect 'popular assumption'. See id.
64. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 554. Brownlie says self-determination referred to in the U.N.
Charter was regarded as merely of hortatory effect, while Higgins goes a little further by stating that it
was not even about dependent peoples. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 112-14.
65. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 554.
66. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 113; Cass, supra note 19, at 24-26 (stating that the acceptance of
self-determination was reflected in the U.N. Charter and a series of resolutions adopted by the General
Assembly).
67. Chen, supra note 50, at 1289.
68. G.A. Res. 1514, U.N. GAOR, 15th Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 66, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1961).
69. Id.
70. This emphasis on territorial integrity is relied on by many who object to a right to secession of
a minority group within a state. See HIGGINS supra note 49, at 124; Derege Demissie, Self-
Determination Including Secession vs. The Territorial Integrity of Nation-States: A Prima Facie Case
for Secession, 20 SUFFOLK TRANSNAT'L L. REv. 165, 169 (1996).
71. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 113.
72. See Taryn Ranae Tomasa, Comment, Ho'Olahui: The Rebirth of A Nation, 5 ASIAN L.J. 247,
263 (1998).
73. G.A. Res. 2200, U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966).
74. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 114-15.
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General Assembly Resolution 2625, the "Declaration of Principles on
Friendly Relations," which was adopted in 1970,75 is another important document
emphasizing the right to self-determination. Self-determination was pronounced to
take various forms: it may be "independence," "free association," "integration with
an independent state," or "emergence into any other political status. '
76  The
essential idea to note is that people are given a choice.77 The Declaration of 1970
states that self-determination is not only a right to decolonization, but also a right
781
to be free from foreign domination.
Nothing in the Friendly Relations Declaration is to be construed to undermine
"the territorial integrity or political unity of sovereign or independent states [that
are] conducting themselves in compliance with the principle of... self-
determination and thus possessed of a government representing the whole people
belonging to the territory. '79 This language in the Declaration seems to result in a
couple of different interpretations. In one view, the wording seems to suggest the
principle of democracy, or 'internal' self-determination. 80 A more extreme way of
interpreting the Declaration can be drawn from the proposition that supports the
supremacy of the right to secession over territorial integrity in instances of
government oppression and harassment of minorities within its national
boundaries.
Self-determination beyond the context of decolonization has been a source of
trouble for some countries and has been a subject of heated debates.8' The issue
has been presented in the form of opposition between respect for territorial
integrity of states and the right of self-determination, including the right to
secede. 2 States challenged with issues of minority factions within their territorial
75. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970).
76. Id.
77. Hill, supra note 20, at 128; Eric Ting-lun Huang, The Evolution of the Concept of Self-
Determination And the Right of the People of Taiwan to Self-Determination, 14 N.Y. NT'L L. REV.
167, 193 (2001).
78. See HiGGINs, supra note 49, at 116 (referring to foreign domination reflected the situations in
Palestine and Afghanistan).
79. G.A. Res. 2625, U.N. GAOR, 25th Sess., Supp. No. 17, at U.N. Doc. A/5217 (1970).
80. Nanda, supra note 59, at 445-46 (noting that internal self-determination refers to a democratic
form of government with wider participation).
81. Steve R. Ratner, Drawing a Better Line: Uti Possidetis And the Borders of New States, 90 AM.
J. INT'L L. 590 (1996).
82. Self-determination and secession are intertwined with the concept of uti possidetis. Uti
possidetis, which provides that "states emerging from decolonization shall inherit the colonial
administrative borders that they held at the time of independence," served as a useful guideline for those
seeking liberation from colonial rule, but may at the same time endanger global order by leaving certain
minority groups unstable and stimulating secessionist movements. See id.
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borders fear that the principle of self-determination might motivate minority
groups to pursue secession. 83 The United Nations, however, has been resolute and
consistent in excluding secession from the right to self-determination.
84
The jurisprudence of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) is another
authoritative source in favor of the right to self-determination. In an advisory
opinion on Namibia, the ICJ stated that self-determination was made applicable to
all people as a result of "the subsequent development of international law" on non-
self-governing territories. 85 In the Western Sahara case, the ICJ also endorsed the
right of the people to determine their political status by their "freely expressed
will."
86
More recent pronouncements are present in the East Timor case.87 In 1991,
Portugal, as the administering power of East Timor, instituted proceedings against
Australia concerning the latter's activities with respect to East Timor.88 Portugal
asked the ICJ to declare that Australia had failed to respect the duties of Portugal
as the administering power and the right of the people of East Timor to self-
determination.89
The ICJ dismissed Portugal's claims on the ground that in the absence of the
consent of Indonesia, a third state, accepting the application would violate the
rights and obligations of Indonesia.90 In its judgment, however, the ICJ declared
that self-determination is "one of the essential principles of contemporary
83. Self-determination has inspired bitter debates on secession of minorities. For example,
secession of Bangladesh is an exceptional case to some. Nanda, supra note 59, at 450. Some others,
however, regard it as an example of secession by the operation of a right to self-determination. Chen,
supra note 50, at 1292-93. The dissolution of the former Soviet Union and experiences in Eastern
Europe has added to the controversy. The view supporting right to secession based on the interpretation
of the Declaration of 1970 seems a little flawed. Apart from the Declaration of 1970, which is legally
non-binding in itself, there is not enough state practice supporting a right to secession, and the principle
of territorial integrity seems to prevail over such a putative right. A more appropriate approach may be
that secession is regarded as one political option to protect certain minority group in extreme
circumstances. It is one thing to suggest secession as a legal right, and another to suggest it as a political
alternative.
84. This determination probably reflects the weight carried by the principle of territorial integrity
in the U.N. Charter. Also, it may be that the threat of rampant secession endangers international peace
and security; the very values the United Nations was created to protect. See Kolodner, supra note 55, at
159-60 (stating that granting the right to secede would produce a highly fragmented and politically
unstable international system).
85. Advisory Opinion on Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South
Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), 1971
I.C.J. 16 (June 21).
86. Western Sahara, 1971 I.C.J. Reports 12 (Oct. 16).
87. Concerning East Timor (Port. v. Austl.), 1995 I.C.J. 90 (June 30).
88. Natalie S. Klein, Multilateral Disputes and the Doctrine of Necessary Parties in the East
Timor Case, 21 YALE J. INT'L L. 305, 305-11 (1996) (explaining that the core of the dispute was
Indonesia's military invasion of the former Portuguese colony of Timor in 1975).
89. Concerning East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 92.
90. This was the result of application of the so-called Monetary Gold principle. Under the
principle, the ICJ cannot adjudicate a dispute where the interests of a state not consenting to the court's
jurisdiction constitute the very subject matter of the dispute. Klein, supra note 88, at 313.
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international law."91 Portugal asserted that the rights of people to self-
determination had an erga omnes character, meaning that the rights involve the
obligations to the international community as a whole. 92 The ICJ was of the
opinion that Portugal's argument was "irreproachable."
93
The ICJ did not give its opinions on the implications of the erga omnes
character of self-determination. However, many academics regard the principle of
self-determination as a jus cogens norm in modem international law.94 The
tendency to label self-determination as jus cogens reflects the position of modem
law on the comprehensive prohibition of colonization by the use or the threat of
force. However, labeling is not the end of the problem. As the exact boundaries of
self-determination are controversial,95 so too is the result of giving the principle of
self-determination a special status in international law.96 Another important aspect
of self-determination is that it forms one factor that constitutes the theory of
democratic governance in international law.97 According to Thomas Franck, self-
determination "has evolved into a more general notion of internationally validated
political consultation., 98 This line of argument places more emphasis on internal
self-determination than on its external aspect relating to decolonization and
91. Concerning East Timor, 1995 I.C.J. at 102. In his separate opinion, Judge Vereshchetin
stressed the importance of the views of the people of East Timor with regard to the whole case.
According to his analysis, after the adoption of the Declaration of 1960 on the Granting of
Independence, the Administering Power has a duty to consult the people of a non-self-governing
territory when "the matter at issue directly concerned that people." Separate Opinion of Judge
Vereshchetin, id. at 138.
92. Portugal aimed to show that the 'Monetary Gold' principle was not applicable in a case where
rights erga omnes were at issue, but the Court did not accept the argument, stating the erga omnes
character of a norm and the rule of consent to jurisdiction were "two different things ". Id. at 102.
93. Id.
94. Jus cogens, a peremptory norm, has a firm place in modem international law. According to
Article 53 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (1969), "a peremptory norm of general
international law is a norm accepted and recognized by the international community of States as a
whole as a norm from which no derogation is permitted and which can be modified only by a
subsequent norm of general international law having the same character." Vienna Convention on the
Law of Treaties, Nov. 8, 1972, art. 53, 23 U.S.T. 3227, 3237, 8 I.L.M. 679, 698, The International Law
Commission (ILC) states that a right to self-determination is one of few accepted peremptory norms of
international law. Report of the International Law Commission, U.N. GAOR, 56th Sess., Supp. No. 10,
supra note 21, at 208, at U.N. Doc. A/56/10 (2001). According to the ILC, jus cogens and erga omnes
rules are almost identical, only with different focuses. While peremptory norms of general international
law focus on the scope and priority to be given to a certain number of fundamental obligations, the
focus of obligations to the international community as a whole is essentially on the legal interest of all
States in compliance being entitled to invoke the responsibility of any State in breach. Id. at 277-78.
95. Many questions remain unanswered: Is self-determination only about independence, or is it a
principle of a continuing application? Do minorities have the right to secession under circumstances?
96. For example, are the rights of minorities to secession also ajus cogens norm? If so, what is the
status of the principle of territorial integrity of states? It is also related to other fundamental principles
such as human rights and international peace. Is the exercise of self-determination that violates human
rights acceptable? Or, is the use of force in pursuit of self-determination justifiable?
97. See Thomas M. Franck, The Emerging Right to Democratic Governance, 86 AM. J. INT'L L.
46 (1992) (explaining that the entitlement to democracy in international law has its root in the
normative entitlement to self-determination).
98. Id. at 55.
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nationalism. In other words, self-determination is associated with the victory of
liberal democracy all over the world. Self-determination, however, is also said to
have contributed to the "undemocratic climate in which ethnic-nationalism.., has
blossomed into a new, totally credible force" in international politics.99
Ill. SELF-DETERMINATION AND BELLIGERENT OCCUPATION
Applicability of self-determination in the context of belligerent occupation
As demonstrated above self-determination is not an idealistic, rhetorical
slogan but a legal right stemming from specific historical experience. The
principle, as it stands now, is a legal invention produced to deal with the
decolonization process after the establishment of the United Nations.100 It is not a
sacred, God-given right of natural law but a legal conception that resulted from
historical struggles and compromises. It is noteworthy that even the U.N. Charter,
one of the most important instruments for the protection of human rights, failed to
directly associate self-determination with decolonization and national liberation.
10 1
Therefore, it may be rather demanding to state that everyone is entitled to the right
to self-determination under all circumstances. Nevertheless, contemporary
belligerent occupation may serve as an appropriate setting for the application of the
established doctrine of self-determination.
The right of people to self-determination may be realized in many forms,
including independence and association with other groups in a federal or non-
federal state.1 0 2 In this regard, a theoretical question arises: "Is self-determination
to be regarded as 'consumed' once a choice is made?" In case of association, this
turns into a controversy on whether the right to self-determination includes a right
to secession.1 0 3  A more general aspect of the question surfaces when people
choose to establish an independent state, a decision that most peoples have actually
made.' 4 Then, is self-determination exhausted once independence is achieved? It
may be said that from the moment when independence is achieved, sovereignty
and equal rights of a state start to take effect.10 5 A state is given sovereign rights
and legal guarantees under international law. In the normal conduct of state
affairs, then, does self-determination disappear? The answer is no.
99. Russell A. Miller, Self-determination in International Law and the Demise of Democracy?, 41
COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 601, 608 (2003).
100. Kolodner, supra note 55, at 155 (explaining the development of the concept of self-
determination after the World War II).
101. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 111-12 (stating that the U.N. Charter focused on the right of the
sovereign member states).
102. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 553.
103. Where a people chose to associate with other groups in an existing state, the right of that
people to self-determination should probably be regarded as assimilated to the right of the whole people
of that state. The right to secession is not about continuous applicability of self-determination, but about
who is entitled to self-determination.
104. HIGINS, supra note 49, at 113-14.
105. See U.N. CHARTER, arts.l(2), 55.
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International law confers equal sovereignty upon a state-a state is a
'subject,' or a distinct actor of international law. 0 6 Sovereign rights are given to a
state, which is different from 'people' in the eyes of international law.'0 7 On the
contrary, self-determination is a right of the people, not of a state, and the right
continues to exist as long as that group of people exists, whether they constitute a
state governing entity or whether that group remains under colonial rule. 10 8 It may
be said that the sovereignty of a state and the right of people to self-determination
exist in parallel with each other. When the sovereignty of a state is invoked
against colonialism, the right of people to self-determination is to be invoked as
well. In this type of scenario, the right to self-determination would come to the
forefront, although such a situation cannot legally destroy sovereignty of an
occupied state. In short, the right to self-determination-a right for people "to
choose for themselves a form of political organization and their relation to other
groups"°9-always lies with the people, not with the state.
The U.N. Charter stipulates that friendly relations between states should be
based on self-determination, and that states must respect the principle of self-
determination in continuing mutual relations."o The 1966 Covenants also provide
for a right to self-determination as a human right,"' which is attached to
individuals and not consumed as a result of political changes. Therefore, it is only
logical to state that people have the ongoing right to self-determination under all
circumstances, even in instances of foreign domination.' 12 Accordingly, there is
no reason to exclude self-determination from consideration of the rights of
civilians in a territory under belligerent occupation. In Security Council Resolution
1511,113 however, there is no direct reference to self-determination, which reflects
the fact that self-determination as a legal right beyond the historical process of
decolonization has yet to be fully acknowledged.' 14
The nature of belligerent occupation is similar to conditions of colonial rule
and has the potential of developing into a new form of colonialism. Belligerent
occupation imposes a kind of de facto government in the occupied territory. This
de facto component, as opposed to a de jure component relied upon by a sitting
authority, indicates that people under belligerent occupation are entitled to the right
106. A state is identifiable as a unit upon which international law confers various rights and duties.
See BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 58-59.
107. Id.
108. As Higgins pointed out, the U.N. Charter provided for self-determination as a right of states,
not of peoples, but the subsequent practice of the UN changed the situations. See HIGGINS, supra note
49, at 111-21.
109. BROWNLIE, supra note 46, at 595.
110. See U.N. CHARTER art. 1, para. 2 and art. 55.
111. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 114-15.
112. Foreign domination is still a source of disputes. For example, the occupation of Jerusalem by
Israel has caused serious controversies about Israeli sovereignty and the self-determination of the
community of citizens of Palestine. See John Quigley, Sovereignty in Jerusalem, 45 CATH. U. L. REV.
765, 774-80 (1996).
113. See S.C. Res. 1511, U.N. SCOR, 4844th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/PV.4844 (2003).
114. In some cases of alien occupation, as with Afghanistan in 1987, the United Nations did refer to
the right to self-determination. See HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 116.
2005
DENy. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
to self-determination. This assertion does not mean that belligerent occupation has
created a de novo right to self-determination for people to be protected under the
laws of war. The right of people to choose their political future continues to exist
whether or not there is a normal, non-wartime, government in place.
When The Hague Regulations and the Geneva Conventions were concluded
in 1907 and 1949 respectively, the international community was not in the position
to foresee that the principle of self-determination could have evolved to its current
form. It was only after the practice of the United Nations in 1950s and 1960s that
the principle of self-determination was accepted as a part of international law." 5
The U.N. Charter was in force at the time of the conclusion of the Geneva
Conventions but the Charter was ambiguous about the concept of self-
determination. 1 6 Consequently, there was no place for self-determination in the
making of the law of belligerent occupation.
Given the status and the meaning of self-determination that is firmly
established in modem international law, re-evaluating the duties of the occupying
powers, and the rights of the people in occupied territories, becomes important.
There is a prima facie contradiction between a people's right to self-determination
and the existence of belligerent occupation. Belligerent occupation, although
temporary in nature, has obtained ruling power not based on the people's will.
Thus, the law of belligerent occupation needs to be revised or, at least re-
interpreted in a way that incorporates the concept of self-determination which
developed independently of international wartime law.
2. Occupation At War in Light of Self-Determination
The first issue needing clarification is the basic relationship between
belligerent occupation and self-determination. Belligerent occupation is not a result
of the exercise of a people's right to choose their own political destiny, thus, it
follows that belligerent occupations contravene the principle of self-determination.
Does it follow, then, that belligerent occupation should be legally prohibited? This
is the same question facing the rules of war.'1 7 Today, war, as a means of state
policy, is illegal, and the prohibition of the use of force lies at the core of modem
international law." 8 The use of force is only lawful when it is used for the
115. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 595 (explaining that self-determination had not been a positive
principle of law before the United Nations tackled the issue of decolonization).
116. HIGGINS, supra note 49, at 111-12.
117. See MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 306 (explaining the principle that the rules governing the
actual conduct of armed conflict are applicable in cases of armed conflict, whether the conflict is lawful
or unlawful under the rules governing the resort to armed conflict).
118. See IAN BROWNLIE, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE USE OF FORCE BY STATES 112-122
(1963) [hereinafter "The Use of Force"]; MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 309-11.
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purposes of legitimate self-defense or when the U.N. Security Council authorizes
such a use, in accordance with Chapter 7 of the U.N. Charter." 9 Once an armed
conflict occurs, however, the laws of war begin to impose themselves on every
party to the conflict.120 An aggressor is to be judged in the light of international
humanitarian law and the laws of war, which present issues separate from
responsibility for the breach of peace.
In theory, the principle of self-determination immediately makes any
belligerent occupation illegal, because occupation is inevitably against the will of
the people in the occupied territory. Considering that the right to self-
determination is a peremptory norm of international law, the illegality of the very
existence of belligerent occupation seems more plausible. The jus cogens
character of the principle of self-determination would disallow every situation that
is in violation of the principle. It may be said that belligerent occupation, which
violates the core value of people's right to self-determination is simply not
permitted.' 2' This theoretical prohibition, however, does not deprive the Hague
and Geneva Conventions of their raison d'6tre.
When actual belligerent occupation occurs in the course of an armed conflict,
certain rules of protection and preservation are to be applied. These rules are
found in the Hague 22 and Geneva laws. 23  Those who violate the rules of
belligerent occupation are responsible for their breaches without regard to the
lawfulness of their acts at the initial phase of armed conflicts.' 24 Therefore, the
question comes down to how to incorporate the principle of self-determination into
the context of armed conflicts and the subsequent belligerent occupation. In other
119. There are some other forms of use of force, such as humanitarian intervention, which some
suggest international law accepts as legitimate. The debates surrounding the legality of humanitarian
intervention are mainly about the interpretation of Article 2(4) of the U.N. Charter, and the formation of
customary international law. See BROWNL1E, supra note 45, at 564-71; Maxine Marcus, Humanitarian
Intervention Without Borders: Belligerent Occupation or Colonialism?, 25 HOUs. J. INT'L L. 99, 103
(2002).
120. BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 564-71; Marcus, supra note 119, at 103.
121. This proposed prohibition of belligerent occupation has yet to be accepted by the actual state
practice. The legality of belligerent occupation seems to remain integrated with the legality of the initial
use of force that resulted in that occupation. It is also to be reminded that, where states representing the
international community impose measures of security on a country for its certain internationally
wrongfil acts such as aggression, the principle of self-determination, in the form of due consultation of
the people, may be precluded. See BROWNLIE, supra note 45, at 169-71. Movement of populations and
frontier changes, which are definitely against the will of the people concerned, may be pursued in the
wake of a war of sanction to prevent future threats to the peace. See The Use of Force, supra note 118,
at 409. Similarly, if the U.S-led multinational forces are regarded in their exercise of occupation and
reconstruction of Iraq as enforcing the decisions of the international community or of the United
Nations, their acts concerning the belligerent occupation can be more easily justified.
122. See generally Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS
29.
123. See generally Geneva Convention of 1949, 75 U.N.T.S. 287, at 1949 U.S.T. Lexis 484.
124. "A belligerent party which violates the provisions of the said Regulations shall, if the case
demands, be liable to pay compensation it shall be responsible for all acts committed by persons
forming part of its armed forces." Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16, art. 3, 36 Stat. 2277, at
1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at 17-18.
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words, how is self-determination balanced with belligerent occupation? The
purpose of the laws of belligerent occupation is to protect civilians and to restore
order and security in the occupied territory. 125 Minimizing or preventing miserable
conditions inflicted upon civilians is the underlying rationale behind the modem
laws of war, and the relevant rules are based on humanitarian needs and causes.
126
One practical approach to reflect self-determination in this area of wartime
law is to restrict the temporal span of belligerent occupation.' 27  It should be
understood that belligerent occupation should not exceed a certain minimum
period of time. The longer the occupation continues, the more the principle of self-
determination is undercut. Fixing a time limit in an inflexible form is probably
unrealistic and ineffective because so much depends on the actual conditions of
each armed conflict and on specific military needs. As a general principle though,
it should be expressly acknowledged that belligerent occupation should continue
for the shortest period of time necessary so that the preservation and the exercise of
self-determination by the people under occupation is not undermined. Once this
general principle is established, more concrete factors that take into consideration
individual cases can be considered.
128
Limiting the duration of belligerent occupation, however, is not a sufficient
application of the principle of self-determination to fundamentally illegal situations
of foreign domination. Another general principle that needs to be adopted is that
belligerent occupation, as long as it exists, should be a temporary process so that
self-determination is truly realized. Given that self-determination is a principal
factor undermining the legitimacy of belligerent occupation, the final result of
occupation should be to lay down the necessary conditions under which the people
in the occupied territory can build their own government-one based on a freely
expressed will. Helping a country to rebuild itself on its own is not an easy task; it
is a much more daunting challenge when the country in question is a hostile enemy
under the belligerent occupation, because the occupant has its own needs, such as
ensuring security.
The recent experience in the reconstruction of several African nations and the
Balkan areas after civil conflicts shows the practically insurmountable obstacles
facing a belligerent occupier, even in the absence of widespread armed conflict.
129
125. Nossel, supra note 31, at 20; Imseis, supra note 22, at 91.
126. See MALANCZUK, supra note 22, at 342-46.
127. Some people believe that rules on belligerent occupation are too idealistic to expect states to
observe, and that they need to be revised to accommodate reality of wars. See Goodman, supra note 25,
at 1581. However, what is more important and urgent is to reflect human rights including self-
determination in the existing laws of belligerent occupation.
128. E.g., S.C. Res.1511, U.N. SCOR, 4844th mtg., at U.N. Doc. S/PV.4844 (2003) (urging the
Coalition Provisional Authority to return governing authorities to the Iraqi people "as soon as
practicable").
129. See Ruth Wedgewood & Harold K. Jacobson, State Reconstruction After Civil Conflict:
Foreword, 95 AM. J. INT'L L. 1, 1-2 (2001).
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The precise methodology of reconstruction and self-determination cannot be dealt
with here, but worthy of note are the two correlated aspects of the proposed
general principle that belligerent occupation should be about securing self-
determination of the people under occupation.
First, in enabling people to exercise self-determination, the occupying powers
may have to be allowed to introduce changes to the existing structures of the
occupied society. The law of belligerent occupation is based on the temporary
nature of occupation and provides that the occupant should respect the laws in
force.' 30  Sometimes, however, the existing elements of socio-political
organization of the occupied territory may fundamentally preclude any notion of
self-determination. 13 1 In this case, it may not be appropriate to allow the existing
conditions to continue. The belligerent occupier may also have to establish proper
legal and political systems in order to enable people to represent themselves.
32
This general statement on the necessary changes that need to be introduced leads
us to the second aspect of the principle of self-determination that has to be applied
to belligerent occupation.
Belligerent occupants should resist the temptation to excessively "nation
build." The term nation building usually refers to a reconstruction strategy with
the goal of bringing about durable peace in a state that has suffered from internal
ethnic or religious conflicts. 133 It is often said that the reconstruction of failed
societies requires more than foreign economic aid, and the notion of nation
building refers to helping dysfunctional states, devastated by civil strife or wars, to
build the political institutions that make future development possible.
34
Recognition that financial aid is fruitless where decent governance is not
present, inspired the West to focus on nation-building in the reconstruction of
chaotic states. 135 Nation-building implies a deeper involvement in the domestic
conduct of political affairs. 36 Planting specific democratic institutions in a certain
country, for example, is a more realistic way to help that country to get out of
poverty and political chaos, instead of simply distributing donated funds. 137 The
use of nation-building is also perceived as an effective means to fight against the
130. Hague Convention of 1907, supra note 16,art. 43, 36 Stat. 2277, at 1907 U.S.T. LEXIS 29, at
37.
131. Id.
132. In Iraq, the Governing Council was composed to represent the Iraqi people. See CNN, Iraqi
Official: Saddam No Longer a Threat (July 30, 2003), at
http://www.cnn.com/2003/WORLD/meast/07/30/sprj.irq.main/index.html (last visited Jan. 7, 2004).
133. Quynh-Nhu Vuong, U.S. Peacekeeping and Nation-Building: The Evolution of Self-Interested
Multilateralism, 21 BERKELEY J. INT'L L. 804, 804-06 (2003) (explaining that peacekeeping operations
are increasingly intertwined with nation building designed to lay the foundations for a durable peace in
regions devastated by civil conflicts).
134. See Sebastian Mallaby, The Reluctant Imperialist: Terrorism, Failed States, and the Case for
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threats of terrorism. But when applying nation-building to a state under
belligerent occupation, the fundamental question to ask is: how compatible is the
principle of nation building with the principle of self-determination? The answer
to this question cannot rule out the notion of nation building but should consider
the inherent risks of such a concept.
Nation building efforts are likely to undermine the right to self-determination
in a country under belligerent occupation. Political institutions may be chosen and
implemented by the occupying powers with the intention of destroying any
elements that look intrinsically hazardous to the belligerent occupants. 139 The
building of national institutions has to stop short of the total implementation of
specific extraneous political systems, and should focus on the establishment of
basic conditions for the exercise of self-determination. 140  Therefore, occupying
powers need to strike a reasonable balance between no involvement and too much
involvement, when attempting nation-building.
IV. CONCLUSION
Today, the principle of self-determination has the potential to outlaw
belligerent occupation altogether. Belligerent occupation, once it occurs, should
be subject to limitations imposed by the operation of the principle of self-
determination. Since belligerent occupation violates the principle of self-
determination, the end of the occupation should foster the right to self-
determination. Self-determination may call for an early end to the occupation and
may obligate the occupants to secure the necessary conditions to implement the
political choice of the occupied peoples. These implications must be legally
recognized so that belligerent occupation will not turn into neocolonialism. In
terms of the laws of belligerent occupation, occupying powers should be allowed
to make minimal changes to the existing political conditions of the occupied
society. At the same time, however, too much involvement in the name of nation
building may hurt the core elements of self-determination.
The question of how to end the war in Iraq is to be answered by bearing in
mind such normative relations between self-determination and belligerent
occupation. The United States and its allies established the interim Iraqi Governing
Council (IGC), wherein various internal sectors of the Iraqi society were
supposedly represented.141On January 30, 2005, the historic Iraqi election took
place, leading to formation of the new government effectively replacing the IGC.
Since most Sunnis did not participate in the January election, 142 it remains to be
138. Vuong, supra note 133, at 821-22.
139. Id.
140. Post-Cold War experiences led foreign aid donors to seek to build in aided countries political
parties, law courts, police forces, central banks and newspapers, etc. See Mallaby, supra note 134, at 4.
It is practically impossible to define a category of institutions that are compatible with self-
determination of the population involved, but it may be said that consultation with the people and
appropriate international bodies would be useful in finding solutions to these sensitive matters.
141. See Patrick E. Tyler & Richard A. Oppel Jr., After the War: Occupation, N.Y. TIMES, July 15,
2003, at A11.
142. The Conflict in Iraq: Election; Shiite Coalition Takes A Big Lead in the Iraq Vote, N.Y.
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seen whether the new government can enjoy political legitimacy, which is essential
to political and social integration of a majority Shia, Kurds, and Sunns. The
government has a responsibility to write a permanent Constitution of Iraq
hopefully by mid-August of 2005, pursuant to which a new general election is to
take place soon.
143
Considering the proposed principle that belligerent occupation should endow
people with the right to self-determination, the formation of the new government
could possibly serve as a stimulus for a complicated process for rebuilding Iraq by
Iraqi's own will. The occupying powers, especially the United States, may be
tempted to accomplish a short-term political goal of establishing a pro-U.S.
government with which they can easily deal; this is of concern to many. 144 It
seems rather dangerous to try to impose certain political systems of U.S. choosing
and supporting specific sects more responsive to such systems, because this
practice would probably aggravate the existing political division among the
religious and ethnic groups within Iraq.145 The final destiny of the Iraqi people
should be left in their own hands. The principle of self-determination must be the
primary factor in making every decision concerning Iraq's. status. A feasible
development strategy may be possible only after the Iraqi people are satisfied with
the exercise of their right to self-determination. It should be noted, however, that
self-determination is required, not because it warrants success of democracy for the
Iraqi people, but because it is to be applied as a legal rule. It is true that self-
determination is a theoretical starting point for democratic governance, 46 but the
principle of self-determination could arouse ethnic or nationalist awareness, which
could end up rejecting the idea of democracy. 147 The distinction between external
and internal self-determination shows these opposing perspectives. Given the
current situation, it is likely that claims for self-determination lean toward an
external aspect of the principle that emphasizes an absence of outside
interferences.
The principle of self-determination may hamstring or halt the necessary
economic reconstruction and political development toward democracy.
Nevertheless, the United States and its allies must accept the reality that the rights
of the people under occupation impose fundamental restrictions on the
management of that occupation.
TIMEs, Feb. 4, 2005, at Al.
143. Iraq Legislators Set Up Panel to Draft a Consitution, N.Y. TiMEs, May 11, 2005, at A9; U.S.
Presses Iraqi Government To Broaden the Role of Sunnis, N.Y. TIMEs, May 13, 2005, at A11.
144. Tyler & Oppel, supra note 141.
145. Id.
146. See Franck, supra note 97, at 52-54.
147. See Miller, supra note 99, at 608.
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PROTECTING THE INNOCENT OR
PROTECTING SPECIAL INTERESTS?
CHILD LABOR, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE WTO
Dexter Samida
INTRODUCTION
For those in wealthy countries, the idea of children toiling in factories or
fields seems like a relic from a bygone age. However, for too many children in the
world this is still a sad reality. Many children work in hazardous conditions.
There were an estimated 211 million children working worldwide in 2000.1 Of
these 211 million children, approximately 8.4 million were involved in child
trafficking, forced and bonded labor, armed conflict, prostitution and pornography,
and other illicit activities-the worst of the worst forms of labor.
2
Poverty, income variability, debt, lack of access to credit, and lack of
educational opportunities are cited as causal factors.3 This article focuses on the
oft-suggested link between trade and child labor.
This article considers two strategies that the international community might
consider in order to reduce the prevalence of child labor. Part I considers whether
countries can combat the scourge of child labor by becoming less open to foreign
trade and globalization. Specifically, this part of the article looks for empirical
* University of Saskatchewan, B.Comm. (1997); University of Toronto, M.A. (1997); Unveristy of
Chicago, J.D. Candidate (2005). The author expresses his sincere gratitude for the assistance of
University of Chicago law school professors David A. Weisbach and Alan 0. Sykes. Martin Zelder,
Senior Research Professional at the University of Chicago. provided useful advice on statistics and
economic theory.
1. INT'L PROGRAMME ON THE ELIMINATION OF CHILD LABOUR, ILO, EVERY CHILD COUNTS:
NEW GLOBAL ESTIMATES ON CHILD LABOUR 20 (2002), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/others/globalest.pdf [hereinafter IPEC]. This
estimate uses a more expansive definition of child labor (ages 5 to 14) than that considered below. See
infra the text accompanying note 24 for an explanation of the numbers used in this article.
2. IPEC, supra note 1, at 25.
3. See ROBERT T. JENSEN, ILO, DEVELOPMENT OF INDICATORS ON CHILD LABOR 8-15 (2000)
available at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/simpoc/guides/jensen.pdf (noting that
because there is evidence that credit restraints are associated with higher levels of child labor, providing
credit to poor households could somewhat alleviate this problem); See generally KATHLEEN BEEGLE ET
AL., CHILD LABOR, CROP SHOCKS, AND CREDIT CONSTRAINTS (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 10088, 2003), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/wl0088 (considering the
relationship between a mother's education and her children's level of educational attainment); See, e.g.,
ALESSANDRO CIGNO ET AL., CHILD LABOR, NUTRITION AND EDUCATION IN RURAL INDIA: AN
ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF PARENTAL CHOICE AND POLICY OPTIONS 34-35 (2001).
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evidence supporting or negating the link between globalization and child labor.
Part II considers the potential effectiveness of a unilateral U.S. trade ban and
whether such a ban would be legal under World Trade Organization law.
I. GLOBALIZATION AND CHILD LABOR
The fact is that the [World Trade Organization]'s policies are creating
conditions for the accentuation of poverty and the decline in the condition of
workers everywhere. Child labor is one manifestation or effect of the demands
being placed on the majority of the world's population under a neoliberal
economic regime.
4
If globalization is responsible for vast increases in the prevalence of child
labor then more restrictive trade policies should enable developing countries to
combat the growth of child labor. This argument relies on the assumption that
globalization is in fact causing more child labor. Many commentators are
convinced there is a link.
For example, Madeleine Grey Bullard, in her award-winning journal article, 5
argues that "[g]lobalization could offer children an escape from lives of toil and
drudgery, but instead, it draws more children into servitude."'6 In nearly identical
words, Bullard's source for that assertion claims the same thing. 7 Interestingly,
neither article has figures demonstrating that an increase in child labor has in fact
occurred, irrespective of the cause.
8
Other commentators claim that there is evidence that "increasing numbers of
children migrate from their natal homes as opportunities for work expand in nearby
towns or distant cities." 9 For example, in early American society, families moved
to areas where child labor was in demand, even if this tended to reduce wages
earned by the adult wage earner. 10 It is in this way that some perceive the export
4. Saadia Toor, Child Labor in Pakistan: Coming ofAge in the New World Order, 575 ANNALS
AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 194, 203-04 (2001). Claims that capitalism is the cause of child labor are
not new. For example, see Edwin Markham, The Hoe-Man in the Making, COSMOPOLITAN (Sept. 1906)
reprinted in MUCKRAKING! THE JOURNALIsM THAT CHANGED AMERICA 4, 6 (Judith Serrin & William
Serrin eds., New Press 2002) ("The factory, we are told, must make a certain profit, or the owners
(absentee proprietors generally, living in larded luxury) will complain.... It pays, my masters, to grind
little children into dividends!").
5. Madeleine Grey Bullard, Child Labor Prohibitions Are Universal, Binding, and Obligatory
Law: The Evolving State of Customary International Law Concerning The Unempowered Child
Laborer, 24 Hous. J. INTL L. 139, 139 (2001). The article received the American Civil Liberties Union,
Ben G. Levy, Essays in Freedom Award.
6. Id. at 156.
7. See Robert Senser, How the Global Economy Promotes Child Labor, available at
http://www.senser.conclali.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (stating that "[tihe global economy should
offer little children an escape from lives of forced labor. Instead, it is drawing more and more of them
into various types of servitude.").
8. See generally tbl. 1 infra page 6.
9. Rachel Baker & Rachel Hinton, Approaches to Children's Work and Rights in Nepal, 575
ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 176, 178 (2001).
10. Donald 0. Parsons & Claudia Goldin, Parental Altruism and Self-Interest: Child Labor
Among Late Nineteenth-Century American Families, ECON. INQUIRY, Oct. 1989, at 637, 655-57
(estimating that around 90% of the income generated by working children in a family was dissipated
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sector to be the most direct link between child labor and globalization.11 This is a
possible connection, and it is one of the critiques of the North American Free
Trade Agreement. 12 Furthermore, some argue that opening up the export sector
increases the opportunities for unskilled labor which could in turn draw children
into the workforce. 1
3
However, this argument glosses over the fact that the child who relocates in
order to find work in the export sector may have previously worked at a less
desirable job. Export jobs are not the only source of employment for child
laborers-only the most visible. 14  In reality only a small percentage of child
laborers work in the export sector.' 5 Given this, even a large increase in the size of
the export sector will have only limited effects on the number of child laborers.'
6
through lower adult male wages); See Kaushik Basu & Zafis Tzannatos, The Global Child Labor
Problem: What Do We Know and What Can We Do?, 17 WORLD BANK ECON. REV. 147, 150-51
(2003) (arguing that there are multiple equilibriums including a "bad" equilibrium where high levels of
child labor push down adult wages. Under this scenario a ban on child labor would be welfare
enhancing).
11. Toor, supra note 4, at 217 ("When we talk about globalization creating the conditions (through
the disembeddedness of the economic from the social) for the increasing exploitation of child labor in
countries of the South, it does not mean only in the export sector, although the export sector is perhaps
the most direct link.").
12. See, e.g., Joshua Briones, Student Scholarship: Paying the Price For NAFTA: NAFTA 's Effect
on Women and Children Laborers in Mexico, 9 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 301, 307 (1999); Joan M. Smith,
North American Free Trade and the Exploitation of Working Children, 4 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 57, 63 (1994) ("[T]here is serious cause for concern that the industrial growth projected under
NAFTA will produce greater exploitation of children.").
13. See, e.g., ERIC V. EDMONDS & NINA PAVCNIK, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND CHILD LABOR:
CROSS-COUNTRY EVIDENCE 18-19 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10317, 2004),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w10317. The authors consider this argument in their paper and
conclude that "the evidence [of their empirical research]... does not find any significant support for
that claim." Id. at 19.
14. See, e.g., Robert J. Liubicic, Corporate Codes of Conduct and Product Labeling Schemes: The
Limits and Possibilities of Promoting International Labor Rights Through Private Initiatives, 30 LAW
& POL'Y. INT'L BUS. 111,140 (describing non-export industries as "invisible" industries).
15. See U.S. DEP'T. OF LABOR, BY THE SWEAT AND TOIL OF CHILDREN: THE USE OF CHILD
LABOR IN AMERICAN IMPORTS 2 (1994), available at
http://www.dol.gov/ILAB/media/reports/iclp/sweat/sweat.pdf (estimating that export markets may
account for as little as 5% of total employment of child laborers).
16. Even if the number of child laborers did increase due to an expansion of the export sector this
might not be all bad. Increased employment demand might (for children and their parents) increase
wages, improve working conditions, or both.
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Moreover, globalization and foreign trade tend to increase incomes.1 7 To the
extent that trade increases family incomes it may lessen families' reliance on child
labor and may move children from the workplace into the classroom.
a. Recent Trends
Linda Golodner, President of the National Consumers League, asserts that
"[t]he problem of child labor has grown along with the expansion of the global
marketplace." 18 An article by Timothy A. Glut seems to provide evidence for this
assertion. He claims that the number of child laborers has increased by 112
million in only eight years.19 He states:
In late 1994, the International Labo[u]r Organization (ILO) estimated that
there were 200 million child laborers in the world's work force.... These
statistics contrast sharply with earlier studies. In 1986, the ILO estimated that
there were only eighty-eight million child workers. This dangerous increase in
the amount of child labor illustrates the ineffectiveness of current measures to
curtail child labor.
20
Glut, however, neglects to cite any actual ILO studies. Instead the author cites
newspaper articles in the Detroit Free Press, L.A. Times, and the Washington
Post.21 His inattention to the actual numbers hides the great improvements that
have been made and creates the impression that something drastic needs to be
done.
Data from the International Labour Office, compiled in Table 1, tells a much
different story.22 In 1960, twenty five percent of world's children worked.23 That
17. See, e.g., Axel Dreher, Does Globalization Affect Growth?, at 14 (2003), available at
http://econwpa.wustl.edu/eps/dev/papers/0210/0210004.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (concluding that
economic integration leads to faster rates of growth); See DAVID DOLLAR & AART KRAAY, TRADE,
GROWTH, AND POVERTY 2 (world Bank, Working Paper No. 2615, 2001), available at
http://www.worldbank.org/research/growth/pdfiles/Trade5.pdf (stating that developing countries that
have "globalized" have grown faster even as wealthier nations growth rates have slowed). Trade
between nations also tends to reduce income gaps between those nations. DAN BEN-DAVID & AYAL
KIMHI, TRADE AND THE RATE OF INCOME CONVERGENCE 16 (Nat'l. Bureau of Econ. Res., Working
Paper No. 7642, 2000), available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w7642.pdf. Finally, some writers
claim that globalization induces better governance. FEDERICO BONAGLIA ET AL., How GLOBALISATION
IMPROVES GOVERNANCE 28 (OECD Development Centre, Working Paper No.181, 2001) available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/41/48/2675871.pdf.
18. Linda F. Golodner, Address at the National Consumers League (Jan. 21, 1998), available at
http://nclnet.org/advocacy/workersrights/speech child labor 01211998.htm.
19. Timothy A. Glut, Changing the Approach to Ending Child Labor: An International Solution to
an International Problem, 28 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L.1203, 1206-07 (1995). See also id., at 1207 n.19
(postulating that, in percentage terms, there has been an "over 100% increase in child labor." Glut also
argues that the increase "cannot simply be attributed to a greater number of children in the world.").
20. Id. at 1206-07 (emphasis added).
21. Id. at 1207; See also id., at 1207 n.15, 1207 n.18.
22. See WORLD BANK, WORLD DEVELOPMENT INDICATORS (2002), available at
http://laborsta.ilo.org/ [hereinafter World Bank Data] This study looks at the amount of economically
active children. For the purposes of this study, the term "child" is restricted to children aged 10-14. The
next age group, 15-19, contains some people generally not considered children. Data for younger
children is not available by country. Researchers generally believe that the term "child labor" should
VOL. 33:3
CHILD LABOR, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE WTO
same year, 39 percent of children in Sub-Saharan Africa worked, as did 38 percent
of children in East Asia and the Pacific. 24 By 2000, the percentages of children
working in the world and Asia had dropped to 11 percent and 8 percent,
respectively, while the percentage of children working in Sub-Saharan Africa had
dropped to 29 percent.25 None of these areas has seen an increase in the
prevalence of child labor.
26
Table 1. Prevalence of Child Labor by Region
27
Region 1960, 1970 1980 1990 1995 2000
East Asia & Pacific 37.82% 32.83% 26.23% 14.27% 11.18% 8.06%
Europe & Central Asia 4.71% 3.55% 3.34% 2.80% 1.97% 1.11%
Latin America &
Caribbean 16.59% 14.64% 12.70% 11.27% 9.87% 8.23%
Middle East & North
Africa 21.61% 18.58% 14.03% 7.80% 6.06% 4.38%
South Asia 31.76% 27.29% 23.35% 19.39% 17.32% 15.03%
Sub-Saharan Africa 39.06% 36.66% 34.71% 32.21% 30.33% 28.99%
World 24.85% 22.20% 19.86% 14.61% 13.08% 11.33%
Table 2 looks at the prevalence (expressed in percentage terms) of child labor
and the total numbers of child laborers in: the world; more developed regions; less
developed regions; and the ten countries that in 2000 had the highest prevalence of
child labor. It illustrates how child labor has declined overall since 1960. Even in
countries that have increased numbers of child laborers the ratio of child workers
to non-workers has fallen, in some places dramatically.
not encompass all work children do (such as light chores). See IPEC, supra note 1, at 32-33. However,
separate data is not available.
23. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see supra Part I., at tbl. 1.
24. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see supra Part I., at tbl. 1.
25. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see supra Part I., at thl. 1.
26. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see supra Part I., at tbl. 1. This statement can be made
even stronger. Only five of the 171 countries measured have seen any increase in the prevalence of
child labor during the time period evaluated. In 1960 the Dominican Republic had 25.7% of the
children aged 10-14 working. In 1970 the rate went up to 31.6% and subsequently down to 24.8% in
1980. In Kenya the rate went from 44.96% in 1970 to 45.06% in 1980. In 1990 the rate dropped to
43.4%. Nicaragua saw a 0.82 percentage point increase between 1960 and 1970, followed by a
subsequent decline. Similarly, the United Arab Emirates and the United States had temporary increases
of 0.45 and 0.10 percentage points respectively in the same time period, also followed by declines.
27. See World Bank Data, supra note 22.
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Table 2. Selected Regions and Child Labor
2 8
Rates Thousands
1960 2000 1960 2000
World 24.7% 11.2% 76420 67444
More developed regions 3.0% 0.0% 2434 17
Less developed regions 32.4% 13.0% 73985 67427
Bhutan 69.1% 51.1% 65 136
Burkina Faso 79.4% 43.5% 426 686
Ethiopia 50.8% 41.1% 1386 3277
Kenya 46.3% 39.2% 435 1699
Mali 63.7% 51.1% 329 726
Nepal 70.7% 42.1% 797 1154
Niger 49.9% 43.6% 182 609
Rwanda 44.2% 41.4% 152 413
Uganda 51.9% 43.8% 438 1343
Furthermore, as illustrated in Table 3, the countries that had the biggest
expansion in their export sectors also had the biggest reductions in the prevalence
of child labor.
2 9
Table 3. Exports and Child Labor
Change in Exports (1995-2000) -21.3% 2.7% 22.1% 61.4% I
Change in Child Labor (1995-2000) -18.2% -25.0% -22.8% -31.2%
Some commentators rightly suggest that child labor is difficult to define, find,
and measure.3 0 Nevertheless, these commentators are content in claiming that
child labor is a serious and increasing problem.3 1 The ILO itself cautions that it is
difficult to make comparisons over different years.3 2 While one should be cautious
in using this data in empirical models, it would be wrong to exempt the claims of
anti-globalization writers from empirical scrutiny simply because the data is
difficult to collect.
28. Table 2 was complied from World Bank Data, supra note 22.
29. Table 3 was compiled from World Bank Data, supra note 22. It only includes countries that
had some positive level of child labor in 1995. The data was broken into quartiles and then analyzed.
The percentage change in child labor was calculated by the deducting the prevalence of child labor in
1995 from the 2000 value and then dividing by the 1995 level. Growth of the export sector was
calculated in a similar fashion.
30. Joan M. Smith, supra note 12, at 63.
31. Id.
32. IPEC, supra note 1, at 18-19.
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b. Previous Empirical Studies
Trade liberalization has had a positive effect on the prevalence of child labor
in Vietnam. One examination of the country indicated that trade liberalization in
the rice market moved one million children out of child labor by increasing family
incomes.3 3 The declines were greatest for secondary school-aged girls, who were
consequently more likely to attend school.
3 4
As for a cross-section of countries, a recent study found no evidence that
greater openness to trade led to higher levels of child labor.3 5 The authors
concluded that while greater openness is correlated with a lower prevalence of
child labor, this effect was statistically insignificant once the study was controlled
for income differences across countries. 3 6 They also concluded that there was no
evidence that increased trade leads to product demand changes which in turn leads
to increases in child labor.3 7 They found no evidence that child labor is related to
the heterogeneity of skill endowments, capital scarcity, or the signing of anti-child
labor agreements.38 Additionally, they concluded that child labor is not driven by
increases in exports of products made by unskilled labor.3 9
Other authors agree with this evaluation. One critique concludes that high
levels of child labor might be attributable to an absence of globalization, rather
than to too much of it.40 The article uses the Sachs-Warner index of openness,
along with a number of control variables.
4'
A cross-sectional study of countries by Robert Shelburne came to similar
conclusions. 42 Shelburne's article used imports and exports as a percent of GNP as
a measure of openness, along with a number of control variables. 43 He found that
countries that are small, poor, and less open to international trade have a greater
prevalence of child labor.
44
33. See ERIC EDMONDS & NINA PAVCNIK, DOES GLOBALIZATION INCREASE CHILD LABOR?
EVIDENCE FROM VIETNAM 31 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 8760, 2000),
available at http://papers.nber.org/papers/w8760.pdf.
34. Id. at 28-29.
35. See EDMONDS & PAVCNIK, supra note 13.
36. Id. at 22-23.
37. Id. at 23.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 18-19, tbl 5.
40. ALESSANDRO CIGNO ET AL., Does Globalization Increase Child Labor?, 30 WORLD
DEVELOPMENT 1579, 1587 (2002); Stanley Fischer, Globalisation and Its Challenges, 93 AM. ECON.
REV. 1, 33 (2003), available at http://www.iie.com/fischer/pdf/fischer011903.pdf (echoing this
sentiment and concluding, "the pro-market pro-globalization approach is the worst economic policy,
except for all the others that have been tried.").
41. ALESSANDRO CIGNO ET AL., supra note 40, at 1585-86.
42. Robert C. Shelbume, An Explanation of the International Variation in the Prevalence of Child
Labour, 24 WORLD ECON. 359, 374-75 (2001).
43. Id. at 372.
44. Id.
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c. New Regressions
This Article builds upon the work of Shelbume. His model of child labor is
represented by the following equation:
CHILAB = a(PCI)6' (OPEN)i2 (GNP)63 3
CHILAB is the percentage of children not in the workforce; PCI is per capita
income; OPEN is imports and exports as a percentage of GNP; and GNP is gross
national product.45 An exponential function was utilized for this Article because
that was the functional form chosen by Shelburne.
46
Some believe poverty increases child labor.47  If true, child labor should
decrease as per capita income (PCI) increases.48 Shelburne uses OPEN to test the
influence of openness on the amount of child labor.49 Shelburne hypothesizes that
in a closed economy the introduction of child labor will, on net, benefit the non-
child-labor factors of production (although with varying distributional effects).
50
In an open economy the benefits of child labor accrue to the children (or their
parents), which suggests that open economies will tend to have less child labor.5 1
Shelbume uses GNP as a measure of economic size. 52 Shelburne argues that for
45. Id. at 372-73. Shelburne used 1996 values for each variable Shelburne also used a dummy
variable for countries with a history of communist rule. Since the dummy variable had little influence
on the results it is dropped here.
46. Id. at 376. Shelburne utilized a Box-Cox procedure to pick the functional form which would
minimize the residual sum of errors. Representative linear equations were estimated for this article (but
not reported). The results were similar to the regressions reported in this article.
47. See Sudharshan Canagarajah & Helena Skyt Nielsen, Child Labor In Africa: A Comparative
Study, 575 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. Sci. 71 (2001).
48. Shelburne, supra note 42, at 369.
49. Id. at 370.
50. Id. at 365 (suggesting that in a three factor world capital and skilled laborers will benefit from
the introduction of child labor,unskilled laborers without children will be harmed, and unskilled
laborers with children would most likely benefit).
51. Id. at 364. Shelburne concludes "[t]hus in a closed economy the non-child-labour factors gain
from child labour, while they do not in an open economy. Therefore, ceteris paribus, one would expect
on a cross-section that where an economy is open to international trade, there is less likely to be child
labour." Id at 366. To illustrate, assume Country X is a closed economy where production equals
consumption. When child labor is introduced the non-child-labor factors of production can still produce
the same combinations of labor-intensive and non-labor-intensive goods. However, the price of the
labor-intensive goods falls allowing them to expand their utility. They can produce at one point and
trade with the child-labor factor of production until they maximize utility. Although the net effect of
the allowance of child labor is positive for the non-child-labor factors as a whole, distributional effects
may make some groups worse off such as wage earners in the labor-intensive market. Next, assume
Country Y is an open economy that cannot influence the world price. When Country Y allows child
labor prices do not change. All non-child-labor factors of production receive the same benefits. Child-
labor is paid its marginal productivity, and thus gains. If the decision to allow child labor is set by
consensus (through norm creation or legislation) Country X (the closed economy) is more likely to
allow child labor as more factors of production benefit from its introduction.
52. Id. at 371.
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large, open economies the introduction of child labor changes the terms of trade,
making the non-child-labor factors of production worse off.53 Smaller countries
cannot affect the terms of trade and therefore the non-child-labor factors are not
made worse off on the whole when child labor is introduced (although there are
distributional effects-some factors are made worse off and some better off).5
4
This suggests smaller countries would be more likely to utilize child labor.
55
Shelburne's article suggests that smaller, poorer, and less open countries have
a greater prevalence of child labor. 56 This result, while interesting, does not fully
address the present issue. His article suggests that at a given point in time, lower
levels of child labor are correlated with higher levels of trade. 57 However, his
results do not indicate whether an increase in the level of global trade over time
leads to an increase in the level of child labor.
It is also not clear that the selected measure for openness (imports and exports
as a ratio of GNP) is the best available measure. As previously mentioned, the link
between globalization and child labor is supposedly between the export sector and
child labor.58 A better measure might therefore focus on exports.
In the following section the Shelbume-model of child labor is extended by
estimating the model for a larger number of time periods. This article will then
consider an alternative measure of trade openness and present some models of
dynamic change.
d. Discussion of Results
The first empirical model tested is based on the Shelburne-model of child
labor discussed above.59 However, slightly different variables were used. Gross
National Income per person is used in place of the per capita income variable.
60
53. Id. at 376.
54. Id. at 375. The factors that compete with child labor are made worse off, while the other
factors are better off.
55. Id. at 369. To illustrate, assume Country X is a large open economy. Before the introduction
of child labor, manufacturers produce a certain level of goods and trade with the world to a point that
maximizes their utility. Since Country X is able to affect the prices of labor-intensive goods, it is
assumed that the products it trades in the world market are labor-intensive goods. When child labor is
introduced, the non-child-labor factors of production can still produce the same combinations of labor-
intensive and non-labor-intensive goods. However, the country's terms of trade have deteriorated. After
the introduction of child labor, Country X receives less skill-intensive goods for each unit of labor-
intensive goods it trades. This implies that the non-child-labor factors are unable to consume as much as
previously and are made worse off. The net effect for each factor depends on the distributional
consequences of the change. Country Y, a small open economy, does not affect the world price and
therefore the non-child-labor factors of production are not made worse off. Country Y is, therefore,
more likely to allow child labor.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 362.
58. See supra text accompanying note 11.
59. The analysis that follows builds on previous models, but I have added, expanded, or altered
those models.
60. See National Accounts: Output and Expenditure, at
http://www.worldbank.org/data/working/def7.html. Gross National Income is what the World Bank
now calls what was formerly Gross National Product (GNP).
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The openness variable uses gross domestic product (GDP) instead of GNP as its
denominator.6 1 These changes are minor.
More importantly, instead of using only a single year, regressions were run
for 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2000. The results are presented in Table 5
of the Appendix. 62 The results replicate what was found previously: child labor is
more prevalent in poorer, smaller, and less open countries. Two measures of
openness were used. The first measure was similar to the measure used by
Shelbume-imports and exports as a percent of GDP.63 The second measure was
exports as a percent of GDP.
Since the dependant variable is the percentage of children not in the
workforce,64 positive coefficients mean that when the variable increases, more
children are not working, and therefore the prevalence of child labor is lower.
65
For each time period the OPEN variable is of the correct (positive) sign and is
highly statistically significant, indicating greater openness is associated with less
child labor.
66
The second model looks at the relationship between changes in the prevalence
of child labor and changes in the other variables.67 If, as the opponents of
globalization believe, increased levels of trade increase child labor, the coefficients
for the OPEN variable should be negative. 68 If increased openness is unrelated to
child labor the coefficient will be zero. If increased openness was related to
decreases in the prevalence of child labor the coefficient will be positive.
The estimated changes represent the differences in each particular time
period, up to the year 2000. For example, the 1960 estimates look at changes in
each of the variables from 1960 to 2000. The results of this model are presented in
Table 6 of the Appendix.
Openness is essentially no different statistically than zero for each of the
estimates.69 This suggests changes in the level of openness are unrelated to the
prevalence of child labor. Per capita income, however, is strongly statistically
significant (and the correct sign) for most of the time periods. 70 In other words,
increasing income leads to less child labor.
61. See World Development Indicators, supra note 22.
62. The Appendix begins on page 433.
63. See Shelburne, supra note 42.
64. This measure was used in order to allow the use of natural logarithms. It is not possible to take
the natural log of 0 (representing the percent of children in the workforce). However, it is possible to
take the natural log of 100 (representing the percent of children not in the workforce).
65. See infra app., at tbl. 5.
66. See infra app., at tbl. 5.
67. Since using changes creates negative variables a linear model was estimated. Data points
where the initial level of child labor was zero were eliminated.
68. The interpretation of coefficients is again slightly counterintuitive because the model looks at
the change in children not working. A negative coefficient means that if the variable increases there are
fewer children not working, in other words, more child labor.
69. See infra app., at tbl. 6. One estimate approaches statistical significance at a low level.
70. See infra app., at tbl. 7.
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One final model was used. This model looked at changes over separate ten-
year periods (1960 to 1970, 1970 to 1980, 1980 to 1990, and 1990 to 2000).71 The
data was also pooled and considered as a whole.
72
The results are slightly different than before. As gross national income
expands, child labor decreases. 73  Gross national income per capita is not
statistically significant in either the ten-year interval estimate or the pooled data
estimate. 74 The coefficients for openness were almost statistically (and the correct
sign) significant at a low level.
75
These results suggest that increased globalization has not led to an increase in
the prevalence of child labor. Refusing to embrace further globalization will not
free developing nations from the existence of child labor. If trade increases
income, trade may indirectly lower the prevalence of child labor.
76
The next section focuses on the whether a unilateral trade ban would benefit
child laborers. It considers whether, even given the above analysis, a unilateral
trade ban targeted at goods produced with child labor is a good idea and whether it
would be legal under WTO law.
II. UNILATERAL TRADE BAN
a. Discussion
Some advocate for the United States' enactment of a unilateral trade ban on
goods produced using child labor. 77 However, as previously noted, only a small
percentage of child laborers are employed in the export sector-perhaps as low as
5 percent. 78 A trade ban would do little to protect child laborers if they found
work elsewhere. Presumably, for at least some children, the export sector is the
best option in terms of wages, working conditions, or both. 79 Even if a large
portion of child labor was involved in the export sector, a trade ban would simply
mean child labor would move elsewhere as the existence of an export sector itself
does not spawn child labor.80
Moving child laborers out of the export sector would tend to increase the
labor supply in other sectors, which could depress wages, lead to worse working
71. See infra app., at tbl. 7.
72. Instead of using differences this model used ratios (New Value/Old Value). This allowed the
use of the original mathematical form of the model.
73. See infra app., at tbl. 7.
74. See infra app., at tbl. 7.
75. The first definition of openness (imports and exports) was statistically significant at 16.4%.
The second definition (exports only) was significant at 15.48%.
76. See Dreher, supra note 17 and accompanying text.
77. See, e.g., Benjamin James Stevenson, Pursuing an End to Foreign Child Labor Through U.S.
Trade Law: WTO Challenges and Doctrinal Solutions, 7 UCLA J. INT'L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 129, 166
(2002); Matthew T. Mitro, Outlawing the Trade in Child Labor Products: Why the GA 7T Article XX
Health Exception Authorizes Unilateral Sanctions, 51 AM. U. L. REv. 1223, 1271 (2002).
78. U.S. DEP'TOF LABOR, supra note 15, at 2.
79. Id.
80. See infra app., at tbl. 5.
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conditions, or both.81 Wages from foreign-owned entities8 2 tend to be higher than
domestic companies, and insomuch as the export sector is proportionately made up
of a greater number of foreign firms than domestic firms, 8 moving labor from this
sector to others could tend to reduce wages for those laborers even if the
movement did not depress wages in other sectors.
If, as is likely in at least some cases, necessity pushes children into working, a
unilateral trade ban could have the perverse effect of increasing the number of
hours children work. This would occur for children that moved to industries paying
lower wages.
8 4
These are not just idle concerns. The threat of the enactment of a law banning
imports of products produced with child labor led to the firing of fifty-five
thousand Bangladeshi children.8 5 A follow-up of a subset of these children found
that none had enrolled in school, half had found jobs paying less money (such as
prostitution, brick-laying, and selling flowers), and the other half were still looking
for work.8 6 Nutrition and health care were better for those children who kept their
jobs. Former workers circulated a petition to return to the factories at least part-
time.8
7
One commentator speculates that early British laws banning child labor may
have increased (at least temporarily) its prevalence:
The effect of the laws was to impose a cost on firms that were found to be
employing children. It is arguable that the added cost, by making children less
attractive to hire, tended to lower their wages. But because children worked
81. This is not a shocking or controversial result. It is a proposition commonly taught in
introductory labor economics classes. See Notes for Chapter 2, available at
http://www.oswego.edu/-economic/eco350/chap2.htm. (last visited Apr. 20, 2005). In other words, an
increase in labor supply results in a lower equilibrium wage, but a higher equilibrium level of
employment. Presumably non-child workers will tend to shift into the export sector if wages adjust.
The magnitude of the wage decline depends on how many of workers are able to shift.
82. See ROBERT E. LIPSEY & FREDERIK SjOHOLM, FOREIGN FIRMS AND INDONESIAN
MANUFACTURING WAGES: AN ANALYSIS WITH PANEL DATA (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9417, 2002), available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9417 (finding that when a
foreign-firm takes over a domestic-firm in Indonesia wages rise); ROBERT E. LIPSEY, HOME AND HOST
CouNTRY EFFECTS OF FDI (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 9293, 2002), available
at http://www.nber.org/papers/w9293 (summarizing the evidence regarding foreign-firms paying
higher wages); ZADIA FELICIANO & ROBERT E. LIPSEY, FOREIGN OWNERSHIP AND WAGES IN THE
UNITED STATES, 1987-1992 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 6923, 1999),
available at http://www.nber.org/papers/w6923 (discussing Venezuela, Mexico, and the United States).
83. See FELICIANIO & LIPSEY, supra note 82, at 3.
84. See Sonia Bhalotra, Is Child Work Necessary?, available at
http://fmwww.bc.edu/RePEc/es2000/0500.pdf (last visited Apr. 19, 2005) (finding evidence that
Pakistani children work due to conditions of necessity and suggesting trade bans could actually increase
the number of hours children work).
85. Ben White, In the Best Interests of the Child?, at http://www.cwa.tnet.co.th/vol12-
4/interest.htm (last visited Apr. 19, 2005).
86. Id.
87. See White, supra note 85; See also CAROL BELLAMY, UNITED NATIONS CHILDREN'S FUND,
THE STATE OF THE WORLD'S CHILDREN 23 (1997), available at
http://www.unicef.org/sowc97/download/sow I of2.pdf.
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primarily to reach a minimal acceptable level of income for their households, a
lower hourly wage induced them to work longer hours. Hence, paradoxically,
the laws may have contributed to a worsening of child labor. The same risk is
there with modem laws, such as India's Child Labor Act of 1986, that impose
fines on firms that hire children.
88
This debate is reminiscent of the one over minimum wage laws-the
imposition of which often has unintended consequences. In Indonesia, for
example, labor legislation, such as minimum wage laws, have had a statistically
significant negative effect on employment in the formal sector of the economy.
8 9
Those suffering the greatest harm were women, the young, and the less educated. 90
Mandating higher wages or better working conditions is also likely to have
significant negative effects for industries under pressure to locate in low-cost
jurisdictions. 91 This would be true even if working conditions were enforced by a
worldwide policy, as employers would move to locations where the wage and
working conditions were justified by levels of productivity. 92 Chasing away
potential employers can only make things worse, as that would tend to also restrict
the opportunities available to the parents of the child laborers.
It is, therefore, not surprising that one of the most prominent child rights
groups-the United Nations Children's Fund-has labeled as a myth the idea that
boycotts and trade bans are the only way to lessen child labor. 93 In fact, a
UNICEF report seriously questions the efficacy of trade bans and their likely long-
term consequences.
94
In this light, it is hard to see how a trade ban would protect child laborers. A
ban would more likely help domestic special interests. Allowing trade bans based
on labor standards unfortunately "opens the door to possible abusive use of trade
barriers for protectionist reasons."'95 It is not surprising that some of the biggest
88. Kaushik Basu, The Economics of Child Labor, 289 SCI. AM. 84 (2003).
89. See generally ASEP SURYAHADI ET AL., Minimum Wage Policy and Its Impact on Employment
in the Urban Formal Sector, 39 BULL.OF INDONESIAN ECON. STUD. 29 (2003).
90. Id.
91. See DRUSILLA K. BROWN ET AL., THE EFFECTS OF MULTINATIONAL PRODUCTION ON WAGES
AND WORKING CONDITIONS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 10-11 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research,
Working Paper No. 9669, 2003).
92. See id. at 11. An unfortunate example is South Africa where the unemployment rate is 40
percent. Labor standards, enacted at the behest of labor unions, have meant many jobs have been
exported to other developing countries. See Sharon LaFraniere, Low Labor Standard Leads South
Africans to Export Jobs, N.Y. TUMs, Mar. 13, 2004, at A3.
93. BELLAMY, supra note 87, at 21, 23-24.
94. Id. at 23-24.
95. Virginia A. Leary, Workers' Rights and International Trade: The Social Clause (GAT, ILO,
NAFTA, U.S. Laws), in 2 FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 177,
204 (Jagdish Bhagwati & Robert E. Hudec eds.,1996); Alan 0. Sykes, Regulatory Protectionism and
the Law of International Trade, 66 U. CHI. L. REV. 1, 3 (1999) (arguing that a unilateral trade ban on
child labor could be seen as a type of "regulatory protectionism." That is, a regulation that imposes
costs on foreign-producers "in a manner that is unnecessary to the attainment of some genuine,
nonprotectionist regulatory objective."). Child labor bans come within this definition as trade bans
affect costs of protection but are unlikely to reduce child labor.
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advocates of trade bans are unions, who couch their demands for special treatment
in more palatable terms.
9 6
Some have argued that in the past the United States has too readily imposed
unilateral trade sanctions and that these sanctions have been ineffective.97 Worse
than being ineffective, unilateral trade bans targeting some of the world's poorest
countries could have quite pernicious effects on the living standards of the most
vulnerable in those countries.
b. Big Enough Stick?
A U.S. unilateral trade ban might prove ineffectual for another reason-the
United States is often not a large trading partner with poorer nations. If the United
States stops trading with a particular country or industry within that country, the
goods could be sold to other trading partners. For the fifteen countries with the
greatest levels of child labor, trade with the United States collectively accounts for
approximately 9.8 percent of their trade.9 8
96. See, e.g., Jenny Bates, International Trade and Labor Standards, PROGRESSIVE POL'Y INST.,
Apr. 1, 2000, available at http://
http://www.ppionline.org/ppici.cfmcontentid= I 152&knlgArealD=1 08&subsecid=206.
97, Claude Barfield & Mark Groombridge, U.S. Unilateral Sanctions are Overused and
Undereffective, 8 AM. ENTERPRISE 76 (1997) (noting that "42 percent of the world's population live in
sanctioned countries" and that "sanctions are rarely effective").
98. See World Bank Data, supra note 22; see infra Part I1, at tbl. 4. The 9.8 percent figure is an
unweighted average of the U.S. trade figures. A weighted average might yield a different result. This
list only includes countries that had bilateral trade data. This data is available at
ttp://data.econ.ucdavis.edu/intemational/wixd/index.html.
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Table 4. Child Labor and Trade Flows
99
US Trade
Child Labor Exports Imports (% of total
Country (% of children) (% of GDP) (% of GDP) trade)
Mali 51.1% 25.0% 40.4% 1.0%
Bhutan 51.1% 29.6% 59.9% 2.4%
Burundi 48.5% 9.0% 23.6% 7.8%
Uganda 43.8% 10.1% 25.7% 8.5%
Niger 43.6% 15.5% 23.1% 15.9%
Burkina Faso 43.5% 10.7% 29.6% 0.6%
Nepal 42.1% 23.7% 32.0% 33.4%
Rwanda 41.4% 8.3% 24.1% 21.7%
Ethiopia 41.1% 15.4% 30.7% 11.1%
Kenya 39.2% 26.5% 35.6% 2.6%
Comoros 38.4% 15.7% 86.1% 18.4%
Tanzania 37.6% 25.6% 31.9% 3.9%
Guinea-Bissau 36.9% 14.7% 23.2% 1.4%
Chad 36.7% 31.8% 58.2% 1.3%
Madagascar 36.6% 16.6% 32.0% 17.0%
Table 4 shows that the countries with the highest levels of child labor tend
not to trade in significant amounts with the United States. Further, the trade sector
in many of these countries is small. This suggests that disruptions to trade flows
would have limited impacts on the economy. A unilateral trade ban targeting these
countries might have little effect if other countries continue to trade with them.
Even if a significant number of countries join together in a multilateral trade
ban, there is no guarantee this would result in net benefits. If a country that utilizes
child labor is unable to find new trading partners a broader trade ban could have
significant effects. Unfortunately, as illustrated above, it is very possible that these
significant effects would be deleterious. 100 Countries wishing to erect a trade ban
are in a precarious situation-in many cases the ban will not affect enough trade to
make much of a difference, and if the ban does make a difference there is little to
suggest the difference would be positive.
The next section focuses on the applicable WTO law. Despite spirited efforts
at trying to demonstrate that such a unilateral trade ban would be WTO legal, as
discussed below, these attempted justifications fail.
99. See World Bank Data supra note 22. Child labor, export, and import data is from 2000. The
prevalence of child labor represents the percent of those aged 10 to 14 that work.. The US trade data is
from 1990. US trade is calculated by dividing the dollar amount of US trade by the particular country's
total export trade flows.
100. See supra notes 29-43, 59- 76.
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c. WTO/GATTLaw
"With GATT, Asian and other slave-wage countries can send products to the
United States without any taxes. They will be able to use child labor, as it is not
prohibited by GATT."101
"The idea, however, that the WTO as it is, and with the name it carries, can
or will influence the destiny of most or even many child laborers, is completely
fanciful."102
The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created with the
goal of lowering tariffs through a multilateral approach. 103 The present day World
Trade Organization (WTO) is the successor to the GATT.10 4 The WTO Charter
contains the 1994 revised GATT, as well as a number of other agreements. 105
GATT Article XI contains a general prohibition of quantitative restrictions
including quotas. 106 A unilateral trade ban on goods produced using child labor
would contravene this article. It would not be permitted under WTO law unless it
fit within one of the exceptions contained in the agreement.
107
GATT Article XX provides a list of general exceptions, of which XX(b) is
the most applicable.' 08 Exception XX(b) allows a departure from GATT rules if
the measure is "necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health."' 109
101. Philip M. Nichols, Trade Without Values, 90 NW. U. L. REv. 658, 680 n.133 (1996) (quoting
William Pipher, NAFTA, GATT Will Ruin U.S. Economy, INDIANAPOLIS NEWS, Nov. 7, 1994, at A13
(letter to the editor)).
102. Sara Ann Dillon, A Deep Structure Connection: Child Labor and the World Trade
Organization, 9 ILSA J. INT'L & COMP. L. 443, 443 (2003).
103. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXT ON THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL REGULATION OF
TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 211 (4h ed. 2002).
104. Id. at 218-19.
105. Id. at 219-20.
106. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Apr. 15, 1994, art. XI reprinted in JOHN H.
JACKSON ET AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC
RELATIONS: CASE, MATERIALS AND TEXT 28-29 (West 4th ed. 2002) [hereinafter GATT 1994]. Article
I could be implicated if the ban was targeted at particular countries, but not others. GATT 1994 art. I,
at 17-18.
107. See Andrew T. Guzman, Trade, Labor, Legitimacy, 91 CAL. L. REv. 885, 890 (2003)
(discussing how labor issues might be incorporated into WTO law).
108. GATT 1994 art. XX, supra notel06, at 45-46. Some have argued that the XX(a) and XX(e)
exceptions could also apply in the context of unilateral child labor bans. See, e.g., Janelle M. Diller and
David A. Levy, Child Labor, Trade and Investment: Toward the Harmonization of International Law,
91 AM. J. INT'L L. 663, 681-85 (1997) (noting that XX(a) applies to measures necessary to protect
public morals.). For the purposes of this Article, this argument is ignored given the improbability of its
success in front of a WTO panel. See Diego J. Linan Nogueras and Luis M. Hinojosa Martinez,
Human Rights Conditionality in the External Trade of the European Union: Legal and Legitimacy
Problems, 7 COLUM. J. EuR. L. 307328 (2001) (concluding "it is practically impossible to think that
Article XX(a) would permit a Member State to apply its concept of public morals extraterritorially");
but see Guzman, supra note 107, at 890-91 (discussing a potential XX(a) argument.). XX(e) applies to
measures "related to products of prison labor." For simplicity, this Article excludes from consideration
"forced" child labor, which is at least arguably similar to prison labor. According to ILO figures less
than 4% of child laborers are "forced or bonded laborers." See IPEC, supra note 1, at 25. This suggests
VOL. 33:3
CHILD LABOR, GLOBALIZATION, AND THE WTO
In trying to fit a unilateral trade ban within this provision, commentators start
by arguing that child labor is hazardous to the health of the child laborers. 110 In
the abstract, this is not seriously in question."' The problem is that it is highly
unlikely that the elimination of child labor through labor bans actually promotes
human health. The decision whether to enter the labor force is likely made based
partially (if not totally in some cases) on necessity. 112 This necessity means
laborers frozen out of the export market are likely to move to other industries-
industries which may pay less, have worse working conditions, or both. The irony
is that a ban on child labor might actually increase the number of hours children
work.113
Without being able to link the ban with human health, the commentators
stumble. One author argues:
Child labor is a 'vital' health risk and, under a balancing approach, domestic
policymakers should be given wide deference to combat it. No reasonably
available alternatives to unilateral sanctions appear to be 'sufficiently effective.'
. .. The drafting history of Article XX(b) plays a supplementary role and does
not exclude the use of unilateral and extraterritorial sanctions. Furthermore, the
WTO Preamble objective of raising standards of living permits the pursuit of
properly delimited social objectives.
114
Ignoring the legality of sanctions for extraterritorial conduct, 1 5 this argument
relies on an unproven assertion: unilateral sanctions are effective in protecting the
significant difficulty in targeting industries that rely on this form of child labor making such bans
difficult to administer.
109. GATT 1994 art. XX(b), supra note 106, at 45. Timothy A.Glut has suggested that unilateral
trade bans might not be considered necessary given the availability of other measures to combat child
labor such as labeling. See Glut, supra note 19, at 1233-34. He notes that the word "necessary" in
Article XX(b) is problematic because GAIT Dispute Panels have interpreted the term to mean "the
least-GATT-inconsistent alternative that a country could reasonably be expected to employ" in order to
achieve its overriding public policy goals. Id. Glut further argues that because inconsistencies with
GATT must be unavoidable, "it is likely that a GATT Panel would find that alternatives such as a
product labeling requirement foreclose the availability of other trade sanctions." Id. at 1234. This
Article does not consider that argument.
110. Glut, supra note 19, at 1233; Benjamin James Stevenson, supra note 77, at 162; Matthew
Mitro, supra note 77, at 1243.
111. See ANACLAUDIA GASTAL FASSA, HEALTH BENEFITS OF ELIMINATING CHILD LABOUR 46
(ILO Working Paper , 2003), available at
http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/publ/download/pol-healthcostben-2003_en.pdf.
112. Bhalotra, supra note 84, at 24 (finding support for the contention that Pakistani children enter
the work force mainly due to conditions of necessity).
113. See supra text accompanying notes 84--8888.
114. Mitro, supra note 77, at 1260-61 (citations omitted).
115. See United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998,
WT/DS58/AB/R, for a discussion of when sanctions for extraterritorial conduct might be allowed in a
case litigated under Article XX(g). The Appellate Body noted:
Of course, it is not claimed that all populations of these species migrate to, or traverse, at one time or
another, waters subject to United States jurisdiction. Neither the appellant nor any of the appellees
claims any rights of exclusive ownership over the sea turtles, at least not while they are swimming
freely in their natural habitat -- the oceans. We do not pass upon the question of whether there is an
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health of child laborers by reducing the prevalence of child labor. As discussed
above, 116 such an assertion is unlikely to prove true in practice, therefore, any
claims that the measure protects child laborers must fail. 117
Further, the ban may also have to comply with the standards enunciated in
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade. 118 A ban on child labor might be
considered a technical regulation as it would "lay[] down product characteristics or
their related processes and production methods... with which compliance is
mandatory." 119  Technical regulations should be created without "creating
unnecessary obstacles to international trade" and "shall not be more trade-
restrictive than necessary to fulfill a legitimate objective, taking account of the
risks non-fulfillment would create."'
120
Proponents of such bans will again have a difficult time proving a ban on
child labor is necessary to prevent harm to human health, as discussed above. One
writer has also noted that the technical barriers agreement gives additional time to
developing nations to comply with proposed barriers.' 2 ' In particular, the
agreement states that "[m]embers shall, in the preparation and application of
implied jurisdictional limitation in Article XX(g), and if so, the nature or extent of that limitation. We
note only that in the specific circumstances of the case before us, there is a sufficient nexus between the
migratory and endangered marine populations involved and the United States for purposes of Article
XX(g)," (emphasis added).
United States-Import Prohibitions of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products, Oct. 12, 1998,
WT/DS58/AB/R, at para. 133. This differs from the case of child labor in two respects. First, the
population of one nation is the exclusive concern of that nation's government. Second, there is little
nexus between the United States and foreign child laborers.
116. See supra text accompanying notes 18-32.
117. Robert Howse & Michael J. Treblicock, The Free Trade-Fair Trade Debate: Trade, Labor,
and the Environment, in ECONOMIC DIMENSIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW: COMPARATIVE AND
EMPIRICAL PERSPECTIVES 186, 215 (Jagdeep S. Bhandair & Alan 0. Sykes, eds., 1997) (arguing that
the fact that the action is unilateral might be enough to condemn it. Unilateral action has previously
been condemned by a GATT panel as violating the requirement of necessity. The panel used a least
restrictive means approach and concluded that "since the United States had not exhausted the avenues
for a negotiated cooperative solution that would have avoided trade disruption" the measures could not
be considered "necessary.").
118. Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASE, MATERIALS AND TEXT 149-73.
119. Id. at 164; See also Glut, supra note 19, at 1234. It is not entirely clear that a ban on child
labor would be considered a technical barrier under WTO case law. See European Communities -
Measures Affecting Asbestos and Asbestos-Containing Products, Sept. 18, 2000, WT/DS 135/AB/R, for
a discussion of this issue. In that case, the WTO Appellate Body limited the definition of "technical
barrier" to those regulations that deal with identifiable groups of products. Id. at para. 70. However,
they noted that a ban on asbestos did deal with an identifiable group of products-that is, all products.
Id. paras. 72, 74. According to the Appellate Body "product characteristics" include things like
"composition, size, shape, colour, texture, hardness, tensile strength, flammability, conductivity,
density, or viscosity." Id. at 67. This would seemingly exclude bans on child labor. There is no
discussion, however, on what constitutes a "related processes or production method." The use of child
labor might fit within this category.
120. GATT 1994 art. 2.2, supra note 106, at 150.
121. Glut, supra note 19, at 1234-35. See also GATT 1994 arts. 2.12, 12, supra note 106, at 151,
161-62.
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technical regulations... take account of the special development, financial and trade
needs of developing country Members. ' 122  This suggests that developing
countries would get additional leeway when defending themselves in front of a
WTO panel.
Given these obstacles it would be a mistake to use unilateral trade bans in the
name of protecting children. The danger of making things worse is too great and
the likely benefits are too small. A World Bank paper notes, "there is virtually no
economic case favoring the use of bilateral or multilateral trade penalties against
labor standards.... On the other hand, the economic case against such penalties is
strong."123
d. Countervailing Duties and GA TT
Some commentators suggest that child labor might be condemned under
international law as either a subsidy or as dumping. 124 Under GATT both
subsidized and dumped goods can have countervailing duties applied to them.125
However, child labor does not fit comfortably within either of these molds.
1. Subsidy
Under WTO law a subsidy is defined as a "financial contribution by a
government" where a "benefit is thereby conferred. ' 126 A financial contribution
includes, inter alia, a situation where "government revenue that is otherwise due is
foregone."'1 27 These requirements are likely to doom any claim that the allowance
of child labor is a subsidy.
Some argue that by failing to enforce laws regarding child laborers,
developing nations confer a benefit on producers who violate those laws with
impunity. 128 However, even if we assume that a subsidy exists, 29 the mere
122. GATT 1994 art. 12.3, supra notel06, at 161. See also GATT 1994, art. 12.4, supra note 106
("Members therefore recognize that developing country Members should not be expected to use
international standards as a basis for their technical regulations ... which are not appropriate to their
development, financial and trade needs.").
123. KEITH E. MASKUS, SHOULD CORE LABOR STANDARDS BE IMPOSED THROUGH
INTERNATIONAL TRADE POLICY? 67 (World Bank Working Paper No. 1817, 1997); see also Basu and
Tzannatos, supra note 10, at 151 (noting that "[in a very poor economy it is entirely possible that the
demand for labor is so low that . . .a ban on child labor can backfire, leaving the children and their
parents impoverished and risking starvation.").
124. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 164-66.
125. See GATT 1994 art. VI, supra note 106, at 23-24; Agreement on Implementation of Article
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET
AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS:
CASE, MATERIALS AND TEXT 174-97 [hereinafter Anti-dumping Agreement]; Agreement on Subsidies
and Countervailing Measures, Apr. 15, 1994, reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., 2002 DOCUMENTS
SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS: CASE, MATERIALS AND
TEXT 253-94 [hereinafter SCM].
126. SCM arts. l.l(a)(1),l.l(b), supra note 125, at 253.
127. SCM art. l.l(a)(l)(ii), supra note 125, at 253.
128. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 165. Though a weak argument, presumably the revenue forgone
could be the fines that could have been imposed. Daniel S. Ehrenberg argues that "'actionable'
subsidies should be expanded to include gross and persistent violations of the prohibition against forced
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existence of a subsidy is not condemned by the WTO. Subsidies are only
condemned if they are considered "specific" under Article 2 of the Subsidies
Agreement.
130
Specific subsidies are either export contingent,13 ' aimed at inducing import
substitution, 132 or targeted at a specific "enterprise or industry or group of
enterprises or industries."'1 33 Since this so-called "child labor subsidy" would be
available to any industry in the country, it would be considered a general subsidy
(allowable) rather than a specific subsidy (impermissible). 34 Therefore, under
WTO law the United States could not take action against this so-called 'subsidy.'
2. Social Dumping
The final argument 135 considered in this Article is whether allowing child
labor is a type of "social dumping."'1 36 Dumped goods are those sold at less than
their "normal value."'1 37 If dumping is found, the complaining nation may impose
a duty on the dumped goods so long as the duty is not greater than the margin of
dumping.1
38
While some argue that dumping should be found when a country lacks
appropriate levels of social legislation, 139 this is not supported by the text of
GATT. To find dumping a product's selling price in the importing nation must be
"less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of trade, for the like product
or child labor." Daniel S. Ehrenberg, The Labor Link: Applying the International Trading System to
Enforce Violations of Forced and Child Labor, 20 YALE J. INT'L L. 361, 393 n. 263 (1995). However,
as the agreement is currently written, there is no textual support for this expansion.
129. See generally, SCM supra note 125. A developing country that found itself in front of a WTO
panel would have a strong argument that there is no subsidy under the definition in the SCM agreement.
130. See SCM art. 2, supra note 125, at 254.
131. See SCM arts. 2.3, 3.1(a), supra note 125, at 254-55. Some might argue that the allowance of
child labor is actually export contingent. See Ehrenberg, supra note 128, at 393 n.265 (arguing that it is
difficult to classify subsidies, and that if the subsidy is given to all industries but export industries
primarily benefit, the subsidy "may be better classified as an export subsidy"); See U.S. DEPT. OF
LABOR, supra note 15, at 2. Given that the export sector employs only a small portion of all child
laborers such re-characterization is not appropriate here as the export industry does not receive a
majority of the benefits of child labor.
132. SCM arts. 2.3, 3.1(b), supra note 125, at 254-55.
133. SCM art. 2.1, supra note 125, at 254.
134. But see Ehrenberg, supra note 128, at 393 n. 265 (indicating that the subsidy must be
"specific" but arguing that a child labor subsidy should still be actionable).
135. See, e.g., Diller & Levy, supra note 108, at 685-686. Some have also argued that Article
XXIII of GATT 1994 might provide an avenue for attacking child labor. Since those arguing this agree
that the "use of Article XXIII in the context of child labor appears problematic under the new WTO
rules," this article will not consider the issue. See also GATT 1994 art. XXIII, supra note 106, at 47,
which states that the provisions of Article XXIII apply when "any benefit accruing to [a country]
directly or indirectly under [the] Agreement is being nullified or impaired ... as the result of ... the
application by another contracting party of any measure, whether or not it conflicts with the provisions
of this Agreement."
136. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 164-66.
137. See GATT 1994 art. VI:1, supra note 106, at 23.
138. See GATT 1994 art. VI:2, supra note 106, at 23.
139. Stevenson, supra note 77, at 165; Ehrenberg, supra note 128, at 392-93.
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when destined for consumption in the exporting country. ' 140 If there are no
domestic prices the lower of the following should be used: "the highest comparable
price for the like product for export to any third country in the ordinary course of
trade" 141 or "the cost of production of the production in the country of origin plus a
reasonable addition for selling cost and profit. 1 42 None of these definitions allow
for consideration of the regulatory environment that generated the costs and prices
of the exporting nation. 143 None of these defmitions would result in finding the
price in the importing nation was lower than the price in the exporting nation due
to the use of child labor.1 44 If the export price is not lower there is no dumping
margin and there cannot be a countervailing duty.'
45
Furthermore, during GATT negotiations both Canada and the United States
argued that "dumping" should only refer to "price dumping."'1 46 The Cuban
delegation's proposal, which would have condemned dumping "whether practiced
through the mechanism of price, freight rates, currency depreciation, sweated
labor, or by any other means," was rejected.
147
Article VI was not meant to apply to so-called "social dumping" and should
not be expanded. If this "social dumping" argument was successful, the coverage
of this provision could conceivably apply anywhere labor standards differed
between nations-a result unlikely contemplated by the signatories of GATT.
48
From an economic standpoint, the case for harmonized labor standards is weak. In
fact, harmonization can end up hurting the poor nations that the proponents of such
harmonization claim they want to help.
1 49
140. See GATT 1994 art. VI:l(a) supra note 106, at 23.
141. GATT 1994 art. VI: I(b)(i), supra note 106, at 23.
142. GATT' 1994 art. VI: 1 (b)(ii), supra note 106, at 23.
143. See GATT 1994 art. VI, supra note 106, at 23.
144. See Anti-dumping Agreement art. 2.1, supra note 125, at 174. If the price of the good was
cheaper by $2 because of the use of child labor, it would be sold for $2 less in both the exporting and
importing nations. See id. at 174-75 (definitions refer to prices and costs and not to the regulatory
environment that those costs were generated in); 19 USC § 1677(15) (2000) (requiring that the sale be
"in the ordinary course of trade." This includes sales in the exporting country even if the product
embodies the work of children and refers to regular business practices. For example, under U.S. law the
term "means the conditions and practices which.., have been normal in the trade under consideration
with respect to merchandise of the same class or kind." This definition does not exclude the use of
child labor.).
145. See GATT 1994 art. VI:I, supra note 106, at 23. Additionally the complaining nation must
prove "material injury to an established industry." Some of the industries (such as carpet weaving) that
utilize child labor may not have a developed country counterpart, making them immune from this type
of attack. A developed country that has no harmed industry should have no ability to complain since
lower prices can only benefit that country.
146. See Diller and Levy, supra note 108, at 681.
147. Id. at 680-681; See also Stevenson, supra note 77, at 165.
148. See Belgian Family Allowances, Nov. 7, 1952, G/32 - IS/59 (declaring a government
procurement statute that imposed a levy on goods originating in countries deemed to have an inadequate
family allowance system to be a violation of GATT).
149. Drusilla K. Brown et al., International Labor Standards and Trade: A Theoretical Analysis, in
I FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE? 227, 269-72 (Jagdish
Bhagwati and Robert E. Hudec eds., 1996). Although these authors believe allowing child labor might
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CONCLUSION
Increased globalization has not been and will not be a major determinant of
the prevalence of child labor. Developing nations should not restrict trade in the
hopes of reducing child labor. Developed countries should not impose unilateral
trade bans on goods produced with child labor. First, the likely consequences of a
unilateral trade ban are negative, with the most vulnerable suffering the greatest.
Second, such action would be impermissible under WTO law.
Child labor is a problem that has afflicted every nation. As wealth has grown
the problem has receded. Protectionist demands disguised as humanitarian
concerns should be resisted. Trade should be allowed to continue to exert a
positive influence on standards of living across the globe.
be thought of as an "unfair" trade practice, they note that the imposition of a countervailing duty will
hurt labor in the low-income country. Id. at 270-272. They further note that gains from trade to high-
income countries do not require the efficient allocation of resources in low-income countries; these
gains are generated from the ability to trade at prices different than the world without trade. Id. at 271.
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III. APPENDIX
Table 5. Child Labor and Openness (Static Model)- 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990, 1995, and 2002
1960 1970 1980
(IMP + (IMP + (IMP +
EXP) (EXP) EXP) (EXP) EXP) (EXP)
Constant 2.84*** 3.01*** 2.44*** 2.64*** 2.75*** 2.88***
(0.35) (0.29) (0.34) (0.26) (0.29) (0.22)
GNI per Capita 0.1709*** 0.1708*** 0.1077*** 0.1056*** 0.0951*** 0.0874***
(0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
GNI 0.0106 0.0073 0.0390** 0.0355*** 0.0273** 0.0266**
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
OPEN 0.09** 0.08** 0.11*** 0.10*** 0.08** 0.08***
(0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
R-2  58.7 58.7 60.8 61.8 59.9 60.8
n 84 84 103 103 122 122
1990 1995 2000
(IMP + (IMP + (IMP +
EXP) (EXP) EXP) (EXP) EXP) (EXP)
Constant 2.98*** 3.19*** 3.15*** 3.38*** 3.17*** 3.37***
(0.24) (0.18) (0.23) (0.17) (0.21) (0.16)
GNI per Capita 0.0647*** 0.0600*** 0.0589*** 0.0578*** 0.0558*** 0.0527***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
GNI 0.0249** 0.0217** 0.0205** 0.0164"* 0.0200** 0.0166*s
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
OPEN 0.10** 0.09*** 0.09*** 0.08*** 0.10** 0.09***
(0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02)
R2 = 51.9 52.9 50.1 50.2 50.0 51.5
n = 144 144 151 151 137 137
A positive coefficient means as the variable increases, the prevalence of child labor decreases.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * means statistically significant at the 10%-level. ** is at the 5%-
level and *** is at the 1%-level.
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Table 6. Child Labor and Openness (Dynamic Model - Change Measured at 2000)
1960 1970 1980
(IMP + (IMP + (IMP +
EXP) (EXP) EXP) (EXP) EXP) (EXP)
Constant 11.27*** 11.46*** 9.79*** 9.93*** 6.40*** 6.33***
(1.14) (1.10) (0.94) (0.88) (0.58) (0.59)
A GNI per 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004*** 0.0004** 0.0004**
Capita (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
A GNI 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000* 0.0000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
A OPEN -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 -0.02 -0.04
(0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03)
R2  15.1 14.8 20.2 20.0 9.9 10.5
n 69 69 85 85 84 84
1990 1995
(IMP + (IMP +
EXP) (EXP) EXP) (EXP)
Constant 3.97*** 3.93*** 1.88*** 1.88***
(0.34) (0.33) (0.15) (0.15)
A GNI per 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0007* 0.0006*
Capita (0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
A GNI 0.0000"* 0.0000"* 0.0000** 0.0000*
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
A OPEN 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.02
(0.01) (0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
R1= 11.1 10.9 7.8 7.5
n= 84 84 86 86
A positive coefficient means as the variable increases, the prevalence of child labor decreases.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * means statistically significant at the 10%-level. ** is at the 5%-
level and *** is at the 1%-level.
Table 7. Child Labor and Changes
(IMP + EXP) (EXP)
GNI per Capita,/ 0.01 0.01




OPEN,. 0  (0.06) (0.05)
A negative coefficient means as the variable increases, the prevalence of child labor decreases.
Standard errors are in parentheses. * means statistically significant at the 10%-level. ** is at the 5%-
level and *** is at the 1%-level.
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PROGRAM FOREWORD
J. Triplett Mackintosh'
September 11, 2001 ("9/11") will stand as a defining moment in U.S. export
controls. Viewed from the distance of several years, it is now evident that 9/11
brought to the glare of public awareness the troubling reality that non-state
terrorists threaten the core of the United States. The prior prevailing view that
' J.D. 2005, University of Denver Sturm College of Law. Thanks to Professor J. Triplett Mackintosh
for his commitment to legal education, to Mark D. Menefee for his generosity in agreeing to write the
introduction, and to Whitney Holmes and Christopher J. Walsh of Hogan & Hartson L.L.P. for
graciously fielding my Sarbanes-Oxley questions.
1. J. Triplett Mackintosh is a partner with Holland & Hart, LLP, in Denver, Colorado, where he
specializes in export controls and white-collar criminal defense. His practice in the area of export
controls has spanned the Cold War to the current war on terror. His clients have included major U.S.
corporations, non-U.S. companies, and individuals in the United States and abroad. He holds a B.A.
from Regis University; an M.A. from the Graduate School of International Studies at the University of
Denver; and a J.D. from Georgetown University Law Center.
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terrorism was something that affected foreign venues was one of the many
casualties of that day. Another victim of 9/11 was the previously held belief that
export controls were merely an irritating part of federal trade controls that were
more a nuisance than anything else. It was clear that the 9/11 terrorists and their
supporters relied on access to U.S.-origin technologies and financial networks to
achieve their scheme.2 It was also clear that throughout the world there were (and
are) many other terrorists waiting for the funds and technology required to harm
the United States.
3
9/11 is not the only noteworthy date in the recent chronology of export
controls, but it was qualitatively different from the others. Other salient events in
the last half of the 1900s have included the conclusion of World War II, the Cold
War, and the first Iraqi conflict. Unlike 9/11, these other events placed the United
States in conflict with governments, that is, state-actors. As the United States and
its allies considered how to keep these state-actors from acquiring technology that
could be used offensively or defensively, the focal point of export controls was
relatively clear, well-defined.
For example, during the Cold War, the United States and its allies under the
"Coordinating Committee on Multilateral Export Controls" ("COCOM") agreed on
an Industrial List of technologies that would be controlled for export to the Eastern
Bloc.4 The analysis was relatively simple for regulators and exporters: "what" is
going "where." 5 The "where" answered all the questions regarding use. If it was
going to the Eastern Bloc, regulators could conclude reasonably that it would be
used to the advantage of the communist state to the detriment of the Free World.6
That meant that licenses were frequently denied and exports restricted.7
The end of the Cold War and the first Iraqi conflict changed the equation. On
the one hand, regulators had an incentive to support technological development of
former Soviet states.8 On the other hand, regulators saw after the first Gulf War
2. See NATIONAL COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES ("9/11
COMMISSION"), THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
TERRORIST ATrACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES, EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 1, 14 (2004), at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/911/pdf/coverexecsummary.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
3. See 9/11 COMMISSION, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT: FINAL REPORT OF THE NATIONAL
COMMISSION ON TERRORIST ATTACKS UPON THE UNITED STATES 362-63 (2004), at
http://a257.g.akamaitech.net/7/257/2422/22ju12004l130/www.gpoaccess.gov/91 l/pdf/secl2.pdf (last
visited Feb. 18, 2005).
4. See Nunn-Wolfowitz Task Force Report: Industry "Best Practices" Regarding Export
Compliance Programs 4, at http://www.usexportcompliance.com/Papers/nunnwolfowitz.pdf (last
visited Feb. 18, 2005).
5. See Department of Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and
Enforcement: Export Management Systems Guidelines Introduction, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/ExportManagementSystems/pdf/emsintro.pdf (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
6. See Nunn-Wolfowitz Task Force Report, supra note 4.
7. See Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and Enforcement: Export Management
Systems Guidelines Introduction, supra note 5.
8. See Department of Commerce, Office of International Technology, Technology
Administration, International Technology Programs, Russia Technology Dialogue, at
http://www.technology.gov/lnternationalVEurope/p-Russia.html (last visited Feb. 18, 2005).
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how Iraq had diverted dual-use or commercial items for military purposes.
9
Regulators also learned how countries, such as Brazil, supported Iraq's military
development by diverting otherwise lawful exports from the United States. 10 The
equation now centered on "use" and "users."" Even an export to an erstwhile ally
might be diverted for proliferation purposes if the "user" was unreliable 12
9/11 only underscored for the U.S. public what regulators had learned during
the first Gulf War: the "use" of an export and the "user" were the critical
questions.' 3 The country of destination became almost secondary as the focus of
regulatory controls went to "end-use" and "end-user."' 4 The new goal was to keep
important technologies from those who would proliferate weapons of mass
destruction and their delivery systems.' 5  This focus, however, put a new
emphasis-and responsibility-on the exporter. This is where Tara Dunn's model
program comes in.
Not surprisingly, post-9/1 1, enforcement of export controls has taken a new
importance. Violations are considered a breach of "homeland security" and export
controls are a new darling of federal prosecutors across the country. 16  U.S.
companies, therefore, have only one choice: comply. The rules are too important
and the penalties too great to treat export controls as if they were some other
paperwork obligation. 17 Ms. Dunn's model program provides clear guidance for
companies facing this compliance burden.
While her program is designed to meet the business activities of a fictional
company, the methodology reflected in her program is directly applicable to other
companies. Counsel for exporting companies would do well to review the model
program and apply it as a rubric to develop a tailored export compliance program.
Ms. Dunn's work on this project was exemplary. The quality of her program
resulted in her receiving the 2004 Holland & Hart Private International Law
9. Douglas Jehl, Who Armed Iraq? Answers the West Didn't Want to Hear, N.Y. TIMES, July 18,
1993 at E5, available at 1993 WLNR 3365960.
10. Id.
11. See id.
12. See id.; Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and Enforcement: Export Management
Systems Guidelines Introduction, supra note 5.
13. See 9/11 COMMISSION, THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT supra note 3 AT 380-81; see also JEHL
supra note 9; see also Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and Enforcement: Export
Management Systems Guidelines Introduction, supra note 5.
14. See Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and Enforcement: Export Management
Systems Guidelines Introduction, supra note 5.
15. See Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and Enforcement: Export Management
Systems Guidelines Introduction, supra note 5.
16. See Justice Ready to Step Up Criminal Prosecution of Export Violations, THE EXPORT PRACT.
Nov. 2003, at 7.
17. See 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2004) (criminal penalties under the Arms Export Control Act); 15
C.F.R. § 746.3(b) (2004) (criminal penalties under the Export Administration Regulations [hereinafter
the "EAR"); 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (debarment under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations); 15
C.F.R. § 764.3 (a)(2) (denial of export privileges under the EAR); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (c)(2) (2004)
(cross-debarment by the Department of State for violations of the EAR); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(c)(2)(ii)(B)
(debarment from government contracts by the Department of Defense for violations of the EAR).
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Award. This was the first time the scholarship award was won by an entry other
than a traditional legal paper. All of us at Holland & Hart are proud of her
achievement and to have had the opportunity to support this fine young lawyer.
PROGRAM INTRODUCTION
Mark D. Menefeel8
When a law enforcement officer looks at a company, one of the first questions
he or she asks him or herself will be: "Are these people good guys or bad guys?"
Much is at stake for the officer. Initial information about the company's activities
helps the officer decide not only how to begin the inquiry but, more importantly,
how best to protect the safety of the officer and his or her fellow officers when
dealing with the company. An investigator approaching an unknown office
building is taking a personal safety risk no less than a police officer approaching a
car that has been pulled over on the highway. While an officer investigating a so-
called "white collar crime" will be typically less likely to encounter a violent
response from the person under investigation than, say, an officer investigating a
drug smuggling operation, the training for federal criminal investigators
emphasizes the possibly fatal consequences to the officer from making incorrect
assumptions about the level of threat posed by a person who is the subject of the
officer's initial questions.
If you were a federal agent charged with responsibility for investigating white
collar crimes such as export control violations or securities fraud, and felt keenly
the need to make a quick and accurate first assessment of whether a company
consists" of good guys who may have made a technical mistake, or terrorist
supporters who wouldn't hesitate to defraud other companies in order to
accomplish their mission, and who are completely willing to kill you in the
process, what would be your test? On an interpersonal level, your initial "gut
reaction" about the truthfulness of the people you meet and interview will tell you
a great deal-but only about those individuals, not necessarily about the
corporation as a whole. Is there some other information, at the corporate level, that
could help you quickly assess the character of the whole organization?
At the initial stage of an investigation the single best indicator of whether a
company is law abiding is whether the company has an effective compliance
program. "According to available information, only 2 of the 865 corporations
sentenced for federal crimes during the last eight years had effective compliance
programs. Of the 143 organizations sentenced under Chapter 8 in 2002, not one
maintained any type of compliance program whatsoever."'19 These sentencing
18. Of Counsel, Baker & McKenzie LLP. Former Director, Office of Export Enforcement,
Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce.
19. Revised Definition of Effective Compliance and Ethics Program in the United States
Sentencing Guidelines Takes Effect on November 1, 2004, CORPORATE COMPLIANCE CLIENT ALERT
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statistics must be understood properly. It does not follow from these statistics that
a company can avoid possible criminal liability by merely officially adopting a
compliance program. What does follow is that there is a strong correlation
between crimes committed by corporations and a complete disregard of their
compliance responsibilities by the management of those corporations.2 ° In other
words, companies whose managers choose not to take their compliance
responsibilities seriously are flying blind. They are significantly more likely to
commit violations of complex regulatory regimes, such as those governing exports,
than companies that maintain reasonably effective compliance programs. 21 They
also are much more likely to generate the sort of "smoking gun" memos and email
that reveal full well their negligence or their knowing and willing intent to violate
laws impeding their short term business plans. An experienced federal investigator
knows that when he or she finds a company operating without an effective
compliance program, the odds are in favor of discovering evidence of a crime.
The vast majority of business people have absolutely no desire to commit
regulatory crimes. But small- and medium-sized companies must make difficult
choices about how to come up with the money needed to insure a reasonable
degree of compliance. Start-up companies find regulatory compliance to be
especially difficult to fund. In the area of export controls, where the regulations
are quite complex, the costs of running an effective compliance program can be
very high. However, because export controls safeguard the national security of the
United States and its allies, the penalties for violations can be devastating. It is not
uncommon for violators to be subject to criminal and civil fines as well as denials
of export privileges; often penalties will be imposed not only against the
corporation but against the midlevel managers or senior executives as well.2
Small- and medium-sized firms, and their owners, are especially susceptible to
multiple penalties.
Tara Dunn's model compliance program provides a great service to the
international business community. Her program can help a smaller company, or a
new start-up firm, reduce its initial export compliance costs while achieving a
sophisticated level of compliance. If a company will take to heart the importance
of complying with U.S. export controls and use Ms. Dunn's model program as its
standard, it will be able to manage its risks effectively and economically.
(Baker & McKenzie LLP, North America), November 2, 2004 at 3 [hereinafter "Baker & McKenzie
Client Alert"]. "Chapter 8" refers to Chapter 8 of the United States Sentencing Guidelines on
Sentencing Organizations. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8 (2004).
20. See Baker & McKenzie Client Alert supra note 19, at 3.
21. See Baker & McKenzie Client Alert supra note 19, at 3.
22. See, e.g., 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2004) (criminal penalties under the Arms Export Control Act);
15 C.F.R. § 764.3(b) (2004) (criminal penalties under the Export Administration Regulations); 22
C.F.R. § 127.7 (2004) (debarment under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations); 15 C.F.R. §
764.3 (a)(2) (2004) (denial of export privileges under the Export Administration Regulations); 15
C.F.R. § 764.3 (c)(2)(ii) (2004) (cross-debarment by the Department of State for violations of the
Export Administration Regulations); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(c)(2)(ii)(B) (2004) (debarment from
government contracts by the Department of Defense for violations of the Export Administration
Regulations).
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Moreover, not only will the company detect potentially illegal transactions and
avoid being pulled into diversion schemes, it also could use the compliance
program as a form of strategic planning for potential overseas markets. Ms.
Dunn's model program might strike a reader who is unfamiliar with the nuances of
export controls as being overly elaborate and complex, with too much technical
terminology. It is not. In fact, the very careful and detailed legal analysis
underlying her program needs to be understood by the management of a company
when they consider implementing their own compliance program. Managers will
need to take the model program and adapt it to fit their company's particular
markets, product lines, and business processes. Then they will be able to simplify
parts of the model program to fit the level of training and understanding of the
employees who will actually implement the program. This is as it should be.
What is important is that they begin with a model program that actually gets the
law right, and that provides the specific legal basis for particular components. This
model compliance program does just that.
I commend Ms. Dunn for her stellar work in developing such a detailed and
clear program to assist companies in developing effective export compliance
programs. She has laid the groundwork for companies to conduct their export
business in ways that are both legal and smart. I also would like to express my
respect and appreciation to the University of Denver Sturm College of Law, the
law firm of Holland & Hart, and the Denver Journal of Intemational Law and
Policy for sharing her fine work with the international business community.
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A. PREFACE
In today's post 9/11 world, non-compliance with U.S. export controls is
simply not an option. A single export violation subjects a company to a range of
potential sanctions: fines of up to $1 million per violation, a loss of export
privileges, and debarment from government contracts.23 After the terrorist attacks
of 9/11, enforcement of these controls has become a Department of Justice
priority.24 The potential penalties and renewed enforcement initiatives highlight
the importance of recommending, developing, and implementing organization-
specific export compliance programs for entities engaged in international trade.25
In addition to decreasing the risk of violations, an export compliance program
serves a critical corporate governance function. For an entity engaged in
international trade, an export compliance program can provide information and
controls necessary for the principal executive officers to certify periodic reports,
and for management to report on internal controls over financial reporting as
required under Sarbanes-Oxley.26 Further, in the event of a violation, an effective
export compliance program may factor significantly against prosecuting the
organization and/or support a downward departure in criminal penalties.
Much has been written about the importance of and relevant considerations
for developing an export compliance program. Unlike much of the existing
scholarship on the topic, this model program articulates specific procedures for
compliance with the primary U.S. export controls at the operational level of a
hypothetical client. While no effective export compliance program is 'one size fits
23. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c) (2004) (criminal penalties under the Arms Export Control Act); 15 C.F.R.
§ 764.3(b) (2004) (criminal penalties under the Export Administration Regulations [hereinafter the
"EAR"); 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2004) (debarment under the International Traffic in Arms Regulations
[hereinafter the "ITAR"]); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (a)(2) (2004) (denial of export privileges under the EAR);
15 C.F.R. § 764.3 (c)(2)(ii) (2004) (cross-debarment by the Department of State for violations of the
EAR); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(c)(2)(ii)(B) (2004) (debarment from government contracts by the Department
of Defense for violations of the EAR).
24. Justice Ready to Step Up Criminal Prosecution of Export Violations, THE EXPORT
PRACTITIONER, Volume 17, No. 11 (Nov. 2003) at 7. See also Robert Block, U.S. Cracks Down on
Technology Exports to Iran: Concern Grows Over Access to Conventional Weapons By Hostile States,
Terrorists, WALL STREET JOURNAL, Feb. 24, 2005, at Al.
25. Under the "deemed export rule," U.S. companies that employ foreign nationals under
circumstances where these employees have access to controlled technologies are considered to be
exporting the controlled technology. See infra notes 106-119 and accompanying text. As used in this
article, the term "engaged in international trade" refers both to physical exports and to exports of
technology under the deemed export rule.
26. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-204, 116 Stat. 745 §§ 302, 906, 404 (2002).
27. Memorandum from Deputy Attorney General Larry D. Thompson to Heads of Department
Components and U.S. Attorneys, Principles of Federal Prosecution of Business Organizations, (Jan.
20, 2003), at http://www.usdoj.gov/dag/cftf/corporate-guidelines.htm [hereinafter "Thompson Memo"]
(last visited Mar. 1, 2005); U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f) (2004); id. § 8B2.1. On
January 12, 2005, in a 5-4 opinion, the United States Supreme Court held that the Sentencing
Guidelines are advisory, rather than mandatory. United States v. Booker, No. 04-104, 04-105, 2005
WL 50108 (Jan. 12, 2005) (5-4 decision) (Breyer, J., majority opinion, in part).
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all,' this model program provides practitioners representing small to mid-cap
companies with a template for developing a comprehensive export compliance
program.
Part 1 of this preface discusses the 'beyond export compliance benefits' of an
export compliance program. Part 2 sets forth the hypothetical client facts and
specific design considerations for the model program.
1. BEYOND EXPORT COMPLIANCE: THE EXPORT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM'S
CRUCIAL ROLE IN CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND MINIMIZING THE IMPACT OF
VIOLATIONS
Principally, an effective export compliance program furthers vital policy
objectives behind export control laws. These include national security, foreign
policy, anti-terrorism, and non-proliferation.28 In addition to promoting these
policy objectives, an export compliance program can have an important impact on
the corporate governance practices of organizations engaged in international trade
and may serve to mitigate the impact of inadvertent export violations. Three recent
and significant legal developments expanded the 'beyond export compliance
benefits' of effective compliance programs for business organizations: (1) the
Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002's section 302 and 906 certifications, and section 404
disclosure requirements; (2) the Department of Justice's Thompson Memo,
outlining principles for federal prosecution of business entities; and (3) the
November 2004 amendments to the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines for Sentencing
Organizations defining an "effective compliance and ethics program" for
mitigating penalties. 29 For organizations engaged in international trade that are
subject to the Securities and Exchange Commission's ("SEC") reporting
requirements, these developments underscore the critical need to develop and
implement a company-specific export compliance program and increase the value
of establishing and maintaining a comprehensive compliance program.
30
28. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 730.4 (2004).
29. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 §§ 302, 906, 404; Thompson Memo, supra note 27; U.S.
SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8C2.5(f); id. § 8B2. 1.
30. Recent SEC action suggests that a comprehensive, firm-wide compliance program designed to
address regulatory matters such as the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act can be an important tool in
complying with federal securities laws. See Press Release, SEC Sues the Titan Corporation for
Payments to Election Campaign of Benin President, 2005-23, at 2-3 at
http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2005-23.htm (Mar. 1, 2005); Complaint at 58, p. 16; Securities and
Exchange Commission v. Titan Corp. (D. C.) (Civ. A. No. 05-0411), at
http://www.sec.gov/litigation/compliants/compl9l07.pdf (Mar. 1, 2005).
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a. SARBANES-OXLEY CONSIDERATIONS: CERTIFICATIONS UNDER SECTIONS
302 AND 906; MANAGEMENT'S ANNUAL REPORT ON INTERNAL CONTROLS OVER
FINANCIAL REPORTING UNDER SECTION 404
Under Sarbanes-Oxley section 302, a reporting company's chief executive
officer and chief financial officer must personally certify that based on their
knowledge there are no material misstatements of material fact or omissions of fact
that would make an annual report on Form 10-K or quarterly report on Form 10-Q
misleading.3  Further, the officers must certify that they are responsible for
establishing and maintaining the organization's disclosure controls and
procedures.32 Section 302's disclosure controls and procedures are broader than
internal controls over financial reporting, and include risk assessment procedures
specific to the company's business, including compliance with certain government
regulations. 33 Further, section 906 requires the principal executive and financial
officers to certify that any periodic report containing financial statements fully
complies with the Securities and Exchange Commission ("SEC") rules and
regulations governing such reports. 4 The SEC has expressly concluded that in
evaluating disclosure controls and procedures, management should examine the
company's compliance with other laws and regulations "to ensure that [it makes]
required disclosure of legal or regulatory matters .... 35
In addition to these certifications, Sarbanes-Oxley section 404 requires
management to report annually on the company's internal controls over financial
reporting. 36 Importantly, the Public Company Accounting Oversight Board has
31. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 302; 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.15d-14 (2004); 17 C.F.R. §
229.601 (b)(31) (2004).
32. See supra note 29.
33. Certification of Disclosure in Companies' Quarterly and Annual Reports, Exchange Act
Release No. 46427 [2002 Transfer Binder], Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 86,720, at 86,131 (Aug. 28,
2002), available at http://www.sec.gov/rnles/final/33-8124.htm, at 7-8; id. at 86,133 n.73, available at
http://www.sec.gov/rules/final/33-8124.htm, at 10 n.73 (noting, "for example, for some businesses, an
assessment and evaluation of operational and regulatory risks may be necessary") (last visited Mar. 3,
2005).
34. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 906; 18 U.S.C. § 1350 (2002); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14(b),
240.15d-14(b); 17 C.F.R. § 229.601(b)(32) (2004).
35. Frequently Asked Questions: Management's Report on Internal Control Over Financial
Reporting and Certification of Disclosure in Exchange Act Periodic Reports, Exchange Act Release
46427, (2004 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 87,262, at 81,001 (Oct. 6, 2004), available at
http:// http://www.sec.gov/info/accountants/controlfaql004.htm (Question 10); see also, Linda L.
Griggs, Requirements for Disclosures about Internal Control over Financial Reporting, RR Donnelly
RealCorporateLawyer.com, at http://www.realcorporatelawyer.com/faqs/404.html (last visited Feb. 3,
2005); PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, Auditing Standard No. 2: An Audit of
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with An Audit of Financial
Statements (Mar. 9, 2004) 15 at 145, at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules -of the_Board/Documents/Rules of theBoard/AuditingStandard_2.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
36. Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 § 404 (2002); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15, 240.15d-15 (2004); 17
C.F.R. §229.308 (2004). Although initially required as part of a company's annual report on Form 10-
K ("10-K"), on November 30, 2004, the SEC granted certain accelerated filers an additional 45 days
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concluded that the lack of an effective regulatory compliance program can be a
deficiency in internal controls over financial reporting. 7
Export violations subject the company to the risk of substantial fines, a loss of
export privileges, and debarment from government contracts, penalties that may
materially impact its operations. 38 Because Sarbanes-Oxley requires certification
that the company's quarterly and annual reports are not misleading, and requires
management to annually assess and report on internal controls over financial
reporting, detailed knowledge of potential export violations is critical to companies
engaged in international trade. Absent an effective export compliance program,
the certifying officers of an organization engaged in international trade will not
have adequate information to assess whether the company is making all required
disclosures of regulatory matters or whether the company's internal controls are
sufficient to identify export liabilities that should be disclosed in its periodic
reports. 39 As a result, the certifying officer will be unable to make the required
certifications and will be obligated to disclose deficiencies in both the company's
disclosure controls and procedures and its internal controls over financial reporting
as required under the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.40 Therefore, any reporting
company engaged in international trade must carefully and critically evaluate its
exposure to export control regulations and penalties for non-compliance. If
compliance costs or penalties could be material, the company should develop and
implement an effective export compliance program in order to meet these
certification and reporting requirements.
b. THE THOMPSON MEMO: U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S PRINCIPLES OF
FEDERAL PROSECUTION OF BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS4 1
In addition to the important role an export compliance program has in
corporate governance, it also may help the organization avoid prosecution in the
event of an export violation. In January 2003, Deputy Attorney General Larry D.
Thompson issued a memorandum outlining the Department of Justice's ("DOJ")
principles for prosecuting business organizations ("Thompson Memo").42
Generally, under the doctrine of respondeat superior, the illegal acts of the
beyond the date of 10-K to provide management's report on internal controls over financial reporting.
Press Release, SEC Postpones Filing Date for Internal Control Reports for Some Accelerated Filers,
2004-162, (Nov. 30, 2004) at http://www.sec.gov/news/press/2004-162.htm (last visited Mar. 3, 2005).
37. PUBLIC COMPANY ACCOUNTING OVERSIGHT BOARD, Auditing Standard No. 2: An Audit of
Internal Control Over Financial Reporting Performed in Conjunction with An Audit of Financial
Statements (Mar. 9, 2004) T 140 at 186, at
http://pcaobus.org/Rules of theBoard/Documents/Rules_of_the_Board/Auditing..Standard_2.pdf (last
visited Mar. 1, 2005).
38. See supra note 23.
39. See supra notes 35 and 37 and accompanying text.
40. 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-14, 240.15d-14 (2004) (certification of disclosure controls and
procedures); 17 C.F.R. §§ 240.13a-15, 240.15d-15 (internal controls over financial reports).
41. Thompson Memo, supra note 27.
42. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 1.
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organization's employees, directors, officers, or agents may warrant prosecution of
the organization, if the acts were taken within the scope of the individual's duties
and were intended, in part, to benefit the corporation.43 According to the DOJ,
charging corporations for their agents' wrongdoing benefits the public by creating
mass deterrence and by decreasing the risk of further public harm.44
The Thompson Memo stresses the importance of scrutinizing the
"authenticity of a corporation's cooperation," and specifically directs prosecutors'
attention to the effectiveness of the organization's corporate governance
practices.45 In particular, one of the nine relevant factors in the charging decision
is the existence and adequacy of the organization's compliance program.46
Although an ineffective "mere[ly] paper" compliance program, or even the
existence of an apparently effective program alone does not support a decision not
to charge the organization, a compliance program reasonably designed to detect
and prevent misconduct evidences a level of voluntary self-policing that may
warrant more lenient treatment. 47  The DOJ instructs that strict application of
respondeat superior may be unwarranted if the organization has an effective
compliance program and the wrongdoing is limited to one "rogue employee. ' '4s
The weight given to an organization's compliance program depends on the design,
effectiveness, and managerial commitment to enforcing the program.49  This
organizational commitment turns on whether the project is adequately staffed,
funded, and audited for effectiveness.50 In addition, prosecutors are directed to
consider whether the program is truly designed to detect the specific potential
misconduct most likely in the corporation's particular business and industry.5'
Notably, a compliance program that does not incorporate regulatory guidance
aimed at the organization's industry is unlikely to justify a decision not to bring
charges.52
In addition to factoring against prosecution, an effective compliance program
may influence two of the other nine factors for making charging determinations.53
First, the corporation's "timely and voluntary disclosure of wrongdoing" and
43. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 2.
44. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 1-2.
45. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 1.
46. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 2-3. The Thompson Memo's nine factors are: (1) the
"nature and seriousness of the offense," (2) the "pervasiveness of wrongdoing within the corporation,"
(3) the "corporation's history of similar conduct," (4) "the corporation's timely and voluntary disclosure
of wrongdoing and its willingness to cooperate" (5) the "existence and adequacy of the corporation's
compliance program," (6) the "corporation's remedial actions," (7) any collateral consequences, (8) the
"adequacy of prosecution of individuals," and (9) the "adequacy of remedies such as civil or regulatory
enforcement actions." Id.
47. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 6.
48. Thompson Memo, supra note 27; see id. at 2.
49. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 6-7.
50. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 7.
51. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 6.
52. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 6.
53. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 4-5 (cooperation and voluntary disclosure); see also id. at
6-7 (restitution and remediation).
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cooperation can justify leniency. 4 A compliance program that effectively detects
wrongdoing through self-auditing or internal investigations gives the organization
the information necessary to make such disclosure. 55 Second, an organization that
develops a compliance program or improves an existing program in response to a
violation exemplifies a willingness to cooperate and make restitution, another
factor weighing against prosecution.56
Although an export compliance program's inherent value lies in preventing
wrongdoing in the first instance, the Thompson Memo highlights the additional
benefits of an effective compliance program should a violation occur.57
c. THE NOVEMBER 2004 AMENDMENTS TO THE U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
FOR SENTENCING ORGANIZATIONS"
The U.S. Supreme Court's January 2005 decision in United States v. Booker59
held that the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines ("Guidelines") are no longer mandatory,
but rather, advisory.60 The November 1, 2004 amendments to the Guidelines
nevertheless provide a detailed framework for evaluating an organization's
compliance program for the purposes of mitigating criminal penalties. 61 Based on
a multi-year review of the organizational guidelines and Sarbanes-Oxley's
directive that the U.S. Sentencing Commission review and amend the Guidelines
so they "are sufficient to deter and punish organizational misconduct," the 2004
amendments introduced a separate guideline for an "Effective Compliance and
Ethics Program., 62  To meet this criteria, an organization must "exercise due
diligence to prevent and detect criminal conduct," and "promote an organizational
culture" to encourage "ethical conduct and a commitment to compliance with the
law."63 The Sentencing Guidelines define effectiveness to require that a program
54. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 4.
55. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 5-6. The DOJ notes that the effect of an organization's
voluntary disclosure is subject to the regulatory limitations of the governing authority. Id. For instance,
only the first corporation to cooperate with the Antitrust Division qualifies for amnesty. Id.
56. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 7.
57. Thompson Memo, supra note 27, at 6, 5, 7.
58. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, ch. 8 (2004). On January 12, 2005, in a 5-4 opinion,
the United Stated Supreme Court held that the Sentencing Guidelines are advisory, rather than
mandatory. United States v. Booker, No. 04-104, 04-105, 2005 WL 50108 at *27 (Jan. 12, 2005) (5-4
decision) (Breyer, J., majority opinion, in part).
59. Booker, No. 04-104, 04-105, 2005 WL 50108 at *27.
60. Id.
61. Id. While the decision severed the provisions of the Guidelines that made them mandatory,
federal courts must continue to consult the Guidelines. Id. (stating, "The district courts, while not
bound to apply the Guidelines, must consult those Guidelines and take them into account when
sentencing"). See also U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, at § B2.1, U.S. SENTENCING
GUIDELINES MANUAL, at § 8A.lI, cmt. historical background; U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES
MANUAL, at § 8C2.5(f).
62. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL, § 8B2, cmt. background; id. § 8B2. 1.
63. U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 8B2.1(a)(l)-(2).
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both prevent and detect criminal conduct.
64
To establish the requisite due diligence and promote a culture of compliance,
an organization must meet seven minimum requirements:
65
1. Focus on Prevention and Detection - The organization must develop a
program to "establish standards and procedures to prevent and detect criminal
conduct.
66
2. High-Level Program Commitment - The organization must commit to the
compliance program at every level of the organization, with particular emphasis on
the board of directors or a committee of the board, and executive management.67
The board or governing authority must be knowledgeable in both the content and
operation of the program, and is charged with exercising "reasonable oversight"
over the implementation and effectiveness of the program. 68 Further, high-level
personnel, defined to include directors, executive officers, managers of a major
functional business unit of the organization, or individuals with substantial
ownership interests, must ensure that the compliance program is effective.69 While
executive management may delegate the day-to-day operational responsibility to
lower-level personnel, ultimate responsibility for the effectiveness of the program
cannot be delegated. 70 To ensure the board or governing authority is sufficiently
informed as to the effectiveness of the compliance program, the individual with
daily, operational responsibility over the program must make annual reports on the
program's effectiveness to the board or a committee of the board.7' Further,
management must allocate adequate resources to the individual with operational
oversight of the program, must vest him with appropriate authority, and must
provide him with direct access to the board, committee of the board, or governing
authority.72
3. Avoid Inconsistent Delegations of Responsibility - The organization must
take reasonable efforts not to delegate compliance program authority to employees
who have engaged in criminal conduct or taken actions that are inconsistent with
the compliance program.73 The guideline's "known or should have known"
standard warrants individual screening of employees, with a particular focus on the
recency of illegal activity or misconduct.74
4. Ongoing Training and Communication - The organization must conduct
64. Id. § 8B2.1(a)(2).
65. Id. § 8B2.1(b)
66. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(1).
67. See id. § 8B2.1(b)(2).
68. Id. § 812. 1 (b)(2)(A).
69. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B). Application note I to § 8B2.1 defines "high level personnel" by
incorporating by reference the definition of "high level personnel" in the commentary to § 8A 1.2. Id. §
8B.I cmt, n.I.; id. § 8A1.2 cmt. n.3.
70. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(B)-(C).
71. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(2)(C).
72. Id.
73. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(3)
74. See id § 8B2. cmt. n.4.
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ongoing training and communicate the program's standards and procedures to the
entire organization, including the board, management, and employees.75 In some
circumstances, it may also be appropriate to provide this training to the
organization's agents.76
5. Ongoing Audit Requirement; Mechanisms for Anonymous Reporting -
The organization must monitor and audit the compliance program, and periodically
evaluate the program's effectiveness.77 While not required, the organization may
establish procedures allowing employees to make anonymous or confidential
requests for further guidance, or to report criminal conduct.78 Such mechanisms
can increase program effectiveness by promoting compliance and active employee
participation without fear of retaliation.79
6. Create Incentives and Disciplinary Measures - The organization must
provide performance incentives for compliance and establish disciplinary measures
for criminal conduct or failure to prevent or detect such conduct. 80 While these
measures are not specifically required as a component of the compliance program
rather than exist as part of the company's personnel review procedures, discipline
for program violations should be case specific.8'
7. Respond Reasonably to Criminal Conduct - Should criminal conduct
occur, the organization must respond to prevent further violations.82 Upon
discovery of a violation, the organization should evaluate whether changes or
modifications to the compliance program are warranted.83 Even in the absence of
criminal conduct, organizations should update or modify their compliance
programs as needed, after periodic review and assessment, to ensure that the
program continually meets each of the seven requirements.84
In addition to these minimum requirements, the Guideline's Application
Notes emphasize that compliance programs should be designed specifically for
each organization, taking into account an organization's industry, size, and prior
misconduct.85 Compliance programs that do not conform to industry practices, or
meet regulatory standards for compliance programs for specific industries, are
86unlikely to qualify as effective programs.
75. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(4).
76. Id.
77. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(5).
78. Id. § 8132.1(b)(5)(C).
79. Id. The Sentencing Commission expressly recognizes that procedures allowing for anonymity
and confidentiality have both value and limitations, and that the Sentencing Guidelines are intended to
allow an organization "maximum flexibility" in designing a system best suited to the organization's
culture. Id. § 8B2.1 historical notes.
80. Id. § 8B2.1 (b)(6).
81. Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.5.
82. Id. § 8B2.1(b)(7).
83. Id.
84. Id. § 8B2.1(c).
85. Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.2(A).
86. Id § 812.1 cmt. n.2(B).
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Smaller organizations are not expected to implement compliance programs
that are as elaborate, costly, and formal as programs required of larger
organizations.87 For example, smaller organizations may implement effective
compliance programs that are directly managed by the board; that provide training
through routine, but informal staff meetings; that rely on existing personnel, rather
than adding additional staff; and that incorporate procedures from existing, well-
regarded compliance programs of similar organizations. 88 Besides industry and
size considerations, organizations should review their prior business history to
identify risk of particular types of criminal conduct.89
In sum, an organization may qualify for decreased criminal penalties if it
exercises due diligence and promotes the requisite culture of compliance through
its export control program. 90 By meeting the seven minimum criteria of an
"Effective Compliance and Ethics Program," an export compliance program
should not only deter or detect a potential misconduct, but also qualify the
corporation for more favorable treatment in the event of a violation. 91
2. HYPOTHETICAL CLIENT FACTS AND MODEL PROGRAM DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS
a. HYPOTHETICAL CLIENT FACTS: XYZ, LLC
92
This model export compliance program was developed for XYZ, LLC, a
hypothetical, small-cap technology startup. The program addresses export controls
under the Export Administration Regulations,
93 Arms Export Control Act,9 4
International Emergency Economic Powers Act,95 and Foreign Corrupt Practices
Act.
96
Tom Johnson, a former engineering professor, founded XYZ, LLC ("XYZ")
to service a large contract for a well-known defense contractor, QRS. During his
tenure at the university and under a contract with QRS, Johnson developed vision-
recognition technology, including the original code that underlies most XYZ
products. Several of these university projects were funded directly by the
Department of Defense ("DOD"). The core of XYZ's technology is an image
87. Id § 8B2.1 cmt. n.2(C)(iii).
88. Id.
89. Id. § 8B2.1 cmt. n.6(A)(iii).
90. Id. § 8C2.5(f).
91. Id.
92. The hypothetical client, XYZ, LLC and the hypothetical client facts are fictional. Part II.A is
a summarized presentation of the hypothetical facts provided by Professor Trip Mackintosh for his
course, "International Business Transactions, Federal Regulation," at the University of Denver Sturm
College of Law, Spring Semester, 2004.
93. 15 C.F.R. §§ 730-74 (2004). These sections of the Code of Federal Regulations comprise the
Export Administration Regulations, or "EAR."
94. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120-27 (2004). These sections of the Code of Federal Regulations comprise the
International Traffic in Arms Regulations, or "ITAR."
95. 50 U.S.C. §§ 1701-1706 (2001).
96. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I to 78dd-3 (1998).
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recognition feature that allows equipped computers to understand images as
discrete as road signs and product variants. XYZ's products include a basic vision
recognition package and other software products that enhance products ranging
from computer-driven machine tools to aviation training programs. XYZ's non-
U.S. customers include automakers, space programs, launch-technology
companies, and government highway projects. Because XYZ's products are
developed specifically for each purchaser, company sales contracts often require
extensive back-and-forth with the customer, including customer visits to XYZ's
Colorado office. At the expiration of the contract period, the software
automatically disables, unless the licensed user renews the contract and receives a
software key from XYZ.
XYZ has small sales, engineering, coordination, and accounting departments.
Many of XYZ's sales and engineering employees are university students from
India and Pakistan. In addition to CEO Johnson, XYZ has one other executive
officer-in-house counsel and CFO, Bob Decisis. In addition to his executive
duties, Decisis manages the team that coordinates projects between the sales and
engineering groups. XYZ's sales team consists of trained engineers. The
company's engineering team consists of twenty part-time code writers who write
for specific applications in response to customer needs.
b. DESIGN CONSIDERATIONS: THE MODEL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
This model program incorporates advice on export compliance "best
practices" from the Department of State, Department of Commerce and the Nunn-
Wolfowitz Task Force Report: Industry "Best Practices" Regarding Export
Compliance Programs.97 Practitioners reviewing the model program should note
four additional considerations.
First, the model program was not designed to include incentives and
discipline within the compliance program itself. Instead, the program was
developed on the assumption that such procedures would be implemented directly
through XYZ's employee compensation and performance reviews.
Second, due to the customer-specific technology requirements for XYZ's
products, the model program does not include a product matrix. Practitioners
developing export compliance programs for companies selling mass-produced
97. Department of State, Bureau of Political Military Affairs, Office of Defense Trade Controls,
Guidelines for DTC Registered Exporters/Manufacturers Compliance Program, at
http://www.pmdtc.org/docs/CompliancePrograms.pdf (last visited Feb. 3, 2005); Department of
Commerce, Bureau of Industry and Security, Compliance and Enforcement: Export Management
Systems, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/ExportManagementSystems/Default.htm (last visited Jan. 23,
2005); Nunn-Wolfowitz Task Force Report: Industry "Best Practices" Regarding Export Compliance
Programs, at http://www.usexportcompliance.com/Papers/nunnwolfowitz.pdf (last visited Feb. 3,
2005).
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products should consider developing matrix of company products with their
appropriate classifications under the U.S. Munitions List or Commerce Control
List.98
Third, the model program was created as a paper-based program, but larger
clients might be best served with a web or intranet-based program. An electronic
program can incorporate technology to track participation in training and
performance of program steps by individual employees, allowing the organization
to document training and track compliance with required procedures.
Lastly, while the model program is footnoted for publication purposes,
practitioners might consider creating compliance programs without extensive
footnotes. Frequent citation to legal authority can detract from the straight-forward
writing style necessary to make the program both readable and understandable to
non-legal employees learning to comply with these complex controls.
B. XYZ, LLC EXPORT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM - BEGINS ON NEXT PAGE
98. 22 C.F.R. § 121 (2004) (U.S. Munitions List); 15 C.F.R. § 774 (2004) (Supp. 1-III 1998, 2003,
2003) (Commerce Control List).
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XYZ, LLC
EXPORT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM99
99. This model program is for general informational purposes and is not intended as legal advice.
The requirements of an effective export compliance program for any particular company depend on the
organization's operational circumstances and technologies. The Author, J. Triplett Mackintosh, Mark
D. Menefee, and the Denver Journal of International Law and Policy expressly disclaim any
responsibility for the adaptation or use of this program.
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EXPORT COMPLIANCE PROGRAM - TABLE OF CONTENTS
Each department's Export Compliance Program instructions are customized to
reflect the differing nature of each department's work. Use this table of contents to
determine which sections apply to your department.
All departments should begin with the OVERVIEW and read through PART IX.
From there, turn to your specific department's section for further instruction.
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PROBLEMS III
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PART I - LETTER FROM TOM JOHNSON, CEO
MM/DD/YYYY
RE: Open Letter to All Employees - XYZ Export Compliance Program
Dear XYZ Employees:
Over the past two years, XYZ has grown from a small technology startup to a
respected player in the global intelligent sensing software industry. Together, we
have taken a vision and built our company with the skill, dedication, and energy of
each of you. Today, I ask each of you for a further commitment to XYZ's
continued long-term success.
XYZ's growth brings new challenges in many areas. One of the most
important things we can do is create systems to help our growing company comply
with U.S. law. Export laws are of particular importance, both for our company and
for the security of the United States. Because these laws protect national security
and seek to avoid increasing the military capabilities of certain foreign countries,
export violations carry significant penalties at both the individual and company
level.'°° These penalties include substantial fines, loss of export control privileges,
being barred from work on U.S. government contracts, and even jail time.'0 ' Each
of us at XYZ must take our obligations seriously, and we must make a company-
wide commitment to value compliance over any sale.
As part of our commitment to compliance, XYZ is implementing an Export
Compliance Program, which translates these regulations into user-friendly steps
that put compliance within the reach of every one of our employees. To
implement the program, we will hold company-wide training sessions this month.
Further, we will conduct annual refresher training and make compliance advice
available on a daily basis. Despite the significant cost of this program, XYZ
management firmly believes that non-compliance carries much larger
consequences for our employees, our company, and our country.
Even with the best compliance program, however, mistakes can and may
happen. XYZ's Compliance Program provides a step-by-step guide should you
make a mistake, have a concern, or suspect a violation. The most important thing
you can do if you suspect a problem is to bring it to our attention so we can correct
it immediately. To that end, we have created a new position, Export Compliance
Officer. Should you ever have a concern or question, contact our Export
Compliance Officer, John Complaisant, at (303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com.
The Compliance Program also provides detailed instructions about other methods
of reporting concerns or violations, such as anonymous reporting to an export-
trained lawyer outside the company or contacting XYZ management. We can only
remedy problems if we know about them, so we ask you to join us in placing the
utmost importance on export compliance.
100. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(a) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 730.6 (2004); see also 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c); 15 C.F.R.
§ 764.3(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2004).
101. 22 U.S.C. § 2778(c); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(b)(2)(i)-(ii).
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We value the commitment each of you has made to XYZ's success.
Together, we can continue our pledge to the long-term success of our company and
to the safety of our country. Thank you for your vision, support, and dedication.
Sincerely,
Thomas Johnson
Chief Executive, XYZ, LLC
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
PART II - XYZ COMPLIANCE PROGRAM - OVERVIEW
PART II.A - OVERVIEW
XYZ, LLC is committed to achieving excellence in the global intelligent
sensing software industry. In this mission, XYZ must be dedicated to compliance
with U.S. export laws. To that end, it is XYZ's corporate policy to value
compliance over any sale. XYZ's Export Compliance Program provides
instruction for our employees in every department, because it takes every one of us
to achieve this commitment to compliance.
This PART II OVERVIEW section is designed as a broad overview of the
purpose of the laws, the scope of their coverage, the agencies that enforce these
laws, and the importance of compliance. These sections provide a general
overview of the laws, but do not provide specific instructions for compliance.
Later sections of this program, designed specifically for each department, will
provide the detailed information you need for compliance. If you read this PART
II OVERVIEW section and have a general understanding of the purpose and scope
of the laws, you have successfully achieved the goal of this section.
Throughout this program, the pages assigned to your department have a space
in the lower left-hand comer for you to initial each page.10 2 Initial and date the
page when you have read and understood the section. If you are confused or do
not fully understand any part of your assigned sections, ask your supervisor for
clarification, or contact XYZ's Export Compliance Officer, John Complaisant, at
(303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
PART II.B - PURPOSE BEHIND UNITED STATES EXPORT CONTROL LAWS
U.S. export control laws serve a very important global function. These laws
protect U.S. national security, support U.S. foreign policy, control proliferation,
and prevent terrorism activities.') 3 They also seek to avoid increasing the military
capabilities of certain individuals, groups, and foreign countries by controlling
defense articles and services and items that can be used for defense purposes.' 4
Not only are U.S. export laws aimed at preventing the spread of these threats, but
they are also designed to ensure the safety of our armed forces in conflict.' °5
Today, more than ever, compliance with these laws is crucial.
102. The running footer for the XYZ, LLC Export Compliance Program read:
"Initials _ Date _ - Need Assistance? Go to intranet: COMPLIANCE 911 for contacts and
instructions." This footer has been excluded from the model program for formatting purposes, but
should be included on every page of the program.
103. 22 U.S.C. § 2778 (a); 15 C.F.R. § 730.6.
104. 22 U.S.C. § 2751 (2004).
105. See id.
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PART II.C - SCOPE OF U.S. EXPORT CONTROL LAWS
1. Definition of "Export"
U.S. export control laws broadly define the term "export." 10 6 Due to the
broad definition, the scope of these laws is not always intuitive.'0 7 Any item that is
transferred from a U.S. person to a foreign person is an export. 10 8 Examples of
items are commodities, software, technology, and technical information.' 0 9 Certain
items with potential military uses, such as software and encryption codes are
strictly controlled."0 The transfer or export of the item can be by any method."'
Exports can happen by mail, fax, uploading/downloading via the web, by e-mail,
by face-to-face conversation, or even by phone. 1
2
2. Definition of "Foreign Person"
Under the laws, a foreign person is any person who is not a "U.S. Person."' 
13
A U.S. Person is a: (1) U.S. Citizen (including U.S. companies, such as XYZ); (2)
Permanent Resident Alien; or (3) Political Refugee protected under the
Immigration and Naturalization Act."
14
3. Location of Transfer
Under U.S. export control laws, it does not matter where the transfer takes
place.'5 U.S. Persons must abide by the law even when overseas.1 6 Furthermore,
an export can take place in the United States if technology is transferred to a
foreign person here.' 1 7 Under the law, this is a "deemed export" that is still subject
to export controls. 1 8 The justification for this rule is that at some point, the
foreign national might return to their home country. 19
106. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b) (2004).
107. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b).
108. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(I)-(b)(2), (a)(1).
109. See 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.17, 120.6 (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(a)(1), (b)(l)-(b)(2).
110. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.6, 120.2 (2004).
111. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(1)-(3).
112. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(l)-(3).
113. 22 C.F.R. § 120.16 (2004).
114. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.15, 120.16 (2004).
115. Id. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(1).
116. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(i).
117. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
118. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
119. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
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4. Embargoes/Denied Parties
Export laws enforce embargoes against certain countries. 20  U.S. embargos
may prohibit travel to, contact with, or business transactions with parties in
specified countries. 12 1 Many of these economic and trade sanctions involve United
Nations or other international mandates.' 22 In addition to these sanctions, U.S.
Persons (remember, this includes U.S. companies) cannot do business with certain
foreign nationals suspected of terrorism or who have ties to terrorist
organizations.
123
5. Anti-Boycott and Anti-Corruption Laws
U.S. laws prohibit U.S. Persons from participating in boycotts of countries
friendly to the United States.124  These laws require that U.S. Persons do not
participate in illegal boycotts and require U.S. Persons to avoid participation and to
report any invitation to participate in an illegal boycott. 1
25
In addition to anti-boycott controls, U.S. law forbids U.S. Persons from
offering or giving a payment or thing of value to a foreign government official
with the intent to improperly influence the individual.
12 6
120. See Office of Foreign Asset Control, Sanctions Program and Country Summaries, at
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/index.html (last visited Jan. 23, 2005).
121. 15 C.F.R. §§ 746.2-746.3, 746.7-746.8 (2004) (restrictions on exports to Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and
Rwanda); 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(i) (2004).
122. 15 C.F.R. § 730.8(a)(4)(iii) (2004); see also, e.g., Exec. Order No. 13,315, 68 Fed. Reg.
52,315 (Aug. 28, 2003) (blocking property of former Iraqi officials, in accord with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1483 of May 22, 2003).
123. See 15 C.F.R. § 744.12 (2004); id. § 744 (Supp. IV 2001).
124. See 15 C.F.R. § 760.2 (2004).
125. See id.; 15 C.F.R. § 760.5(a) (2004).
126. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1, 78dd-2 (2004).
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6. Examples of XYZ Transactions Covered by U.S. Export Laws
* Sending software to a customer overseas, or making software available on
our web or FTP site that a customer could download (even though the site
is hosted in the United States. and the customer completes the download
independently)
127
" Furnishing a defense service, by training a foreign person (whether in the
United States or abroad) to use XYZ software that was designed or
adapted for military use
28
" Sharing technical data or know-how with a foreign person (could be a
customer or co-worker) in person, by phone, live-web support, e-mail, or
at a trade show (whether in the United States or abroad)
129
* Incorporating XYZ software into a foreign made item that a customer
sends to you and then shipping the item back to the customer'
30
7. Hiring New Employees
Because sharing technical data with foreign persons in the United States can
be an export under U.S. laws, each potential hire must be screened prior to
employment for badge/classification requirements. 3 '
Each XYZ department must submit the name of potential hires to the
Compliance Screeners in the Accounting department prior to hiring them. Further,
you must wait for approval before hiring any employee. Failure to do so can result
in a violation.
127. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2) (2004).
128. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.9 (2004).
129. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(3)-(4); 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)-(3).
130. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17; 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
131. See supra note 130.
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PART II.D - COMPLIANCE PROGRAM KEY PERSONNEL
In order to execute this program, XYZ has made several personnel changes.
The following people are the primary contacts for export control. A detailed list of
how to handle suspected problems follows in PART III, COMPLIANCE 911.
This section should familiarize you with individuals you can use as resources
in the export process.
1. John Complaisant, Compliance Officer - (303)123-0911 -
jcomp@XYZ.com
As Compliance Officer, John is XYZ's expert on export control compliance.
We selected John for this position because he has worked in Bob Decisis's group
since XYZ's start-up and he has an in-depth understanding of our projects, systems
and operations. John has received intensive training in export control laws in order
to help each XYZ employee make good compliance decisions. In addition to
overseeing the program, John provides advice to the Compliance Screeners and
applies for required licenses. John is available for your questions and concerns. If
you ever suspect a violation or believe you have made a mistake, you can contact
John for assistance. If necessary, he will bring in Outside Counsel for assistance.
2. Bob Decisis, In-House Counsel and Chief Financial Officer, Head of
Coordination Team - (303)123-1411 - bdecisis@XYZ.com
Bob worked with Tom Johnson, CEO, to raise the necessary funding to start
XYZ. He oversees the Coordination Team (which includes John Complaisant, our
Compliance Officer.) His responsibilities under the Export Control Program
include general oversight and periodic reviews of the various departments and
compliance control functions. He also reviews all contracts for the required
certifications and declarations.
3. Anne Comptable and Compliance Screeners, Accounting Department -
(303)123-4444 - acomptable@XYZ.com
As the Vice President of Accounting, Anne has extensive experience in the
finance and contracts for XYZ's projects.
Each employee in the Accounting department has been trained as a
Compliance Screener. The Compliance Screeners will perform initial screens on
potential customers and employees for license requirements.
4. Jane L. Doe, ABC Firm, LLP, Outside Counsel - (303)999-9999 -
jldoe@abclaw.com
As Outside Counsel, Jane understands the critical importance of compliance
with U.S. export control laws. Should you ever have a concern, suspect a
violation, or believe you may have made a mistake, you can contact her
anonymously to make a report.
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PART I.E - AGENCIES THAT CONTROL U.S. EXPORTS
1. Who Controls Exports
The two main government agencies that administer and enforce U.S. export
law are the U.S. Department of State and the U.S. Department of Commerce.
2. State Department
The State Department controls "defense articles" and "defense services."'
3 2
Generally, the State Department controls items and services that are 'born
military,' meaning that they were designed, modified or adapted for military




The Commerce Department controls "dual use" items, which are those items
which have both commercial and military or proliferation applications. 135 Many
commercial items, which may not have obvious military uses, are controlled by the
Commerce Department.136 Because some items are mainly commercial in nature,
the Commerce Department Rules allow for more or less control, depending on the
item. 37 The Commerce Department also administers U.S. anti-boycott laws.
13 8
4. Other Agencies
The Treasury Department enforces embargoes that further U.S. foreign policy
and security goals. 3 9 Anti-corruption laws are enforced by the Department of
Justice.
140
A general understanding that the State Department controls items and services
that are inherently military and that the Commerce Department regulates dual-use
items is sufficient knowledge about these particular agencies for the purpose of this
OVERVIEW section.
132. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.2, 120.17 (2004).
133. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2004).
134. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.6, 120.2 (2004). The Department of State determines, with consent of the
Department of Defense, which items are covered by the U.S. Munitions List. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3; 15
C.F.R. § 730.3 (2004).
135. 15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
136. See id.
137. See id.; 15 C.F.R. § 730.7 (2004) (noting that few exports covered by the Commerce
Department require application to the Bureau of Industry and Security for a license).
138. 15 C.F.R. §§ 760.1-760.5 (2004).
139. See 15 C.F.R. § 730.4 (2004).
140. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(d)(l)-(d)(2), 78dd-2(e)(l)-(e)(2) (2004).
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PART II.F - IMPORTANCE OF COMPLIANCE - COST OF VIOLATIONS
Violations of U.S. export laws carry substantial penalties. Individuals are
subject to fines of up to $1 million and/or up to ten years in prison, per violation.1
4'
Companies face penalties of up to $1 million or five times the value of the
transaction, per violation. 142 Because of the broad scope of the laws, each business
transaction could involve several violations. In addition, individuals and
companies may forfeit the goods or proceeds from a transaction that occurs in
violation of these laws. 1
43
The government may further penalize violations by taking away export
privileges, by prohibiting other parties from doing business with companies and
individuals who have violated the law, and by barring companies who violate the
law from working on government contracts. 44 Bear in mind that most of XYZ's
business over the past two years has been in conjunction with QRS, a large
government contractor. A loss of the ability to work with QRS would have
devastating effects on XYZ's viability.
Because the cost of violations is so great to every one of us, XYZ takes
compliance extremely seriously. Although these penalties are daunting,
compliance is within everyone's reach. XYZ has developed this Export
Compliance Program to prevent costly violations. Each step of the program
describes how to comply and where to turn for help.
Further, XYZ has developed a special section of the program in PART III
called COMPLIANCE 911. It describes in detail how to address questions,
concerns, suspicions, or problems. XYZ's goal is to resolve compliance problems
in an efficient, confidential manner. We can only resolve issues and support our
employees if each of us is committed to identifying and reporting potential
problems.
141. 22 U.S.C. §2778 (c) (2004).
142. 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(b)(2)(i)-(ii) (2004).
143. 22 C.F.R. § 127.6 (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 764.3(c)(2)(i).
144. See supra note 23.
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PART III - COMPLIANCE 911 - How To ADDRESS CONCERNS, SUSPICIONS, OR
PROBLEMS
IF YOU SUSPECT A PROBLEM OR VIOLATION:
If you suspect a problem or violation, don't panic. These laws are complex,
and mistakes can happen. The most important thing you can do is to contact us.
It is extremely important that you bring any concern to our attention immediately,
so that we can correct the problem and minimize any potentially negative
consequences. If you believe there has been a violation, suspect you have made a
mistake, or are presented with a situation you do not know how to handle, follow
the COMPLIANCE 911 PROTOCOLS.
COMPLIANCE 911 PROTOCOLS:
1. Don't panic.
2. Stop the transaction immediately. If the transaction involves a shipment of
goods, stop the shipment. If the transaction involves communication with a
foreign person, terminate the communication.
3. Retain all records. Records can form the basis of a defense or help
document the steps of the transaction that led to the concern.
4. Contact any of the following people to report the concern. If you would
like to report anonymously, contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at the number
below.
a. John Complaisant - Compliance Officer - (303)123-0911 -
jcomp@XYZ.com
b. Bob Decisis - In-House Counsel/CFO - (303)123-1411 -
bdecisis@XYZ.com
c. Anne Comptable - Accounting/Compliance Screening - (303)123-4444 -
acomptable@XYZ.com
d. Tom Johnson - CEO - (303)123-7777 - tjohnson@XYZ.com
e. Jane L. Doe - Outside Counsel - (303)999-9999 -jldoe@abclaw.com
5. Maintain confidentiality. After properly reporting the incident, keep the
matter confidential. This will allow us to thoroughly assess the situation. Talking
about the matter may jeopardize any attorney/client privilege that may exist.
6. Wait for further instruction. If you have contacted XYZ management, we
will immediately contact Outside Counsel and then determine the best course of
action. If you have contacted Outside Counsel directly, she will provide you with
instructions directly.
You can access the COMPLIANCE 911 PROTOCOLS and the COMPLIANCE 911
Contact List on the XYZ intranet link entitled COMPLIANCE 911.
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PART IV - AVOIDING INADVERTENT VIOLATIONS - CUSTOMER 'RED FLAGS'
PART IV.A - BE ALERT TO 'RED FLAGS'
Often, avoiding violations is as simple as being alert to 'red flags' that may
signal that a customer presents a risk of a violation. 145 Being aware of common
signals that can indicate an individual is trying to obtain U.S. exports unlawfully
can help you avoid making a mistake.1 46  The best and safest approach to
compliance is to be careful not to 'self-blind. ' 147 Under the law, we each have an
affirmative duty to know certain information related to our transactions.
48
Ostrich-like behavior or avoiding hearing 'bad' information does not protect
anyone from liability.1
49
PART IV.B - LOOKING FOR RED FLAGS IS AN ONGOING DUTY
The best way to avoid violations is to be on the alert for red flags at all times.
Just because a customer has not shown red flags at the beginning of the transaction
does not mean they may not exhibit red flags later in the transaction.
145. 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. 11I 1997).
146. See id. § 732 (Supp. 111(b) 1997).
147. Id. § 732 (Supp. IlI(a)(3) 1997).
148. See id. § 732 (Supp. II(a)(2) 1997). The knowledge required under the EAR depends on the
situation. See id. If 'red flags' are present, they create an affirmative duty to inquire further. Id.
Absent 'red flags,' it is appropriate to rely on a customer's representations. Id.
149. Id. § 732 (Supp. 111(a)(3) 1997).
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PART 1V.C - RED FLAGS TO LOOK OUT FOR
Later sections of the program will address how to conduct a specific screening
for red flags. In this section, however, it is important to familiarize yourself with
potential red flags so that you can be on the lookout for these signs throughout
your work.' 50 Don't be afraid to 'hold up' a sale or 'kill the deal.' It is much more
important to contact someone to discuss the concern instead of going ahead with
the transaction. 15' Remember, compliance is more important than any sale.
If you see a red flag or have any doubts, do not continue the transaction.
5 2
Treat it like a suspected violation and utilize the COMPLIANCE 911 PROTOCOLS,
located in PART HI or on the XYZ intranet at the link entitled COMPLIANCE 911.
1 The customer's name or address is similar to someone who comes up on an
individual screening list.' 53 Often, individuals on screening lists go by several
names or share addresses. The accounting department Compliance Screener will
conduct this screen.
2. The customer is reluctant to offer information about the end-use of the
item. 154 For example, when you ask the customer about the software's end-use or
inform the customer that XYZ requires a certification of end use, the customer
hesitates or does not call back for several days. Sales and engineering employees
should be alert for this.
3. XYZ's software capabilities do not fit the customer's line of business, such as
a plant nursery or construction equipment business inquiring about XYZ's high-
resolution image recognition software. 5 5 Sales and engineering employees should
be alert for this.
4. XYZ's software is incompatible with the technical level of the country it will
be shipped to, such as a third-world country that does not have either a space or
engineering industry. 56 Sales, engineering, and accounting employees should be
alert for this.
5. The customer has little or no business background in either the engineering or
space industry. 157 Sales and engineering employees should be alert for this.
6. The customer is willing to pay cash up front, which would be unusual because
XYZ's customers generally pay with letters of credit or staged cash payment
during the development of the software for the contract. 58 Sales and accounting
employees should be alert for this.
150. See id. § 732 (Supp. 111(b) 1997).
151. See id. § 732 (Supp. I1(a)(6) 1997).
152. See id.
153. See infra Part X.II.A.
154. 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. II(b)(1) 1997).
155. Id. § 732 (Supp. II1(b)(2) 1997).
156. Id. § 732 (Supp. 111(b)(3) 1997).
157. Id. § 732 (Supp. I1I(b)(4) 1997).
158. Id. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(5) 1997).
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7. The customer is unfamiliar with the basic functionality of sensing software or
image recognition technology. 159 Sales and engineering employees should be alert
for this.
8. The customer declines the training and maintenance services that XYZ
provides as part of each software contract. 160 Sales, engineering, and accounting
employees should be alert for this.
9. The customer is vague about delivery dates or wants deliveries made to odd
destinations, such as Post Office boxes, remote locations or destinations that are far
away from the customer's place of business. 16 1 Sales and accounting employees
should be alert for this.
10. The customer gives a freight forwarder as the product's final destination.
162
Sales and accounting employees should be alert for this.
11. The shipping route is abnormal, such as a customer with a reported ultimate
destination in France routing the delivery through India. 163 Sales and accounting
employees should be alert for this.
12. The customer requests unusual packaging, such as asking for an unmarked
box or providing their own packaging materials. 64  Sales and accounting
employees should be alert for this.
13. The buyer is evasive or makes contradictory statements about the software's
use, such as stating that they will use the software in a plant in Colorado but
making frequent references to their engineering facility in China.165 Sales and
engineering should be alert for this.
159. Id. § 732 (Supp. 1I(b)(6) 1997).
160. Id. § 732 (Supp. l11(b)(7) 1997).
161. Id. § 732 (Supp. I1I(b)(8) 1997).
162. Id. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(9) 1997).
163. Id. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(10) 1997).
164. Id. § 732 (Supp. II1(b)(1 1) 1997).
165. Id. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(12) 1997).
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PART V - ANTI-BOYCOTT PROTECTIONS
PART V.A - AVOIDING AND REPORTING ILLEGAL BOYCOTTS
U.S. anti-boycott laws are designed to prevent U.S. Persons (including U.S.
companies) from participating in boycotts against countries friendly to the United
States.166 This can be confusing, because you must comply with U.S. sanctions
and embargoes, but you cannot comply with invitations to participate in embargoes
against countries friendly to the United States.
167
Participation in any boycott of a country friendly to the United States is
prohibited.168 Currently, your primary concern is the Arab League Boycott of
Israel. 169  This long-standing boycott is aimed at Israel, with people who do
business with Israel, or those who do business with parties the Arab League places
on its "black list.'
' 70
Therefore, if your project involves countries in the Arab League, be on the
alert for inquiries about whether XYZ does business with Israel or with companies
who do business with Israel. Such questions are invitations to participate in the
boycott and must be reported.' 7' More information on the reporting requirement is
in the section below called PART V.C.2 - POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS.
172
Also prohibited are agreements to discriminate against others based on race,
religion, sex, national origin, or nationality.
113
166. 15 C.F.R. §§ 760.2(a), 760.1(a), (e) (2004).
167. 15 C.F.R. § 760.2(a).
168. Id.
169. See Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, Office of Antiboycott
Compliance, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/antiboycottcompliance/oacrequirements.html (last visited Feb.
3,2005).
170. Eugene Kontorovich, The Arab League Boycott and WTO Accession: Can Foreign Policy
Excuse Discriminatory Sanctions?, 4 CHI. J. INT'L L. 283, 286-88 (2003).
171. 15 C.F.R. §§ 760.2(a), 760.5(a)(1) (2004).
172. See infra Part V.C.
173. 15 C.F.R. § 760.2(b).
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PART V.C - NEGATIVE AND POSITIVE OBLIGATIONS
Under U.S. Anti-Boycott law, there are both and negative and positive
obligations. 75 The negative obligations are things you cannot do, and the positive
obligations are things you must do. The boycott you should currently be concerned
with is the Arab League Boycott of Israel, but keep in mind that any minimal
request for information might be part of an illegal boycott.
76
174. See League of Arab States: Member States, at
http://www.arableagueonline.org/arableague/english/level2_en.jsp?level-id=ll (last visited Jan. 16,
2005).
175. See 15 C.F.R. § 760.2(a), (b) (prohibitions against participating in boycotts and against
discrimination); 15 C.F.R. § 760.5(a) (requirement to report invitations to participate in boycotts).
176. See Bureau of Industry and Security, Department of Commerce, Office of Antiboycott
Compliance, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/antiboycottcompliance/oacrequirements.html (last visited Feb.
3, 2005).
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1. Negative Obligations - Things You Cannot Do:
a. Agree to refuse or refuse to do business with companies located in
boycotted countries, businesses organized in boycotted countries, or blacklisted
companies 
77
b. Agree to furnish or furnish information about business with boycotted
countries, businesses organized in boycotted countries or blacklisted companies
178
You may be able to provide a Certificate of Origin that attests that the
software was manufactured in the United States.' 79 These forms are available on
the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS. 1
80
c. Agree to discriminate against others based on race, religion, sex, national
origin, or nationality'
8'
d. Agree to furnish or furnish information about race, religion, sex, national
origin, or nationality 1
82
e. Pay with or accept letters of credit that include requirements that violate any
of these negative obligations'
83
f. Agree to follow the laws of countries participating in a prohibited boycott'
84
(see the list of Arab League members in PART V.B), which may include
requirements to comply with the Arab League Boycott of Israel
To avoid this problem, you may agree to follow the laws of a country unless
the laws conflict with U.S. law.'
85
177. 15 C.F.R. § 760.2(a), (d).
178. Id.
179. 15 C.F.R. § 760 (Supp. I pt. 11979).
180. The model program does not include a sample certificate of origin. For more information on
certificate of origin, see id.
181. 15 C.F.R. § 760.2(b).
182. Id. § 760.2(c).
183. Id. § 760.2(0.
184. Id. § 760.2(a)(5).
185. 15 C.F.R. § 760 (Supp. I pt. II(A) 1979).
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2. Positive Obligations - Things You Must Do:
a. Report any invitation to participate in a boycott'
86
An invitation includes:
" Being asked to comply with the boycott 87
" Being asked to furnish information that helps the country carry out the
boycott 88
b. If you believe you have received an invitation to participate in an illegal
boycott, do not furnish information or answer questions, STOP the transaction,
and immediately contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911
or jcomp@XYZ.com.
PART V.D - HOW TO CONTINUE IN A TRANSACTION AND AVOID VIOLATIONS
It is possible to receive an invitation to participate in a boycott but stay in
compliance and complete the transaction by avoiding participation in the boycott
and making the proper report. 189
For example:
* If a customer asks you to agree to follow the laws of Syria:
o You could respond that you would be willing to "follow the laws
of Syria unless these laws conflict with U.S. law."' 190
o You would need to contact John Complaisant, XYZ's
Compliance Officer, so that he could make the required report. 19'
As long as you report the invitation and do not comply with the
request, you could continue the transaction.
192
" If a customer asks you if you will certify that the software does not use any
Israeli-based technology:
o You could respond by saying, "I am not able to answer that
question, but I can provide a Certificate of Origin."' 93
o This would require contacting John Complaisant so that he could
report the invitation.
194
186. Id. § 760.5(a)(1) (2004).
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. See id. §§ 760.2,760.5(a)(1).
190. See id. § 760 (Supp. I pt. II(A) 1979).
191. Id. § 760.5(a).
192. See id.
193. Id. § 760 (Supp. I pt. 11979).
194. Id. § 760.5(a).
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PART VI - ANTI-BRIBERY PROTECTIONS
Under U.S. anti-bribery laws, U.S. citizens, nationals, residents and
businesses are prohibited from giving a corrupt payment to a foreign government
official for the purpose of influencing a decision of the official in his official
capacity. 195
PART VI.A - PROHIBITED PAYMENTS
Specifically, a "corrupt payment" is the payment of money or an offer or
promise to give anything of value to influence the official in his official capacity,
to influence the official to violate his/her lawful duty, or to seek an improper
advantage. 196  For example, making a contribution to the private school the
official's children attend, or making charitable contributions to the official's
favored charity could be a corrupt payment, if made with the intent to obtain an
improper advantage or to secure the official's action in his/her official capacity.
97
Under the law, even making an offer of payment, as long as it is made with
the intent to influence, obtain improper advantage, or induce improper influence, is
all that is required for a violation. 98 Even if the official refuses to accept the
benefit, or accepts the benefit but does not take the desired action, it is still a
violation. 199
PART VI.B - LIMITED EXCEPTIONS FOR COMMON BusINEss PRACTICES AND
PAYMENTS
Certain common business practices, such as paying the costs of a foreign
official to travel to a plant for a plant visit may be legal. 2° In addition, certain
payments as part of routine government action may be allowed.20 ' Because the
exceptions are extremely limited, you must contact XYZ's Compliance Manager,
for preauthorization for any payment to a foreign official.2 °2 Contact John
Complaisant, at (303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com for pre-approval and the
instructions for reimbursement for these limited, pre-approved transactions.
195. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I(a), 78dd-2(a) (2004).
196. Id.
197. Id.
198. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(l), 78dd-2(a)(1). Under the statute, both offers and payments are
prohibited. Id.
199. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
200. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-I(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2).
201. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b).
202. 15 C.F.R. § 760.5 (2004).
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PART VI.C - THIRD PARTY PAYMENTS CAN CREATE LIABILITY
If a third party, such as a XYZ project partner makes an illegal payment, XYZ




Therefore, it is extremely important to let our project partners, agents, and market
makers know that they must abide by U.S. law. 20 4 Non-compliance is grounds for
XYZ to unilaterally terminate the contract. If you ever suspect that a project
partner may violate or has violated anti-bribery law, report your concerns
immediately to John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 or
jcomp@XYZ.com.
PART VI.D - HIGH RISK PROJECTS
Even though XYZ employees are strictly prohibited from making an illegal
payment or offer, you may receive a request for corrupt payment from a foreign
official. Certain XYZ projects may be at higher risk than others for violations of
anti-bribery laws. When a foreign government has regulatory control over a large
infrastructure project such as XYZ's South American Highway Project, this may
create an incentive for officials to request bribes or 'payoffs' in exchange for
favorable treatment on the project. Further, some countries are considered to
present a higher risk for bribery requests or inadvertent violations.20 5 When the
Compliance Screener initially screens your NEW CONTACT FORM, he will perform
a specific screen and let you know when the project may be particularly at risk for
bribery issues.
If you are notified that the project is at increased risk because of the specific
countries involved, proceed with caution. If you have any questions or concerns
during the project, contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)123-
0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
203. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a).
204. Id.
205. See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2004, at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/pi2O04.en.html#cpi2004 (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
VOL. 33:3
A MODEL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
PART VII - RECORDKEEPING
PART VH.A - DOCUMENTING COMPLIANCE STEPS AND EXPORT DECISIONS
A well-documented export procedure is an integral part of complying with
export laws and defending against any possible liability. Throughout this program,
employees will receive instructions on how to complete screening checklists,
document consultations, and record the analytical process used to make export
decisions. In addition to the documentation required by each step, you must keep
all records of correspondence and negotiations. °6 Following these procedures is
an extremely important part of the compliance process and allows XYZ to
document the analysis underlying export transactions.
PART VH.B - RECORD RETENTION
Under U.S. export laws, these records must be kept for a minimum of five
years, and occasionally longer.20 7 As a rule, keep all records for at least five
years.20 8 In accordance with XYZ's Document Retention Policy, after the five-
year term has expired, you must get written permission from John Complaisant,
Compliance Officer, before sending any export records to document destruction.
206. 22 C.F.R. § 122.5(a) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 762.6(a) (2004).
207. 22 C.F.R. § 122.5(a); 15 C.F.R. § 762.6(a).
208. 22 C.F.R. § 122.5(a); 15 C.F.R. § 762.6(a).
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PART VIII - TRAINING AND ACCOUNTABILITY
PART VIII.A - INITIAL TRAINING
Upon the implementation of this program, all current XYZ employees will
undergo an intensive training procedure designed to help all employees be sure that
they are following the steps necessary for compliance.20 9 All new hires will be
trained prior to beginning work.
PART VIII.B - ANNUAL REFRESHER TRAINING
Refresher training will be conducted annually for all employees. 210 If at any
time you feel you would benefit from additional guidance or training, contact the
Compliance Officer, John Complaisant, at (303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com.
PART VII.C - COMPANY AUDITS
In order to be sure that our program is effective, XYZ will complete internal
and external audits from time to time as counsel deems necessary.21 Outside
Counsel will direct these audits.2 12
PART VIII.D - DUTY TO REPORT
The duty to report questions, problems, concerns, and suspected violations as
described in the section entitled COMPLIANCE 911 is an ongoing requirement for
each employee at XYZ. As outlined in that section, you may report either to
management or anonymously to Outside Counsel. Rather than viewing
compliance as an extra task, consider compliance the foremost commitment of
your job.
Should an outside party contact you regarding XYZ's compliance program or
export procedures, you are not obligated to speak with them. If you feel more
comfortable, you may request that XYZ provide you with representation before
you respond to any third party. It is, however, XYZ's policy to cooperate with the
government, and as such, the company is happy to provide you with representation
in response to any inquiry.
209. See U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Management Systems Guidelines, Element
4: Training, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Export ManagementSystems/pdf/admin4.pdf (last visited Feb.
23, 2005).
210. Id.
211. U.S. Bureau of Industry and Security, Export Management Systems Guidelines, Element 5:
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A MODEL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
PART X.A - KNOWING YOUR CUSTOMER - SALES
1. Salesperson - XYZ's First Line of Defense
As a XYZ salesperson, you are uniquely situated. Usually, you are the first
point of contact for any potential XYZ customer. This position brings an
important responsibility-to make sure you are not inadvertently "exporting" tech
data while getting to know the potential customer, and to make sure that XYZ can
do business with the lead you are pursuing.213 Remember, it is XYZ's policy to
value compliance over any sale.
2. Avoiding an Inadvertent Export
Generally, export laws require a license for the export of technical data.
21 4
Because many of you are trained engineers, be careful not to reveal technical data
about XYZ's software when talking initially with potential customers .2 5 Doing
so, before screening procedures are completed and licenses are secured could result
in a violation. Further, because certain sanctions prohibit any contact with
embargoed countries, even calling a customer in an embargoed country or mailing
a brochure could be violation.216
213. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(3)-(4) (2004) (defining export of technical data); see also 15 C.F.R.
§ 734.2(b)(2)-(3) (2004) (defining export of technology or software).
214. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2004) (defining technical data); see also 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2),
(b)(9) (2004) (defining export of technology or software).
215. See supra note 213.
216. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. §§ 746.2-746.3, 746.7-746.8 (2004) (restrictions on exports to Cuba, Iraq,
Iran, and Rwanda); see also 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(i) (2004).
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3. Screening the Customer
As early as possible in the discussions with a potential customer, submit
information about the potential customer to the Accounting Department for an
Individual/Country Screen. This may be done by filling out the form in the
Forms/Sales section entitled NEW CONTACT FORM. This form is also available on
the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS. Once you have filled out the form, give
it to Accounting, for a Compliance Screening of the individual and country.
This screening process will allow XYZ to avoid doing business with
individuals who have been banned from receiving exports due to export
violations.21 7 In some cases, doing business with certain customers will require an
export license for similar reasons.218 This process allows us to identify parties who
we can't do business with or with whom business may be transacted only after
getting the appropriate license. 219 Vigilance at this step can prevent a violation.
Further, by determining that it is safe to pursue business with a customer, you will
be able to spend your time selling to customers with whom XYZ can do business.
This screening step also checks the contact's country. A customer's country
can be the basis for prohibiting a transaction or trigger a licensing requirement.220
By learning right away if a license is required, you will you will be able to explain
the need for time to get a license, thus avoiding any last-minute surprises.
If you plan to pursue a business lead and have not yet made contact, fill out
the NEW CONTACT FORM to the best of your ability and submit to Accounting for
initial screening. Do not initiate contact until you have received instructions from
the Compliance Screener.
217. 15 C.F.R. § 744.1(a) (2004); see 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2004) (describing debarment).
218. 15 C.F.R. § 744.2(b) (2004).
219. See 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (debarment); 15 C.F.R. § 744.1(a) (prohibiting exports to certain end-
users); 15 C.F.R. § 744.2(b) (license requirement to do business with certain end-users).
220. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 746.1 (2004).
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4. Customer-Initiated Contacts
If you meet a contact at a trade show, or a potential customer contacts you,
submit the NEW CONTACT FORM to Accounting for an initial screen as soon as
possible after the initial contact. Limit communications with the contact, to the
extent that you can, while you await instructions from the Compliance Screener.
5. Understanding the Results from Compliance Screener's
Individual/Country Screens
The initial INDIVIDUALICOUNTRY SCREEN should take less than 48 hours.
While you await the results, do not contact the potential customer. If the potential
customer contacts you, be polite, but try to limit your communication.
The Compliance Screener will either tell you that it is either:
" OK to Proceed
o If it is OK to proceed, date and initial the CUSTOMER TRACKING
FORM to document that you received the results from the
Compliance Screener. Keep the results of the screen in the
CUSTOMER EXPORT FILE.
o Go to the DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST, at PART
X.C.
" Stop - You cannot continue the transaction at this time.
o This does not necessarily mean XYZ cannot work with the
customer. It generally means that a license is required. If a
license is required, the Compliance Screener will begin the
licensing process immediately upon determining that a license is
required. Once a license is granted, you will be notified.
If you receive an approval, proceed under the directions
for OK to Proceed directly above this section.
o If the result is a flat-out denial (because the government has
placed the potential customer is on a debarred list), you will be
notified with the results of the Individual/Country screen.
o If the Compliance Screener changes the result to OK, document
as required above and go to the next step, the DIVERSION
RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST, at PART X.B.
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PART X.B - DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST - SALES
In the sales department, you may have the best chance to assess whether or
not the customer is a diversion risk-meaning that the customer says one thing but
plans to do another.221 These are the 'Red Flags' that were introduced in the
222Overview section.
Protecting against possible violations requires that you not 'self-blind' and
that you be aware of signals that may indicate a customer is attempting to obtain
U.S. exports illegally.223 Not knowing 'bad' information does not protect you or
XYZ from liability.224 Rather, by actively evaluating each customer, you protect
both yourself and the company.
Complete the DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST. This is available in
the Forms/Sales section and on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS.
* If the answer to any of the questions is Yes, STOP the transaction
immediately and contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at
(303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
" If the answer to all of the questions is No, it is OK to Proceed, you may
continue in the transaction.
o Date and initial the CUSTOMER TRACKING FORM to document
that you completed the DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG
CHECKLIST. Keep the results of the screen in the CUSTOMER
EXPORT FILE.
M Go to the PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST, at PART
X.C.
o Don't forget that your impressions about these questions can
change over time. If later in the transaction you have any doubts
in your answers to the Diversion Risk/Red Flag Checklist, stop
the transaction immediately contact John Complaisant,
Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
221. See supra Part IV.C.
222. See supra Part IV.C.
223. 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. I1(a)(3) 1997).
224. Id. § 732 (Supp. III(a)(2) 1997). The knowledge required under the EAR depends on the
situation. Id. If 'red flags' are present, they create an affirmative duty to inquire further. Id. Absent
'red flags,' it is appropriate to rely on a customer's representations. Id.
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PART X.C -PROLIFERATION RISK - SALES
Assessing the customer's business activities is a crucial part of determining
whether or not a transaction will require an export license.225 The customer's
business or personal activities can trigger a licensing requirement if the customer is
involved in: (1) nuclear activities; (2) the design, development, production, or use
of missiles; (3) the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of
chemical or biological weapons. 26 These activities need not be the customer's
direct business activity, as indirect involvement can also trigger the licensing
requirements. 227 Further, the activities do not have to involve XYZ's software or
services to require a license. 8  The fact that the customer is involved in the
activities can be all that is required to trigger a licensing requirement if the
government determines that doing business with the customer will somehow
229support the customer's proliferation activities.
Completing this step requires you to inquire with the customer about their
business and complete the PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST.2 3 ° Some of the
information you need to answer the questions may come up in your initial
conversations about end-use and end-user. If you don't feel you have obtained
enough information about the customer's business while completing the NEW
CONTACT FORM, you may wish to inquire about the customer's business history
during routine conversation.
225. 15 C.F.R. § 744.2(a) (2004).
226. 15 C.F.R. §§ 744.2, 744.3,744.4 (2004).
227. 15 C.F.R. § 744.2(a).
228. Id. § 744.2(b) (license requirement triggered by high diversion risk).
229. Id.
230. Id. § 744.2(a) n. 1. "Knowledge" with respect to proliferation risk includes "reason to know."
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Complete the PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST. This is available in the
Forms/Sales section and on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS.
" If the answer to any of the questions is Yes, STOP the transaction
immediately and contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at
(303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com. Wait for his instruction before
proceeding.
* If the answer to all of the questions is No, you may continue in the
transaction.
o Date and initial the CUSTOMER TRACKING FORM to document
that you completed the PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST.
Keep the results of the screen in the CUSTOMER EXPORT FILE.
Go to the CERTIFICATIONS/DECLARATIONS section at
PART X.D.
o Don't forget that your impressions about these questions can
change over time. If later in the transaction you have any doubts
in your answers to the Proliferation Risk Checklist, stop the
transaction and immediately contact John Complaisant,
Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
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PART X.D - CERTIFICATIONS AND DECLARATIONS - SALES
Certifications and Declarations Are Always Required
Should a customer inquire, XYZ requires certain certifications and
declarations in order to do business. Issues covered include certifications of final
destination, end-user, end-use, involvement in proliferation activities, and anti-
bribery controls. 3' Violation of these certifications is grounds for XYZ's
unilateral termination of any contract.
As part of the compliance procedure, you are not responsible for getting these
certifications and declarations. Nonetheless, this topic may come up in business
negotiations, so you should be aware of XYZ's policies.
If the topic of certifications and declarations comes up during the course of
the transaction, the customer's response may raise a 'red flag.' 232 Be familiar with
the 'red flags,' and contact the Compliance Officer, John Complaisant, at
(303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com if you have any concerns. A copy of the
DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST is available in this section under
Forms/Sales or on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS.
If a customer asks for details regarding the relevant certifications and
declarations, contact a Compliance Screener in Accounting.
Now review the procedure for INITIATING PRODUCTION at PART X.E.
231. See 22 C.F.R. § 123.9(a)-(c) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 758.6 (2004).
232. See supra Part IV.
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PART X.E - INITIATING PRODUCTION - SALES
1. Steps You Should Have Taken to Reach this Point
Before you proceed, be sure you have completed each of the steps below. If
you are directed to stop (at any step), contact John Complaisant and do NOT
proceed.
a. Submit NEW CONTACT FORM to Compliance Screeners for
INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN
23 3
b. Receive OK to Proceed status on the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN
2 34
c. Conduct the DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST and determine that it is
OK to proceed
235
d. Conduct the PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST and determine that it is OK
to proceed
236
e. Inform the customer about required CERTIFICATIONS/DECLARATIONS
23 7
f. Comply with all ANTI-BOYCOTT and ANTI-BRIBERY LAWS
238
2. Initiating Production
Once you are certain you have completed each of these steps and do not have
any reason to stop the transaction, the project is ready to move to the Engineering
Department.
In accordance with XYZ's regular business practices, contact someone on
Bob Decisis's Coordination Team to discuss the project. They will route it to the
appropriate engineers. Note the date that you sent the project to the Coordination
Team on the CUSTOMER TRACKING FORM.
233. See supra Part X.A.3.
234. See supra Part X.A.4-X.A.5.
235. See supra Part X.B.
236. See supra Part X.C.
237. See supra Part X.D.
238. See supra Part V, VI.
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PART X.F - SALES DEPARTMENT FORMS
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NEW CONTACT FoRM - SALES
NAME OF CONTACT (note any inconsistencies in spelling, nicknames, etc.)
PERSON FILLING OUT FORM/INTIAL
DATE COMPLETED
CONTACT ADDRESS
DATE OF FIRST CONTACT
SOURCE OF LEAD/CONTACT (describe in detail)
XYZ PRODUCT CONTACT INTERESTED IN (describe in detail, if known)
CONTACT'S END USE FOR PRODUCT
COUNTRY OF PRODUCT'S ULTIMATE DESTINATION
OTHER INFORMATION YOU BELIEVE WOULD BE HELPFUL
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CUSTOMER TRACKING FORM - SALES
NAME OF CONTACT
CONTACT ADDRESS
DATE OF FIRST CONTACT
PERSON FILLING OUT FORM/INTIAL
INDIVIDUAL COUNTRY SCREEN (performed by Compliance Screener)
" Date submitted to Accounting/Compliance Screening
" Date results returned by Accounting/Compliance Screening
" Result of Screen: OK to Proceed __ Stop -
o If transaction stopped, date stopped:
o If transaction resumed (status change from Stop to OK to
Proceed because license obtained), date resumed:
DIVERSION RISK CHECKLIST (performed by salesperson)
" Date Checklist Completed/Initials /
" Result of Screen: OK to Proceed __ Stop -
o If transaction stopped, date stopped:
o If transaction resumed (status change from Stop to OK to
Proceed because license obtained), date resumed:
PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST (performed by salesperson)
" Date Checklist Completed/Initials /
" Result of Screen: OK to Proceed __ Stop -
o If transaction stopped, date stopped:
o If transaction resumed (status change from Stop to OK to
Proceed because license obtained), date resumed:
Date Project Sent to Coordination Team (if applicable)
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DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST - SALES
NAME OF CUSTOMER BEING SCREEENED
CUSTOMER ADDRESS
XYZ PRODUCT TO BE PURCHASED (describe in detail)
CUSTOMER'S END USE FOR PRODUCT
COUNTRY OF PRODUCT'S ULTIMATE DESTINATION
PERSON PERORMING SCREEN/INTIAL
DATE PERFORMED
*If the answer to any of these is yes or you have any doubts, do not continue in the
transaction. Contact XYZ's Compliance Manager, John Complaisant, at (303)123-
0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com for assistance.
1. The customer is reluctant to offer information about the end-use of the
item.239 For example, when you ask the customer about the software's end use or
inform the customer that XYZ requires a certification of end use, the customer
hesitates or does not call back for several days. YES_ NO_
2. XYZ's software capabilities do not fit the customer's line of business, such as
a plant nursery or construction equipment business inquiring about XYZ's high-
resolution image recognition software.240 YES_ NO_
3. XYZ's software is incompatible with the technical level of the country it will
be shipped to, such as a third-world country that does not have either a space or
engineering industry.24' YES__ NO
4. The customer has little or no business background in either the engineering or
space industry.242 YES__ NO_
5. The customer is willing to pay cash up front, which would be unusual because
XYZ's customers generally pay with letters of credit or staged cash payment
during the development of the software for the contract.243 YES__ NO__
6. The customer is unfamiliar with the basic functionality of sensing software or
image recognition technology. 2 " YES__ NO
7. The customer declines the training and maintenance services that XYZ
provides as part of each software contract.245 YES_ NO_
239. 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. lI1(b)(1) 1997).
240. Id. § 732 (Supp. 1I1(b)(2) 1997).
241. Id. § 732 (Supp. I1I(b)(3) 1997).
242. Id. § 732 (Supp. Il(b)(4) 1997).
243. Id. § 732 (Supp. IlI(b)(5) 1997).
244. Id. § 732 (Supp. Il(b)(6) 1997).
245. Id. § 732 (Supp. I1(b)(7) 1997).
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8. The customer is vague about delivery dates or wants deliveries made to odd
destinations, such as Post Office boxes, remote locations, or destinations that are
far away from the customer's place of business.246 YES_ NO.-
9. The customer gives a freight forwarder as the product's final destination.247
YES_ NO
10. The shipping route is abnormal, such as a customer with a reported ultimate
destination in France routing the delivery through India.248 YES_ NO_
11. The customer requests unusual packaging, such as asking for an unmarked
box or providing their own packaging materials. 249 YES_ NO_
12. The buyer is evasive or makes contradictory statements about the software's
use, such as stating that they will use the software in a plant in Colorado but
250
making frequent references to their engineering facility in China.
YES_ NO
246. Id. § 732 (Supp. IIl(b)(8) 1997).
247. Id. § 732 (Supp. 11I(b)(9) 1997).
248. Id. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(10) 1997).
249. Id. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(1 1) 1997).
250. Id. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(12) 1997).
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PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST - SALES
NAME OF CUSTOMER BEING SCREEENED
CUSTOMER ADDRESS
NEW CUSTOMER: YES_ NO_ If yes, list date of last order
PERSON PERORMING SCREEN/INTIAL
DATE PERFORMED
XYZ PRODUCT TO BE PURCHASED (describe in detail)
CUSTOMER'S END USE FOR PRODUCT
COUNTRY OF PRODUCT'S ULTIMATE DESTINATION _ _ _
For the purposes of this PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST, whether or not you
know does not matter. Your assessment should include actual knowledge, or a
suspicion that the answer is yes.
251
1. Do you know, or are there indications that the customer is directly or
indirectly involved in any nuclear explosive activities (whether or not related to
customer's interest in XYZ software)?252 YES__ NO_
2. Do you know, or are there indications that the customer is directly or
indirectly involved in the design, development, production, or use of missiles
(whether or not related to customer's interest in XYZ software)?
15 3
YES_ NO
3. Do you know, or are there indications that the customer is directly or
indirectly involved in the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of
chemical or biological weapons (whether or not related to customer's interest in
XYZ software)?254 YES_ NO
*If the answer to any of the preceding questions was yes, or raised any doubts, do
not continue in the transaction. Contact XYZ's Compliance Manager, John
Complaisant, at (303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com for assistance.
251. See 15 C.F.R. § 744.2(a) n. 1 (2004).
252. See id. § 744.2(a).
253. See id. § 744.3(a)(2) (2004).
254. See id. § 744.4(a) (2004).
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PART XI- ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT INDEX
Mandatory Export Compliance Section Part Date Read/Initials
CEO's Letter I /
Overview II I
Compliance 911 III 
Customer Red Flags IV I
Anti-Boycott Protections V I
Anti-Bribery Protections VI /
Recordkeeping VII /
Training and Accountability VIII /
Export Decision Tree IX /
ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT SECTIONS XI /
Knowing Your Customer - Engineering XI.A /
Diversion Risk/Red Flag Checklist -
Engineering XI.B I
Proliferation Risk - Engineering XI.C /
Classifying the Item - Engineering XI.D I
Classifying Defense Articles/Services -
State Dept. XI.E I
Classifying the Item - Commerce Dept. XI.F
Forms/Engineering XI.G /
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PART XI.A - KNOWING YOUR CUSTOMER - ENGINEERING
1. Avoiding an Inadvertent Export
Generally, export laws require a license for the export of technical data.25 5 As
an engineer, you are at a particularly high risk for inadvertently revealing technical
data. Doing so, before screening procedures are completed and licenses are
secured could result in a violation. Revealing technical data in a conversation with
a foreign customer or even an employee may require a license. 56 Further, because
certain embargos prohibit any contact with sanctioned countries, even calling a
customer in an embargoed country or mailing a brochure could be violation.257
2. Licensing Protections
At the sales level, potential customers are screened for individual and country
status that may require a license. Once someone on the Coordination Team
contacts you with a pre-screened contact, it is safe to discuss business with the
contact.
Further, all employees are screened for potential licensing issues. Following
XYZ's Badge/Classification Requirements is all that is required regarding
licensing issues with co-workers.
3. Import Licensing Requirements
Occasionally, a customer may wish to send you an item to examine for
software development or adaptation. To receive this import, a license may be
required.258 Should a customer inquire about sending an item to XYZ, first contact
the Compliance Officer, John Complaisant, at (303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com
to see if a license is required. As with any export, an export license may be
required to return the item to the customer after examination. 2 9 Contact John
Complaisant for assistance before returning any item.
255. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2), (b)(9) (2004).
256. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(3)-(4) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)-(3).
257. 15 C.F.R. §§ 746.2-746.3, 746.7-746.8 (2004) (restrictions on exports to Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and
Rwanda); see 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(i) (2004).
258. See22 C.F.R. § 120.18 (2004).
259. See id. § 120.17(a)(1); 15 C.F.R. § 730.5(a) (2004).
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PART XLB - DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST - ENGINEERING
In the engineering department, you may observe customer behavior signaling
a diversion risk-the customer is saying one thing but plans to do another.26 °
These are the 'Red Flags' that were introduced in the Overview section.26'
Protecting against possible violations requires that you not 'self-blind' and
that you be aware of signals that may indicate a customer is attempting to obtain
U.S. exports illegally.262 Not knowing 'bad' information does not protect you or
XYZ from liability. 263 Rather, by actively evaluating each customer, you protect
both yourself and the company.
After discussing the customer's product needs, complete the DIVERSION
RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST. This is available in the Forms/Engineering section
and on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS.
" If the answer to any of the questions is Yes, STOP the transaction
immediately and contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at
(303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
" If the answer to all of the questions is No, you may continue in the
transaction.
* Date and initial the PROJECT TRACKING FORM to document that you
completed the DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST. Keep the
results of the screen in the PROJECT FILE.
o Go to the PROLIFERATION RISK section, at PART XI.C.
" Don't forget that your impressions about these questions can change over
time. If later in the transaction you have any doubts in your answers to
the Diversion Risk/Red Flag Checklist, stop the transaction immediately
contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 or
jcomp@XYZ.com.
260. See supra Part IV.
261. See supra Part IV.
262. See 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. III(a)(3) 1997).
263. Id. § 732 (Supp. I1(a)(2) 1997). The knowledge required under the EAR depends on the
situation. If 'red flags' are present, they create an affirmative duty to inquire further. Id. Absent 'red
flags,' it is appropriate to rely on a customer's representations. Id.
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PART XI.C - PROLIFERATION RISK - ENGINEERING
1. Proliferation Risk
Assessing the customer's business activities is a crucial part of determining
whether a transaction will require an export license.264 The customer's business or
personal activities can trigger a licensing requirement if the customer is involved
in: (1) nuclear activities; (2) the design, development, production or use of
missiles; (3) the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical
or biological weapons.265 These activities need not be the customer's direct
business activity, as indirect involvement can also trigger the licensing
requirements.266 Further, the activities need not involve XYZ's software or
services to require a license.267 The fact that the customer is involved in the
activities can be all that is required to trigger a licensing requirement.
268
2. Your Role in Assessing Proliferation Risk
The sales department conducts a proliferation risk screen prior to your work
with the customer. Your role is to be aware of indicators that signal possible
proliferation activities.269 If at any time you suspect that the customer may be
involved in any of the above-listed proliferation activities, stop the transaction or
communications immediately, and contact John Complaisant, compliance Officer,
at (303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
264. See 15 C.F.R. § 744.2(a) (2004).
265. Id. §§ 744.2-744.4 (2004).
266. Id. § 744.2(a).
267. See id. § 744.2(b) (license requirement triggered by high diversion risk).
268. See id.
269. Id. § 744.2(a) n. 1. "Knowledge" with respect to proliferation risk includes "reason to know."
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PART XI.D - CLASSIFYING THE ITEM - ENGINEERING
1. How the Classification Process Begins
In some circumstances, the results of screening at the sales department level
will mandate the need for a license. In that case, John Complaisant, Compliance
Officer, will contact you to discuss product classification for licensing purposes
before you begin work on the project.
In other circumstances, the Coordination Team will contact you about a
project, but no license application will have been initiated by the time you receive
the project. In this case, nothing in the initial screening process triggered a
licensing requirement. When you receive a project from the Coordination Team
and no license has been obtained, you must recommend a product classification to
the Compliance Officer, who will determine whether or not a license is required.
2. Classification and Your Role in the Licensing Process
As an engineer, your specific knowledge about software and services will be
critical in making the determination about whether or not a license is required.
You will not be responsible for license applications, but your classification work
will be an important part of the licensing process. This section provides step-by-
step instructions on how to assist in the classification.
It is your responsibility to:
" Assist in the classification process upon request from the Compliance
Officer or upon being assigned to a project by the Coordination Team
" Complete the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM, located under
Forms/Engineering or on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS.
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3. Determining Which Agency Regulates the Export
The two main government agencies that administer and enforce U.S. export
law are the Department of State and the Department of Commerce.
The State Department controls "defense articles" and "defense services."
270
The general State Department rule is that these regulations cover items and
services that are 'born military,' meaning that they were designed, modified, or
adapted for military application.271 Because of the inherent military value of these
items, they are strictly controlled. 72
The Commerce Department controls "dual use" items, which are those items
which have both commercial and military or proliferation applications.273 Many
commercial items, which may not have obvious military use, are controlled by the
Commerce Department. 74 Because some items are mainly commercial in nature,
the Commerce Department Rules allow for more or less control, depending on the
item. 275 The Commerce Department also administers U.S. anti-boycott laws.
276
270. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.2, 120.17 (2004).
271. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3(a)-(b) (2004).
272. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.6, 120.2 (2004) The Department of State determines, with consent of the
Department of Defense, which items are covered by the U.S. Munitions List. Id. § 120.2.
273. 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2004).
274. See id.
275. See id.; 15 C.F.R. § 730.7 (2004) (noting that few exports covered by the Commerce
Department require application to the Bureau of Industry and Security for a license).
276. 15 C.F.R. §§ 760.1-760.5 (2004).
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PART XI.E - CLASSIFYING THE ITEM - ENGINEERING - DEFENSE ARTICLES AND
DEFENSE SERVICES CONTROLLED BY THE STATE DEPARTMENT
1. State Department Export Controls
Because the State Department controls inherently military articles and
services, they will apply in any circumstance where it appears that both the State
and Commerce Department rules could apply.277 For this reason, the classification
analysis begins with a determination of whether or not the item or service is
controlled by the State Department.
2. State Department - U.S. Munitions List
The State Department's rules apply to items on the U.S. Munitions List
("Munitions List").278 This list covers anything designed, developed, configured,
or adapted for military application.279 Determining whether the Munitions List
covers an item is not always easy. Often, it requires a request to the State
Department for help in this classification.28 0 This request is called a COMMODITY
JURISDICTION REQUEST.28 l
3. Your Role in Classifying Software and Services under the Munitions List
You will not be responsible for making a Commodity Jurisdiction Request, as
those are handled by the Compliance Officer. Your role, however, is to help
determine if a Commodity Jurisdiction Request is necessary. Your determination
that an item or service was designed, developed, configured, or adapted for
military application generally means a Commodity Jurisdiction Request will be
necessary.282
4. Classification for Software (Technical Data) and Defense Services Based on
Final Product
Under State Department rules, classification of technical data (which includes
software) and defense services are based on the final product into which they will
be integrated.283 When classifying software, technical data, or defense services,
look for completed, end products into which these items will be incorporated.
Therefore, even if the software is not by itself inherently military, it can still be
covered by the Munitions List.284 An example would be intelligent sensing
software designed for use in guided or ballistic missiles.285
277. See 22 C.F.R. §120.5 (2004); see 15 C.F.R. §734.3(b)(1)(i) (2004).
278. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.2, 121.1 (2004).
279. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3 (2004).
280. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4 (2004).
281. Id.
282. See id.
283. See22 C.F.R. § 121.1(a).
284. See id.
285. See 22 C.F.R. § 121.16 (Item 11) (2004).
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5. Technical Data and Defense Services Covered by the Munitions List
The Munitions List controls technical data and defense services. 28 6 Inherently
military software or software that will be used for an inherently military end
product is covered under technical data on the Munitions List.
287
6. Technical Data
Under the Munitions List, software includes (but is not limited to): system
functional design, logic flow, algorithms, application programs, operating systems,
and support software for design, implementation, test, operation, diagnosis, and
repair of defense articles.288
Technical data also includes information other than software for the design,
development, production, repair, or modification of defense articles or services.
2 8 9
7. Defense Service
Under the Munitions List, defense services include giving assistance or
training to foreign persons (in the United States or abroad) in the design,
development, production, repair, or modification of defense articles.290 Providing
assistance with technical data covered by the Munitions List to foreign persons,
and providing training or educational publications to foreign persons or a foreign
military is providing a defense service.29 1
8. Strictly Adhere to All Badging and Classification Rules
From time to time, XYZ may employ foreign persons in non-technical roles.
Because the transfer of technical data to a foreign person may require a State
Department license, all XYZ Engineers must be vigilant in adhering to XYZ's
badge/classification requirements. If you need to review the policy, go to the
21intranet under BADGE/CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTS. 92 This system protects
against accidental exports of defense services to unclassified co-workers. Even a
quick conversation about encryption code in the hallway, if within earshot of an
unclassified co-worker, can be a violation of both the XYZ badge requirements
and export laws.293
286. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.2, 120.17 (2004).
287. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.6 (2004).
288. 22 C.F.R. § 121.8(f) (2004).
289. 22 C.F.R. § 120.10(a)(1) (2004).
290. 22 C.F.R. § 120.9(a)(1) (2004).
291. Id. § 120.9(a).
292. These requirements are not included within the model program, but should include
mechanisms to allow co-workers to assess whether they can share technical data with an individual
without risking a violation of the deemed export rule. See 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii) (2004); see also
supra Part II.C.
293. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(4) (2004).
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9. Munitions List Categories
If you determine that the software/service is likely to be covered under the
State Department's Munitions List, note this on the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
FORM.
The categories on the Munitions List are as follows. They are also available
on the State Department website at http://pmdtc.org/usml.htm.294
Category Description
1 Firearms, Close Assault Weapons and Combat Shotguns
2 Guns and Armament
3 N/A
4 Launch Vehicles, Guided Missiles, Ballistic Missiles, Rockets, Torpedoes, Bombs, and
Mines
5 N/A
6 Vessels of War and Special Naval Equipment
7 Tanks and Military Vehicles
8 Aircraft and Associated Equipment
9 Military Training Equipment
10 Protective Personnel Equipment
11 Military Electronics
12 Fire Control, Range Finder, Optical and Guidance and Control Equipment
13 Auxiliary Military Equipment
14 Toxicological Agents, Including Chemical Agents, Biological Agents, and Associated
Equipment
15 Spacecraft Systems and Associated Equipment
16 Nuclear Weapons, Design and Testing-Related Items
17 Classified Articles, Technical Data and Defense Services Not Listed in Other
Categories
18 Directed Energy Weapons
19 N/A
20 Submersible Vessels, Oceanographic and Associated Equipment
21 Miscellaneous Articles
294. 22 C.F.R. § 121 (2004), available at Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department
of State, Defense Trade Controls - United States Munitions List Categories,
http://www.pmdtc.org/usml.htm.
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10. Exception for Fundamental Research
Under the Munitions List, there is a licensing exception for research
considered fundamental research.2 95 Because much of XYZ's software is based
on the work that Tom Johnson did at the university, there is a strong possibility
that this exception may apply.296 You are not responsible for making the actual
determination. You must, however, notify John Complaisant, Compliance Officer,
of relevant information relating to the possibility of using this exception. Submit
this on the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM.
Fundamental research is:
" Conducted in engineering at accredited U.S. colleges
297
" Information ordinarily published/shared broadly in the scientific
community
2 98
Research is not fundamental if:
* It is funded by the U.S. government and the government places controls on
the dissemination of the information as part of the funding requirement 9
" The university agreed to restrictions (from sources other than the
government) on the publication of the research
30 0
11. Special Licenses for Ongoing Software or Service Projects
A special license is available when a project will involve ongoing use of
software or services (but will not grant the customer a right to manufacture the
software).30 ' If you believe the project may qualify for this special license, check
the line called "Ongoing Project/Technical Assistance Agreement May Apply" on
the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM so that John Complaisant can consider
applying for this special license.
295. 22 C.F.R. §§ 120.11(8), 120.10(a)(5) (2004).
296. See id. § 120.11(8).
297. Id.
298. Id.
299. Id. § 120.11(8)(ii).
300. Id. § 120.11(8)(i).
301. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.22 (2004).
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12. Providing Information to Assist in Commodity Jurisdiction Request
If software or services appear to be subject to the Munitions List, John
Complaisant will work with Outside Counsel to submit a Commodity Jurisdiction
Request to make the final determination. Your job in this process is to provide
information that will be the basis for the request. On the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
FORM, fill out the section entitled "Commodity Jurisdiction Request Information."
Part of making an accurate request involves understanding the nature of the
software or identity of the final item in which the software or service will be used.
In some cases, items that seem inherently military will not be covered by the State
Department's Munitions List if:
The application of the item is predominantly civil and has a performance
equivalent in civil application.302
" Performance equivalent is defined byform,fit, or function °
" The intended use of the item is not relevant to the inquiry (i.e.
even though an item is being designed for a civil application, if it
is not predominantly civil and does not have a performance
equivalent in civil application, the item will still be covered by
the Munitions List).
304
13. Information You Must Provide for Commodity Jurisdiction Request
The information you will need to provide for the Commodity Jurisdiction
Request includes:
" Description of the article or service
305
" History of the item's design, development, and use
30 6
" Brochures or documents related to the item
30 7
14. Start the Initial Classification Process Early
Because Commodity Jurisdiction Requests can take forty-five days (and then
require licensing after the request is returned), it is important to complete the
INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM as quickly as possible.0 8
302. 22 C.F.R § 120.3(a)(ii) (2004).
303. Id.
304. See id. § 120.3(b).
305. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(c) (2004).
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. See id. § 120.4(e).
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15. Next Steps
If you believe State Department rules apply, send your completed INITIAL
CLASSIFICATION FORM to John Complaisant. He will instruct you on how to
proceed. You may be able to do some work while awaiting the license, as long as
you aren't providing the customer with technical data or defense services.
16. If State Department Rules Don't Seem to Apply
Should you determine that the State Department's Munitions List does not
appear to cover your software or service, you must notify John Complaisant,
Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com for confirmation of
your assessment. Once you have received this confirmation, document this on the
PROJECT TRACKING FORM, available under Forms/Engineering or on the intranet
under COMPLIANCE/FORMS. Then, go to the next section, COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT CLASSIFICATION at PART XI.F.
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PART XI.F - CLASSIFYING THE ITEM - ENGINEERING - COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT CLASSIFICATION
1. Your Role in Classifying Software and Services under the Commerce
Department Rules
If you determine that the State Department Rules do not apply and you have
gotten approval on this determination from John Complaisant, you will need to
classify the item under the Commerce Department rules.3°
The Commerce Department controls items that can have "dual use," or both
civil and military use.310 Unlike the controls of the State Department, these are not
items or services designed, modified, or adapted for military use. Because there is
less "risk" with these items, the classification is more user-friendly. The
Commerce Department's Commerce Control List uses very specific, detailed
descriptions. 311 Because our engineers have detailed knowledge of XYZ's specific
projects and services, each engineer will classify their own projects.
2. Determining the Item/Service's Export Control Classification Number
To make a classification under the Commerce Control List, you must
determine the item or service's Export Control Classification Number
("ECCN").3 12 Once you have determined the ECCN, list it on the INITIAL
CLASSIFICATION FORM and send it to John Complaisant, Compliance Officer.
An ECCN is a 5-character classification:
313
" The first digit represents the category of the item or service.314 For
example, a first digit of 4 represents computers. 315  Most of XYZ's
software and services will begin with 3, 4, 5, or 6 (3=computers,
4--telecommunications, 5=information security, 6=sensors and lasers).
" The second character, a letter, represents the product group.3 16 Most of
XYZ's products will be classified D, software.
3 17
309. 22 C.F.R. § 120.5; 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2004).
310. 15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
311. See 15 C.F.R. § 774 (Supp. 11998).
312. See 15 C.F.R. § 738.2(c) (2004).
313. Id. § 738.2(d).
314. See id.
315. 15 C.F.R. § 738.2(a).
316. Id. § 738.2(d).
317. Id. § 738.2(b).
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3. Finding an ECCN
To find an item's ECCN, you may search by:
" Item Classifications listed by ECCN (numeric/alpha classifications) at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/indexnum.pdf
31 8
" Item Classification listed by item names (alphabetized listing of items) at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/indexccl.pdf 3 9
Once you link to the list, use the binoculars located in the upper toolbar to
"jump" to a certain spot in the list. Type in the number (i.e., type 4A001 to get to
the first item in the computers category) or name and click return.
4. How to Find an ECCN for Technology
When determining the ECCN for technology, if it is required for the
development, production, or use for items on the ECCN, it is classified under the
ECCN of the item the technology is required to develop, produce, or use.32 °
The actual use of the technology (i.e. for a lesser-controlled item) does not
change the classification of the technology. The ECCN is based on the most
highly-controlled level applicable for the technology.
321
5. Print and Attach a Copy of ECCN Details
Print and attach a copy of the ECCN details from the Commerce Control List
to the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM.
6. If You Can't Find an ECCN
If you cannot find an ECCN for your item, it is covered by the catch-all
category "EAR99. 322  List "EAR99" in the ECCN blank on the INITIAL
CLASSIFICATION FORM.
7. Questions about Finding an ECCN
If you have any questions or would like help determining the proper ECCN,
contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 or
jcomp@XYZ.com for assistance.
318. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (Supp. I-Ill 1998, 2003, 2003), available at Export Administration
Regulations Database, Numerical Index to the Commerce Control List,
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/indexnum.pdf.
319. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (Supp. 1-111 1998, 2003, 2003), available at Export Administration
Regulations Database, Alphabetical Index to the Commerce Control List,
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/indexccl.pdf.
320. See 15 C.F.R. § 738.2(a)-(c)
321. See id. § 774 (Supp. II pt. 1 2003).
322. See 15 C.F.R. § 774.1 (2004).
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8. Next Steps
Once you have assigned an ECCN, send your completed INITIAL
CLASSIFICATION FORM to John Complaisant, and document this step on the
PROJECT TRACKING FORM, located in this section under Forms/Engineering or in
the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS. Await instruction from John
Complaisant on how to proceed. You may be able to do some work while awaiting
the license.
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PROJECT TRACKING FORM - ENGINEERING
NAME OF CUSTOMER
CUSTOMER ADDRESS
DATE PROJECT RECEIVED FROM COORDINATION TEAM
PERSON FILLING OUT FORM/INTIAL
DIVERSION RISK CHECKLIST (performed by engineer)
* Date Checklist Completed/Initials /
" Result of Screen: OK to Proceed __ Stop-
o If transaction stopped, date stopped:
o If transaction resumed (status change from Stop to OK to
Proceed because license obtained), date resumed:
Date Compliance Manager Approved Decision NOT to Classify Under State
Department Rules (if applicable)
Date INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM sent to Compliance Manager
DENV. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y
DIVERSION RISK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST - ENGINEERING
NAME OF CUSTOMER BEING SCREEENED
CUSTOMER ADDRESS
XYZ PRODUCT TO BE PURCHASED (describe in detail)
CUSTOMER' S END USE FOR PRODUCT
COUNTRY OF PRODUCT'S ULTIMATE DESTINATION
PERSON PERORMING SCREEN/INTIAL
DATE PERFORMED
*If the answer to any of these is yes or you have any doubts, do not continue in the
transaction. Contact XYZ's Compliance Manager, John Complaisant, at (303)123-
0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com for assistance.
1. The customer is reluctant to offer information about the end-use of the
item.323 For example, when you ask the customer about the software's end use or
inform the customer that XYZ requires a certification of end use, the customer
hesitates or does not call back for several days. YES_ NO_
2. XYZ's software capabilities do not fit the customer's line of business, such as
a plant nursery or construction equipment business inquiring about XYZ's high-
resolution image recognition software.324 YES__ NO
3. XYZ's software is incompatible with the technical level of the country it will
be shipped to, such as a third-world country that does not have either a space or
engineering industry.325 YES__ NO
4. The customer has little or no business background in either the engineering or
space industry.326 YES__ NO
5. The customer is willing to pay cash up front, which would be unusual because
XYZ's customers generally pay with letters of credit or staged cash payment
during the development of the software for the contract. 327 YES__ NO__
6. The customer is unfamiliar with the basic functionality of sensing software or
image recognition technology.32 YES_ NO_
323. See 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. 11I(b)(1) 1997).
324. See id. § 732 (Supp. II(b)(2) 1997).
325. See id. § 732 (Supp. I1(b)(3) 1997).
326. See id. § 732 (Supp. 111(b)(4) 1997).
327. See id. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(5) 1997).
328. See id. § 732 (Supp. II(b)(6) 1997).
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7. The customer declines the training and maintenance services that XYZ
provides as part of each software contract.3 29 YES_ NO_
8. The customer is vague about delivery dates or wants deliveries made to odd
destinations, such as Post Office boxes, remote locations or destinations that are far
away from the customer's place of business. 33.° YES_ NO
9. The customer gives a freight forwarder as the product's final destination.
3 3 1
YESNO_
10. The shipping route is abnormal, such as a customer with a reported ultimate
destination in France routing the delivery through India.332 YES_ NO_
11. The customer requests unusual packaging, such as asking for an unmarked
box o: providing their own packaging materials.333 YES_ NO_
12. The buyer is evasive or makes contradictory statements about the software's
use, such as stating that they will use the software in a plant in Colorado but
making frequent references to their engineering facility in China.
334
YES_ NO_
329. See id. § 732 (Supp. l1l(b)(7) 1997).
330. See id. § 732 (Supp. I11(b)(8) 1997).
331. See id. § 732 (Supp. 111(b)(9) 1997).
332. See id. § 732 (Supp. 111(b)(10) 1997).
333. See id. § 732 (Supp. IlI(b)(l 1) 1997).
334. See id. § 732 (Supp. I11(b)(12) 1997).
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INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM - ENGINEERING
NAME OF CUSTOMER
XYZ JOB NUMBER
PERSON FILLING OUT FORM/INTIAL
DATE COMPLETED
SOURCE OF CLASSIFICATION REQUEST:
REQUEST FROM COMPLIANCE MANAGER
ENGINEERING - NORMAL PROJECT FLOW
AGENCY COVERAGE:
AGENCY EXPECTED TO CONTROL EXPORT:
STATE COMMERCE
DATE COMPLIANCE MANAGER CONFIRMED THAT STATE
DEPARTMENT RULES DO NOT APPLY (if applicable)
STATE DEPARTMENT CLASSIFICATION:
MUNITIONS LIST CATEGORY NUMBER335
PROJECT MIGHT BE FUNDAMENTAL RESEARCH?33 6 YES NO
ONGOING PROJECT/TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE AGREEMENT MIGHT
APPLY?337 YES NO_
COMMODITY JURISDICTION REQUEST INFORMATION:
338
PREDOMINANTLY CIVIL APPLICATION? YES NO_
PERFORMANCE EQUIVALENT IN CIVIL APPLICATION (form, fit, and
function)? YES_ NO
IF YES TO EITHER OF ABOVE, DESCRIBE IN DETAIL
335. See supra Part XI.E.I-XI.E.9.
336. See supra Part XI.E.10.
337. See supra Part XI.E.11.
338. See supra Part XLE.12-XI.E.14.
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COMMERCE DEPARTMENT CLASSIFICATION33 9
ECCN_
PRINT AND ATTACH COPY OF PAGES LISTING THE ECCN DETAILS
(check once attached) -
339. See supra Part XI.F.
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PART XH.A - INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN (POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS) -
ACCOUNTING/EXPORT COMPLIANCE SCREENING DEPARTMENT
1. Screening Individuals/Countries
Potential customers, their countries, and the countries of ultimate destination
for XYZ products must be screened to determine if export licenses are required.
These screens can be done using the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN form,
available at the end of this section under FORMS - ACCOUNTING/COMPLIANCE
SCREENING or on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS.
2. Requests from Sales Department
The sales department will submit customer information for screening on the
NEW CONTACT FORM. Screen the individual and the country following the links
on the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN form. The directions for screening are
right on the form.
To search lists, link to the list. Use the binoculars, located in the upper
toolbar to find and "jump" to sections of the list.
3. Individual or Country Matches
If the countries or individuals match (or are very similar to a name or address
on a list), contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 or
jcomp@XYZ.com so he may begin the licensing process.
File the completed INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN form in the CUSTOMER
FILE. Notify the salesperson via email (read receipt requested) that they must
STOP the transaction. Print the email, including the read receipt, and file it in the
CUSTOMER FILE. If and when a license is obtained, the Compliance Officer will
notify the salesperson that they may resume the transaction. You will be copied on
this email. Print a copy of the email for the CUSTOMER FILE.
4. Corruption/Bribery Risk
Follow the link on the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN form. 34°  If the
customer's country is listed in the last 50 countries on the list (those deemed most
susceptible to corruption risk), notify the salesperson via email (read receipt
requested). 4 Your message should be a simple warning to let them know that the
customer's country has a high risk of corruption or illegal bribery and that they
should take the utmost caution in the transaction. Print the email, including the
read receipt, and file it in the CUSTOMER FILE.
340. See infra Part XII.G (Individual/Country Screen Forms).
341. See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2004, at
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2004.en.htnl#cpi2004 (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
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PART XH.B - INDIVIDUAL SCREEN (POTENTIAL EMPLOYEES) -
ACCOUNTING/EXPORT COMPLIANCE SCREENING DEPARTMENT
Under export control laws, potential employees who are not U.S. Persons
may require licenses to receive certain data or training.342 Exports can take place
in the United States, even on the XYZ campus, if technology is transferred to a
foreign person here.343 The law presumes that at some point, a foreign national
will return to their home country.344 This is the deemed export rule.
345 For this
reason, all XYZ departments will submit names and addresses of potential hires to
you for screening prior to hire.
When any department notifies you by email of a potential hire, screen the
name against the Individuals section of the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN form.
" If there are ANY matches, notify John Complaisant, Compliance Officer,
at (303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com so he can apply for a license. File
the completed form in the POTENTIAL EMPLOYEE FILE.
* If there are NO matches, notify the appropriate department via email (read
receipt requested) that they may hire the employee. Print a copy of the
email, including the read receipt, and file it in the POTENTIAL EMPLOYEE
FILE.
For more information on the deemed export rule, go to
http:www.bis.doc.gov/DeemedExports/DeemedExportsFAQs.html.346
If you have any problems, concerns, or questions, contact John Complaisant,
Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
342. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (2004); 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.2(b)(1)-(3) (2004).
343. See supra note 342.
344. 15 C.F.R. § 734.2(b)(2)(ii).
345. Id.
346. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Deemed Export" Questions
and Answers, at www.bis.doc.gov/DeemedExports/DeemedExportsFAQs.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2005).
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PART XII.C - LETTERS OF CREDIT AND METHODS OF PAYMENT -
ACCOUNTING/EXPORT COMPLIANCE SCREENING DEPARTMENT
1. Letters of Credit - High Risk for Illegal Boycott Violations
In the accounting department, it is critical that you be aware of the laws
against participating in illegal boycotts.347 Often, conditions in letters of credit
specify that the customer or vendor follows the laws of a certain country or certify
the origin of products.348 You must review each letter of credit to make sure it
does not violate U.S. Anti-Boycott laws.349
Review the ANTI-BOYCOTT PROTECTIONS section located at PART V for
details.35° If you have any questions or concerns, contact John Complaisant,
Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
2. Methods of Payment - Be Alert for Red Flags
The way customers pay for XYZ software and services may present 'red
flags' in the transaction. 3 Because most of XYZ's customers pay by staged cash
payments, other methods or sources of payment may indicate a risk of diversion or
other illegal activity such as illegal transfers of funds.352 Review the section
entitled CUSTOMER RED FLAGS at PART IV to review the red flag indicators if
you have any concerns. Contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at
(303)123-0911 or jcomp@XYZ.com if anything about the customer's payment
seems suspicious.
347. See supra Part V.
348. See 15 C.F.R. 760.2(f) (2004).
349. Id.
350. See supra Part V.
351. See supra Part IV.
352. See 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. III(b)(5) 2005).
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PART XH.D - REIMBURSEMENTS AND ANTI-BRIBERY PROTECTIONS -
ACCOUNTING/EXPORT COMPLIANCE SCREENING DEPARTMENT
All Requests to Pay Customer Expenses Require Pre-Approval
Due to the complexity of anti-corruption laws, all requests to cover expenses
for trips, entertainment, etc. require pre-approval from John Complaisant.
353
Should an employee inquire about being reimbursed or getting approval for
expenses, contact John Complaisant, at (303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
PART XII.E - CONTRACTS, INVOICES AND OTHER DOCUMENTS -
ACCOUNTING/EXPORT COMPLIANCE SCREENING DEPARTMENT
1. Certifications and Declarations Required in Contracts
XYZ requires certain certifications and declarations in order to do business.
Issues covered include final destination, end-user, end-use, involvement in
proliferation activities, and anti-bribery controls. Violation of these certifications
is grounds for XYZ to unilaterally terminate any contract.
To enact and enforce these requirements, the following clauses must be in all
contracts. They are available on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/CONTRACTS:
35 4
" Certification of Final Destination
* Certification of End-Use and End-User
" Certification of Non-Proliferation
" Agreement to Abide by U.S. Anti-Bribery Laws
2. License Numbers Required on All Invoices, Bills of Lading, and Shipping
Documents
All invoices, bills of lading, and shipping documents must include the proper
license number and other designation as required by the State or Commerce
Department.3 " John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, will provide this
information to you once he obtains the required license.
353. See supra Part VI.
354. These certifications and agreements are not included in the model program. For more
information, see infra Part XII.E.3 (addressing final destination and end use); infra Part IV (addressing
non-proliferation protections); supra Part VI (addressing anti-bribery protections).
355. See 22 C.F.R. § 123.22 (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 732.5 (2004).
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3. Shippers Export Declaration - Invoices, Bills of Lading, and Shipping
Documents
This language must be printed on all XYZ invoices, bills of lading, and
shipping documents for items sent with a State Department License:
"These commodities are authorized by the U.S. Government for export only to
[country of ultimate destination] for use by [end-user]. They may not be
transferred, transshipped on an non-continuous voyage, or otherwise be disposed
of in any other country, either in their original form or after being incorporated
into other end-items, without the prior written approval of the U.S. Department of
State. ,356
The following language must be printed on all XYZ invoices, bills of lading,
and shipping documents for items covered by Commerce Department rules or
licenses:
"[These/this] [commodities, technology, software] [were/was] exported from
the United States in accordance with the Export Administration Regulations.
Diversion contrary to US. law is prohibited. "'
356. 22 C.F.R. § 123.9(b) (2004).
357. 15 C.F.R. § 758.6 (2004).
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PART XII.F - VERIFICATIONS - PRE-SHIPMENT & PRIOR TO SENDING
SOFTWARE KEYS - ACCOUNTING/EXPORT COMPLIANCE SCREENING
DEPARTMENT
1. Quarterly Customer/List Verifications
Once per quarter, screen all open customer files against the lists on the
INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN list.35 8 This will identify any changes in customer
or country status that could lead to an inadvertent violation. If you get a match,
STOP any ongoing or potential transactions (by notifying the sales or engineering
department) and contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)777-7911
or jcomp@XYZ.com.
2. Pre-Shipment - Final Verification
When Engineering sends you a final item to be packaged for shipment, re-run
the customer and country through the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN. If the
customer or country matches any lists, STOP the transaction and immediately
contact John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 or
jcomp@XYZ.com. Keep a copy of the PRE-SHIPMENT
INDIVIDUAL/DESTINATION SCREEN in the CUSTOMER EXPORT FILE.
3. Requests for Software Keys - Verification and Re-Certification Required
XYZ software comes with an internal "bomb" which causes the software to
become disabled at the end of the contract period unless the user obtains a software
key from XYZ. As a condition to providing the key to disable the bomb, you must
re-screen the customer and country using the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN
form. Further, the customer must re-certify their uses and agreement to comply
with U.S. law. This agreement is available on the XYZ intranet under CONTRACT
EXTENSION/RECERTIFICATION.
358. See, e.g., Bureau of Industry and Security U.S. Department of State, Export Management
Systems Guidelines, Denied Persons Screen, at 34, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/exportmanagementsystems/pdf/screenl.pdf (last visited Feb. 14, 2005)
(describing the need for a process for updating customer lists).
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PART XH.G - ACCOUNTINGIEXPORT COMPLIANCE SCREENING DEPARTMENT
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INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN (POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS) -
ACCOUNTING/COMPLIANCE SCREENER
NAME OF CUSTOMER BEING SCREEENED
ADDRESS
XYZ PRODUCT TO BE PURCHASED (describe in detail) or INVOICE
NUMBER
CUSTOMER'S END-USE FOR PRODUCT




Initial Screen Pre-Shipment __ Software Re-certification
SCREENING INDIVIDUALS
Look for the customer's name on the following six lists:
1. Denied Persons List - http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/thedeniallist.asp.3 59
MATCH? YES_ NO_
If re-screening a party screened in the last 90 days, go to the recent update
site (for a faster screen 'of the Denied Parties List). Go to
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/recentchanges.asp.36 ° MATCH? YES_ NO_
2. Debarred List - www.pmdtc.org/debar059.htm. 3 6 1 MATCH?
YES_ NO_
3. Specially Designated Nationals -
www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/tl 1 sdn.pdf.3 62 MATCH? YES_ NO_
359. 15 C.F.R. § 764 (Supp. 1. 2002), Bureau of Industry and Security U.S. Department of
Commerce, The Denied Persons List, available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/thedeniallist.asp (last
visited Feb. 14, 2005.
360. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Recent Changes to the
Denied Persons List, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/recentchanges.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
361. 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2004), Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State,
List of Statutorily Debarred Parties, July 1988-April 2004: available at
http://www.pmdtc.org/debar059.htm.
362. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/tl I sdn.pdf (last visited
Feb. 23, 2005).
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4. Federal Register - http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/fedreg/ear-fedreg.html. 363
Look for list updates. MATCH? YES_ NO_
5. Entity List - http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744spir.pdf. 364
MATCH? YES_ NO_




Interpreting the results of the Individual Screen:
" If any of the above is a match, immediately contact John Complaisant at
(303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
* If none of the above match, the individual has passed this section of the
screen.
COUNTRY SCREEN
Look for the customer's country on the following two lists:
1. Office of Foreign Asset Control Embargo List -
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/. 66 MATCH?
YESNO_
2. Office of Defense Trade Control Arms Embargo List -
http://pmdtc.org/country.htm.367 MATCH? YES_ NO_
Interpreting the results of the Country Screen:
" If any of the above is a match, immediately contact John Complaisant at
(303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
* If none of the above match, the customer has passed this section of the
screen.
363. U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Register Rules Affecting the Export Administration
Regulations, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/fedreg/ear-fedreg.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
364. 15 C.F.R. § 774 (Supp. IV 2001), Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Entity List, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf1744spir.pdf (last visited Feb.
14,2005).
365. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Unverified List, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Enforcement/UnverifiedList/unverified-parties.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2005).
366. Office of Foreign Asset Control, U.S. Treasury Department, Sanctions Program and Country
Summaries, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/ (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
367. 22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (2004), Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State,
Embargo Reference Chart, available at http://pmdtc.org/country.htm (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
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CORRUPTION/BRIBERY RISK SCREEN
Compare customer's country and project location against the Transparency
International website for corruption/bribery risk: • 368
http://www.transparency.org/cpi/2004/cpi2OO4.en.html#cpi2004.
Interpreting the results of the Individual Screen:
" If the country is listed in the last 50 countries on the list (countries at the
end of the list being at higher risk for corruption or bribery), notify the
salesperson requesting the screen, and tell them to proceed with
caution.
369
" If the country is not in the bottom 50 on the list, you don't need to do
anything further.
INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN RESULTS (Potential Customers)
Individual Screen
_____ Matched on any list, if yes, date John Complaisant notified __
___ Did not have any matches
Country Screen
_____ Matched on any list, if yes, date John Complaisant notified __
___ Did not have any matches
Corruption/Bribery Screen
Country in bottom 50 on Transparency.org website, 370 notified salesperson
OK to proceed with caution
Country not in bottom 50
STATUS:
OK to PROCEED, or
STOP to await licensing or further instruction from John Complaisant
Date employee notified_
368. Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index 2004, at
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INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN (POTENTIAL EMPLOYEES) -
ACCOUNTING/COMPLIANCE SCREENER





Look for the customer's name on the following list:
1. Denied Persons List - http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/thedeniallist.asp. 37'
MATCH? YES_ NO_
If re-screening a party screened in the last 90 days, go to the recent update
site (for a faster screen of the Denied Parties List). Go to
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/recentchanges.asp.37 2 MATCH? YES NO__
2. Debarred List- www.pmdtc.org/debar059.htm.3 73 MATCH?
YES_ NO
3. Specially Designated Nationals -
www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/tl lsdn.pdf. 74 MATCH? YES_ NO_
4. Federal Register - http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/fedreg/ear-fedreg.html.
375
Look for list updates. MATCH? YES_ NO_
5. Entity List - http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744spir.pdf.
376
MATCH? YES_ NO
371. 15 C.F.R. § 764 (Supp I 2002), Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, The Denied Persons List, available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/thedeniallist.asp (last
visited Feb. 14, 2005).
372. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Recent Changes to the
Denied Persons List, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/recentchanges.asp (last visited Feb. 14, 2005).
373. 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2004), Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State,
List of Statutorily Debarred Parties, July 1988-April 2004, available at
http://www.pmdtc.org/debarO59.htm (last visited Feb 14, 2005).
374. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t I 1 sdn.pdf , (last visited
Feb. 15, 2005)
375. U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Register Rules Affecting the Export Administration
Regulations, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/fedreg/ear-fedreg.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
376. 15 C.F.R. § 744 (Supp. IV 2001); Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Entity List, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744spir.pdf (last visited Feb. 14,
2005).
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6. Unverified List -
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Enforcement/UnverifiedList/unverified parties.html.37
MATCH? YES_ NO__
Interpreting the results of the Individual Screen:
" If any of the above is a match, immediately contact John Complaisant at
(303)123-0911 orjcomp@XYZ.com.
" If none of the above match, the individual has passed the screen.
INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN RESULTS (Potential Employees)
Individual Screen
___ Matched on any list, if yes, date John Complaisant notified
___ Did not have any matches
STATUS:
OK to PROCEED. , or
STOP to await licensing or further instruction from John Complaisant
Date employee notified.__
377. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Unverified List, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Enforcement/UnverifiedList/unverified-parties.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2005).
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PART XIII - COORDINATION TEAM
COORDINATION TEAM INDEX
Mandatory Export Compliance Section Part Date Read/Initials
CEO's Letter I /
Overview II I
Compliance 911 III /
Customer Red Flags IV /
Anti-Boycott Protections V I
Anti-Bribery Protections VI I
Recordkeeping VII /
Training and Accountability VIII /
Export Decision Tree IX I
COORDINATION TEAM SECTIONS
Sales Department Section X /
Engineering Department Section XI /
Knowing Your Customer XIII.B I
Diversion Risk/Red Flags XIII.C I
Contract Certification Clauses XIII.D I
Forms/Coordination Team XIII.E I
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PART XIII.A - REQUIRED READING - SALES AND ENGINEERING DEPARTMENT
SECTIONS - COORDINATION TEAM
Required Reading - Sales and Engineering Department Sections
As the go-between group that coordinates work between the Sales and
Engineering Departments, it is critical that you understand their functions in the
export compliance process. Be sure you have completed the reading requirements
for both the SALES and ENGINEERING SECTIONS, at PARTS X AND XI before
going any further.
You can initial the sections in their SALES and ENGINEERING INDEXES in
your copy of the Compliance Program manual to document your completion of
these steps.
PART XIII.B - KNOWING YOUR CUSTOMER - COORDINATION TEAM
1. Danger of Export Violations in Early Contacts
Generally, export laws require a license for the export of technical data.37 Be
careful not to reveal technical data about XYZ's software when talking initially
with potential customers. 379 Doing so, before screening procedures are completed
and licenses are secured could result in a violation. Further, because certain
sanctions prohibit any contact with embargoed countries, even calling a customer
in an embargoed country or mailing a brochure could be violation.
3 80
378. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.10 (2004); 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.2(b)(2), (b)(9) (2004).
379. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(3)-(4) (2004); 15 C.F.R. §§ 734.2(b)(2)-(3).
380. 15 C.F.R. §§ 746.2-746.4, 746.7-746.8 (2004) (restrictions on exports to Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and
Rwanda); 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(i) (2004).
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2. Screening the Customer
As early as possible in the discussions with a potential customer, submit
information about the potential customer to the Accounting Department for an
INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN. This may be done by filling out the form in the
Forms/Coordination Team section entitled NEW CONTACT FORM. This form is
also available on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/FORMS. Once you have filled
out the form, give it to Accounting, for a Compliance Screening of the individual
and country.
This screening process will allow XYZ to avoid doing business with
individuals who have been banned from receiving exports due to export
violations.38' In some cases, doing business will require obtaining an export
license for similar reasons.382 This process allows us to identify parties who we
can't do business with or with whom business may be transacted only after getting
the appropriate license.383 Vigilance at this step can prevent a violation. Further,
by determining that it is safe to pursue business with a customer, you will be able
to spend your limited time working on customers with whom XYZ can do
business.
This screening step also checks the contact's country, which can prohibit a
transaction or merely trigger a licensing requirement .
3. Pursuing New Leads
If you plan to pursue a business lead and have not yet made contact, fill out
the NEW CONTACT FORM to the best of your ability and submit to a Compliance
Screener in Accounting for INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN. Do not forward
contacts to the Sales Department without instructions from the Compliance Officer
after receiving results of this screen. If you are given approval to proceed, send a
copy of the approval with the contact information to the Sales Department.
If you meet a contact at a trade show, or the potential customer contacts you,
submit the NEW CONTACT FORM to Accounting for an initial screen as soon as
possible after the initial contact. Do not continue communicating with the contact,
to the extent that you can control it, while you await instructions from the
Compliance Officer. If you are given approval to proceed, send a copy of the
approval with the contact information to the Sales Department.
381. 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 744.1(a) (2004).
382. See, e.g., 15 C.F.R. § 744.2(b) (2004).
383. See 22 C.F.R. § 127.7; 15 C.F.R. § 744.1(a); 15 C.F.R. § 744.2(b).
384. 15 C.F.R. §§ 746.1(a)(1), 746.1 (2004).
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PART XIII.C - DIVERSION RISKJRED FLAGS - COORDINATION TEAM
Always bear in mind the Red Flags that were introduced in the OVERVIEW
section at PART IV.385 If a potential customer engages in suspicious behavior, do
not forward the contact to the Sales Department without first discussing your
concerns with John Complaisant, Compliance Officer, at (303)123-0911 or
jcomp@XYZ.com.
PART XIII.D - CONTRACT REVIEW - COORDINATION TEAM
Higher Level Review Required on Certification/Declaration Clauses of All
Contracts
As the department that reviews all XYZ contracts, it is important to be sure
that the required Certifications and Declarations are in all company contracts.
38 6
These clauses require our customer and business partners to follow U.S. export
laws. Further, they give us the opportunity to unilaterally terminate any contract
should the other party violate these certifications.
As you review contracts, make sure the required certifications/declarations are
included. These are available on the intranet under COMPLIANCE/CONTRACTS.
Once you have included these clauses, Bob Decisis must review and approve the
clauses. Document the date of Bob's review and approval and file it in the
PROJECT CONTRACT FILE.
385. See supra Part IV.
386. 22 C.F.R. §123.9(b) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 758.6 (2004); see also supra Part XII.E.
VOL. 33:3
2005 A MODEL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM 529
PART XIII.E - COORDINATION TEAM FoRMs
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NEW CONTACT FORM - COORDINATION TEAM
NAME OF CONTACT (note any inconsistencies in spelling, nicknames, etc.)
PERSON FILLING OUT FORM/INTIAL
DATE COMPLETED
CONTACT ADDRESS__
DATE OF FIRST CONTACT
SOURCE OF LEAD/CONTACT (describe in detail)
XYZ PRODUCT CONTACT INTERESTED IN (describe in detail, if known)
CONTACT'S END USE FOR PRODUCT
COUNTRY OF PRODUCT'S ULTIMATE DESTINATION_
OTHER INFORMATION YOU BELIEVE WOULD BE HELPFUL
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PART XIV - EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER
EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER INDEX
Mandatory Export Compliance Section Part Date Read/Initials
CEO's Letter I /
Overview II 
Compliance 911 III 
Customer Red Flags IV I
Anti-Boycott Protections V I
Anti-Bribery Protections VI I
Recordkeeping VII /
Training and Accountability VIII /
Export Decision Tree IX /
Handling Compliance 911 Reports XIV.A /
Individual/Country Screens - Potential
Customers
Deemed Export Rule - Potential Employees
Responding to Employees' Questions
or Concerns
Licensing Process Flowchart
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Shipping Without a License (NLR) XIV.I /
Option 1 - Publicly Available XIV.I. 1 /
Option 2 - EAR99 XIV.I.2 I
Option 3 - No Controls for
ECCN/Country XIV.I.3 I
Self-Validated License Exceptions XIV.J /
Self-Validated License Exception Example XIV.K /
Applying for a Commerce Department
License X1V.L /
Forms/Compliance Officer XIV.M /
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PART XIV.A - HANDLING COMPLIANCE 911 REPORTS - EXPORT COMPLIANCE
OFFICER
1. If an Employee Contacts you under the COMPLIANCE 911 PROTOCOLS
a. Make sure the employee has stopped the transaction, communication, or
shipment.
b. Remind the employee to retain all records.
c. Remind employee to maintain confidentiality.
d. Immediately contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or
jldoe@abclaw.com. She will assist you in handling the matter.
e. Document the receipt of the report and the date you contacted
OutsideCounsel in the COMPLIANCE 911 REPORTS folder.
2. Consider the Benefits of Voluntary Disclosure
In the event that an investigation conducted in conjunction with and at the
direction of Outside Counsel discovers a possible violation, voluntary reporting of
the violation to the appropriate government agency can be a mitigating factor in
the assessment of penalties. 387 Outside Counsel will discuss this option and the
possible risks and benefits of pursuing this course of action should this matter
arise.
387. 22 C.F.R. § 127.12(a) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 764.5(a) (2004); see also supra notes 54-55 and
accompanying text (discussing voluntary disclosure as a factor weighing against prosecuting the
organization).
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PART XIV.B - INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN (POTENTIAL CUSTOMERS) -
EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER
1. Individual/Country Screen
If a customer's name or country matches Commerce or State Department lists,
the Compliance Screener will notify you. Some matches mean there is an absolute
prohibition against doing business with the party.3 88  In other cases, it will
necessitate getting a license.
389
2. Complete Bans on Transactions
If a potential customer's name comes up as a match on the following lists, it is
a complete ban on doing business with the party. Should the Compliance Screener
notify you of a match, confirm it by searching the match at the appropriate website.
a. Denied Persons List - http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/thedeniallist.asp.39 °
If re-screening a party screened in the last 90 days, go to the recent update
site (for a faster screen of the Denied Parties List). Go to
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/recentchanges.asp. 39'
b. Debarred List- http://www.pmdtc.org/debar059.htm.392
c. Specially Designated Nationals -
http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/tl 1 sdn.pdf.
393
d. Federal Register -http://www.acc.ess.gpo.gov/bis/fedreg/ear-fedreg.html.
394
Look for list updates.
If you confirm a match, notify the Compliance Screener immediately so that
they can notify the employee . requesting the screen of the total ban. If the name is
close to a name on the above lists, contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at
(303)999-9999 or jldoe@abclaw.com for advice on how to proceed. Document the
date you checked the lists and the date you discussed the matter with Outside
Counsel in the COMPLIANCE CONSULTATION FILE.
388. 15 C.F.R. § 744.12 (2004); see also 15 C.F.R. §S 746.2-746.4, 746.7-746.8 (2004)
(restrictions on exports to Cuba, Iraq, Iran, and Rwanda); id. §732.3(i) (2004).
389. 15 C.F.R. § 746.1 (a)-(b) (2004).
390. 15 C.F.R. § 764 (Supp. 1 2002); Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, The Denied Persons List, available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/thedeniallist.asp.
391. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Recent Changes to the
Denied Persons List, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/recentchanges.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
392. 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2004); Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State,
List of Statutorily Debarred Parties, July 1988-April 2004, available at
http://www.pmdtc.org/debarO59.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
393. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons,-at http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t 1I sdn.pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2005).
394. U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Register Rules Affecting the Export Administration
Regulations, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/fedreg/ear-fedreg.html (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
OL. 33:3
A MODEL COMPLIANCE PROGRAM
3. Transactions That Require a License (at a minimum)
If a potential customer's name comes up as a match on the following lists, a
license will be required, but is not guaranteed to be granted, in order to do business
with the party. Should the Compliance Screener notify you of a match, confirm it
by searching the name on the appropriate website.
a. Entity List - http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744spir.pdf. 395
b. Unverified List -
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Enforcement/UnverifiedList/unverified-parties.html. 3 96
c. Office of Foreign Asset Control Embargo List -
http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/.397
d. Office of Defense Trade Control Arms Embargo List -
http://pmdtc.org/country.htm. 9 s
If you confirm a match, notify the Compliance Screener immediately, and
notify the employee requesting the screen of the need to wait while you apply for a
license.
i. Document the date you checked the lists and the date you notified the
Compliance Screener and the employee of the need to wait for a license in
COMPLIANCE CONSULTATION FILE.
ii. Contact the Engineering department to have them complete an INITIAL
CLASSIFICATION FORM, so that you can determine whether to apply for a State or
Commerce License.
ii. Upon receipt of the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM from Engineering,
follow the directions for applying for a license under the appropriate agency.
395. 15 C.F.R. § 744 (Supp. IV 2001), Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Entity List, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744spir.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
396. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Unverified List, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/EnforcementlUnverifiedList/unverified-parties.html (last visited Feb. 20,
2005).
397. Office of Foreign Asset Control, U.S. Treasury Department, Sanctions Program and Country
Summaries, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/enforcement/ofac/sanctions/ (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
398. 22 C.F.R. § 126.1 (2004); Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State,
Embargo Reference Chart, available at http://pmdtc.org/country.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
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PART XIV.C - DEEMED EXPORT RULE - POTENTIAL EMPLOYEES - EXPORT
COMPLIANCE OFFICER
1. Deemed Export Rule
Under export control laws, potential employees who are not U.S. Persons
may require licenses to receive certain data or training.399 Exports can take place
in the United States, even on the XYZ campus, if technology is transferred to a
foreign person here.40 0  The law presumes that at some point, a foreign national
will return to their home country.40 1  This is the deemed export rule.4 °2  The
Compliance Screeners will screen all potential employees against the lists below.
If they find a match, they will contact you. In the event of a match, contact Jane L.
Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or jldoe@abclaw for guidance on what
licenses may be required and if XYZ's BADGE/CLASSIFICATION REQUIREMENTS
can adequately prevent possible violations if a license is required.
a. Denied Persons List- http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/thedeniallist.asp.4 3
If re-screening a party screened in the last 90 days, go to the recent update
site (for a faster screen of the Denied Parties List). Go to
http ://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/recentchanges.asp. 4°
b. Debarred List - http://www.pmdtc.org/debar059.htm.4 5
c. Specially Designated Nationals -
http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/t I I sdn.pdf.
40 6
d. Federal Register -http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/fedreg/ear-fedreg.html. 7
Look for list updates.
e. Entity List - http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744spir.pdf.
40 8
399. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17 (a)(3)-(4) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 7342(b)(2)(ii) (2004).
400. See supra note 383.
401. See supra note 383.
402. See supra note 383.
403. 15 C.F.R. § 764 (Supp. I 2002); Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, The Denied Persons List, available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/thedeniallist.asp (last
visited Feb. 20, 2005).
404. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Recent Changes to the
Denied Persons List, at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/dpl/recentchanges.asp (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
405. 22 C.F.R. § 127.7 (2004); Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State,
List of Statutorily Debarred Parties, July 1988-April 2004, available at
http://www.pmdtc.org/debar059.htm (last visited Feb. 20, 2005).
406. Office of Foreign Assets Control, U.S. Department of Treasury, Specially Designated
Nationals and Blocked Persons, at http://www.treas.gov/offices/eotffc/ofac/sdn/tl I sdn.pdf (last visited
Feb. 25, 2005).
407. U.S. Government Printing Office, Federal Register Rules Affecting the Export Administration
Regulations, at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/fedreg/earjfedreg.html (last visited Feb. 23, 2005).
408. 15 C.F.R. § 744 (Supp. IV 2002): Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of
Commerce, Entity List, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/744spir.pdf (last visited Feb.
20, 2005).
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f. Unverified List -
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Enforcement/UnverifiedList/unverifiedparties.html.
4 0 9
For more information on the deemed export rule, go to
ee s tml 410http ://www.bis.doc.gov/DeemedExports/De medExportsFAQs.htm.
409. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Unverified List, at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Enforcement/UnverifiedList/unverified-parties.html (last visited Feb 23,
2005).
410. Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, "Deemed Export " Questions
and Answers, at http://www.bis.doc.gov/DeemedExports/DeemedExportsFAQs.htm (last visited Feb.
23, 2005).
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PART XIV.D - RESPONDING TO EMPLOYEES' QUESTIONS OR CONCERNS -
EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER
1. Diversion Risk/Red Flags
If a customer provides indications that they may be a diversion risk under the
DIVERSION RisK/RED FLAG CHECKLIST, employees will contact you.411 Contact
Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or jldoe@abclaw.com to discuss
any reported concerns.
2. Proliferation Risk
If an employee suspects that a customer may be involved in proliferation
activities such as nuclear activities; the design, development, production, or use of
missiles; or the design, development, production, stockpiling, or use of chemical or
biological weapons, they will notify you. Upon this notification, you will need to
apply for a Commerce Department license if the potential export falls under
Commerce Department rules.41 2 Contact the Engineering department to have them
complete an INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM, so that you can determine whether
to apply for a State or Commerce License.
3. Anti-Boycott Protections
If an employee contacts you with suspicions or concerns regarding an illegal
boycott, follow the steps for handling reports under COMPLIANCE 911
PROTOCOLS while you investigate.4 13 Identify any invitations to participate and
any employee response to such invitation.414 Contact Jane L. Doe, Outside
Counsel, at (303)999-9999 orjldoe@abclaw.com to discuss any possible violations
and to complete any reports of invitations required under the law.41 5
411. 15 C.F.R. § 732 (Supp. III 1997); see also supra Part IV.
412. 15 C.F.R. §§ 744.2(a), 744.3(a), 744.4(a) (2004).
413. See supra Part V.
414. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 760.2-760.5 (2004).
415. See id.
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4. Anti-Bribery Protections
Employees have been explicitly instructed that any requests for
reimbursement or requests to cover expenses must be approved by the Compliance
Officer, in order to avoid the payment of illegal bribes.416
In some cases, certain common business practices, such as paying the costs of
a foreign official to travel for a plant visit and certain ministerial payments are
allowed under the law.417 It is important that XYZ employees understand that they
are not to identify potential exceptions to the general ban against payments.
Instead, only you can make this determination.
Exceptions under the Anti-Bribery laws include payments to facilitate routine
government actions.4 18 Examples would be obtaining permits or licenses and
getting utilities or phone lines connected. Payments that are lawful under the laws
of the particular foreign country also are an exception to the general ban on
payments.419
As a general rule, avoid reimbursing officials for expenses incurred. Rather,
let XYZ incur the expenses directly. This creates a paper trail documenting actual
use of the payment.
Contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or
jldoe@abclaw.com to discuss whether a proposed payment might qualify for an
exception. It is extremely important that you document the sources of information
used to approve any payment in the COMPLIANCE CONSULTATION FILE.
5. Import and Export of Customer Item
Engineers may contact you regarding the temporary import of customer items
for projects. Often these imports require a license.420 Further, once the item enters
the United States, even if it belongs to a customer, XYZ may need a license to
return the item, because the item becomes subject to U.S. export laws when it
enters the United States.42' Contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-
9999 or jldoe@abclaw.com for assistance with these issues.
416. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a), 78dd-2(a) (2004).
417. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1(c)(2), 78dd-2(c)(2); id. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b).
418. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b).
419. 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(c)(1), 78dd-2(c)(2).
420. 22 C.F.R. § 120.18 (2004).
421. 22 C.F.R. § 120.17(a)(1) (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 730.5(a) (2004).
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PART XIV.F - APPLYING FOR STATE DEPARTMENT LICENSES - EXPORT
COMPLIANCE OFFICER
1. State Department Licenses
Upon your request (after an INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN indicates the
need for a license) or after receiving a project, the Engineering department will fill
out an INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM. If they determine that an item is
inherently military because it was designed, modified, or adapted for military
application, they will indicate that its export is controlled by the State
Department's U.S. Munitions List ("Munitions List").422
Once the engineer has determined that the item is subject to the Munitions
List and a State Department license is required, they will provide the following
information on the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM:
* A proposed Munitions List category number
423
* Whether they believe the item may be the product of fundamental research
and qualify for a licensing exception
424
" Whether they believe the project is ongoing in nature and may qualify for
licensing under a Technical Assistance Agreement425
" Relevant information for preparation of a Commodity Jurisdiction
Request
426
2. If Engineering Does Not Think the State Department Controls the Export
If the Engineering Department determines that the potential export is not
controlled by the State Department, they will ask for your approval of this
determination on their INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM. If you agree with their
determination, sign off on the form and return it to the employee. Keep a copy in
the COMPLIANCE CONSULTATION FILE. Go to the next section, EXPORTS UNDER
COMMERCE DEPARTMENT RULES at PART XIV.H.
If you are unsure whether or not State Department rules apply, continue
through this section. If you still do not feel comfortable making the determination,
contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel at (303)999-9999 or jldoe@abclaw.com for
assistance.
422. 22 C.F.R. § 120.3(a) (2004).
423. Id. § 121 (2004).
424. Id. §§ 120.11 (a) (8), 120.10(a)(5) (2004).
425. Id. § 120.22 (2004).
426. Id. § 120.4 (2004).
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3. Fundamental Research Licensing Exception
Under the Munitions List, there is a licensing exception for fundamental
research.a27 Because much of XYZ's software is based on the work that Tom
Johnson did at the university, there is a strong possibility that this exception may
apply.
Fundamental research is:
" Conducted in engineering at accredited U.S. colleges
42s
" Information ordinarily published/shared broadly in the scientific
community
429
Research is not fundamental if:
* It is funded by the U.S. government and the government places controls on
the dissemination of the information as part of the funding requirement
430
* The university agreed to restrictions (from sources other than the
government) on the publication of the research
431
4. Technical Assistance Agreements
A Technical Assistance Agreement is available if a project will involve
ongoing use of software or services (but will not grant the customer a right to
manufacture the software).432
5. Using the Fundamental Research Exception and Technical Assistance
Agreements
Contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or
jldoe@abclaw.com for assistance determining whether an export qualifies as
fundamental research or if a Technical Assistance Agreement may apply.
6. Determining that a State Department License is Required
To make a final determination that a State Department license is required, you
must make a Commodity Jurisdiction Request.433 See PART X1V.G for details on
preparing a COMMODITY JURISDICTION REQUEST.
427. Id. § 120.11 (a)(8).
428. Id.
429. Id.
430. Id. § 120.1 1(8)(ii).
431. Id. § 120.11(8)(i).
432. See id. §120.22 (2004).
433. Id. § 120.4 (2004).
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PART XIV.G - COMMODITY JURISDICTION REQUEST WITH STATE
DEPARTMENT - EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER
Commodity Jurisdiction Requests are complex applications to the State
Department for determination whether or not the Munitions List covers the
potential export.434  The Munitions List does not cover items that are
predominantly civil and have a performance equivalent in civil application. 435 The
key to a Commodity Jurisdiction Request is to identify and adequately describe the
predominantly civil nature of the item and its performance equivalent in civil
application, if applicable.436
" Performance equivalent is defined by form,fit, or function.
437
* The intended use of the item is not relevant to the inquiry. For example,
even though an item is being designed for a civil application, if it is not
predominantly civil and does not have a performance equivalent in civil
application, the item will still be covered by the Munitions List.
438
1. Information Required for Commodity Jurisdiction Request
Engineering will provide the information you will need to provide for the
Commodity Jurisdiction Request with the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM:
" Description of the article or service
439
" History of design, development and use
440
" Brochures or documents related to the item 441
For more information on the documents required for a Commodity
Jurisdiction Request, go to http://www.pmdtc.org/docs/cj.pdf.
442
2. Filing a Commodity Jurisdiction Request
Once you have compiled the information for a commodity jurisdiction
request, contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or
jldoe@abclaw.com for preparation of the request.
434. See id.
435. Id. § 120.3(a)(i)-(ii) (2004).
436. See id.
437. Id. § 120.3(a)(ii).
438. See id. § 120.3(b).
439. See id. § 120.4(c) (2004).
440. Id.
441. Id.
442. Directorate of Defense Trade Controls, U.S. Department of State, Guidelines for Preparing
Commodity Jurisdiction Requests, at http://www.pmdtc.org/docs/cj.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2005).
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3. Begin the Initial Classification Process Early
Because Commodity Jurisdiction Requests can take up to forty-five days (and
then require licensing after the request is returned), it is important to complete the
INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM as quickly as possible." 3
4. Appealing the Results of a Commodity Jurisdiction Request
The results of the Commodity Jurisdiction Request are not final, they may be
appealed. 444 If you strongly disagree with the State Department's determination,
contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or jldoe@abclaw.com to
discuss the possibility of an appeal.
443. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.4(e).
444. Id. § 12 0.4(g).
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PART XIV.H - EXPORTS UNDER COMMERCE DEPARTMENT RULES - EXPORT
COMPLIANCE OFFICER
1. Exports Covered by the Commerce Department
If the export is not covered by the State Department, you must determine
whether it is subject to Commerce Department rules." 5  The Commerce
Department covers items considered "dual use," or those that may have both
civilian and military application.4 6 Almost any item can fall under the Commerce
Department rules. Under these rules, your export may:
* Be eligible for export without a license
44 7
" Be eligible for export under a license exception (a self-validated license the
exporter "grants" themselves, a "Self-Validated License Exception")
448
" Require a license 449
2. Refer to the Initial Classification Form from Engineering
To determine what requirements apply to your export under the Commerce
Department Rules, you will need to refer to the Export Classification Control
Number ("ECCN") assigned by the Engineering and the ECCN details the
Engineer attached to the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM.4 5 °
3. Steps under Commerce Department Rules
Under the Commerce Department rules, follow these steps:
451
a. Determine whether a license is required or you can ship without a license -
No License Required - NLR
b. If a license is required, search for an exception (a Self-Validated License
Exception)
c. If there is no exception, apply for a license
445. See 22 C.F.R. § 120.5 (2004); 15 C.F.R. § 730.3 (2004).
446. 15 C.F.R. § 730.3.
447. See id. §§ 732.1(d)-(e) (2004).
448. See id. § 732.4(a) (2004).
449. See id. § 732.1(d) (2004).
450. See id. § 738.2(c) (2004).
451. See id. § 732.1; see also id. § 732 (Supp. 11 1997).
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PART XIV.I - SHIPPING WITHOUT A LICENSE UNDER COMMERCE DEPARTMENT
RULES - (NLR) - EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER
Under the Commerce Department rules, a Commerce Department license is
not required if:
" It is software or technology that is publicly available,452
* The item is EAR99, 45 3 or
" There are no controls on the country of ultimate destination for the
reasons your particular export's ECCN is controlled.454
1. NLR Option 1 - Publicly Available Software/Technology
Software or technology can be exported under NLR status if the following
three conditions are met:
a. The technology or software is publicly available.4 55
b. The technology or software is not being used in support of proliferation
* 456activities.
c. The technology or software is not encryption code, ECCN 5M002. 457
You cannot use the NLR status if the individual is on the DENIED PERSONS
LIST in the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN.45 8 You must apply for a license. Go
to PART XIV.L.
a. Publicly Available
Publicly available means the software or technology is available to the public
in the form of periodicals, books, electronic, or any other media; readily available
at libraries; covered by patents or published patent applications; released at
conferences open to the public.459 Software is considered publicly available when
it is available through general distribution at a cost not exceeding the cost of
reproducing and distributing it.
460
452. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(3) (2004).
453. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 732.3(d)(5), 732.3(g)-(l), but see infra note 466 (describing the potential
need for a license for EAR99 items being reexported to Iran).
454. 15 C.F.R. § 738.4(a)(2) (2004).
455. Id. § 734.3(b)(3).
456. Id. §§ 744.2-744.4 (2004).
457. Id. § 774 (Supp. I 1998).
458. Id. §§ 736.2(b)(4), 744.1(c) (2004).
459. Id. §§ 734.3(b)(3), 734.7(a) (2004).
460. Id. § 734.7(b) (2004).
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b. Not Used in Proliferation Activities
461
The Sales and Engineering departments screen for customer proliferation
activities. Contact the salesperson on the project for a copy of their
PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST from the CUSTOMER FILE.
In addition, contact the engineer on the project to confirm that there were no
indications that the customer is involved in proliferation activities. Document
these communications in the PROJECT LICENSING FILE.
c. Not ECCN 5D002
462
The Engineer will have provided an ECCN on the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
FORM. If the ECCN is not 5D002, file the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM with
the PROJECT LICENSING FILE.
If your export meets all of these requirements, go to PART XIV.I.4 for further
instructions.
461. Id. § 736.2(b)(7).
462. Id. § 734.3(b)(3).
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2. NLR Option 2 - Item is EAR99
Exports classified as EAR99 can be exported under NLR status if the
following six conditions are met:
463
a. The item is EAR99.4 4
b. The CUSTOMER SCREENS did not specifically trigger the need for a license.465
c. The export is not going to an embargoed destination.466
d. The export is not being used in support of proliferation activities.467
e. The shipment will not travel through or be temporarily unloaded in:
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, North
Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan or Vietnam.468
f. The technology or software is not encryption code, ECCN 5D002.469
You cannot use the NLR status if the individual is on the DENIED PERSONS
LIST in the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN.470 You must apply for a license. Go
to PART X1V.L.
a. Item is EAR99
The Engineer will have provided an ECCN on the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
FORM. If the item classification is EAR99, file the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
FORM with the PROJECT LICENSING FILE.
b. Customer Screens Did NOT Trigger Need for License
4 1
The Coordination Team will contact you if any screens indicated the need for
a license. All departments will contact you if they have concerns about any
customer or transaction that might trigger the need for a license. If the article is to
be exported or reexported to Iran, contact Outside Counsel for assistance in
determining whether any additional licensing requirements may apply.
47 2
463. See id. § 732.3(d)(5).
464. Id.; see also infra note 466.
465. See supra Part XII.A; 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(g)-(h) (2004).
466. 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(i) (2004). In certain circumstances, re-export of an EAR99 item to Iran
may not be subject to a licensing requirement under the EAR (NLR), but still be subject to a licensing
requirement under the Office of Foreign Asset Controls [hereinafter "OFAC"]. Id. § 746.7. Exports
made in violation of OFAC licensing requirements also violate the EAR. Id. § 746.7 (prohibiting
exports or re-exports to Iran of items subject to both the EAR and OFAC's Iranian Transactions
Regulations without OFAC authorization). The author extends special thanks to Mark D. Menefee for
pointing out and clarifying this overlap of Commerce and Treasury Department regulations.
467. Id. § 732.30).
468. Id. §§ 732.3(k), 736.2(b)(8)(ii) (2004).
469. Id. § 734.3(b)(3).
470. Id. §§ 736.2(b)(4), 744.1(c) (2004).
471. See supra Part XII.A; 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(g)-(h).
472. See supra note 466.
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c. Not Going to Embargoed Destination
The Compliance Screeners screen for embargoed destinations. Contact the
Compliance Screener on the project for a copy of their INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY
SCREEN from the CUSTOMER FILE. File a copy of this the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY
SCREEN in the PROJECT LICENSING FILE.
d. Not Used in Proliferation Activities
The Sales and Engineering Departments screen for customer proliferation
activities. Contact the salesperson on the project for a copy of their
PROLIFERATION RISK CHECKLIST from the CUSTOMER FILE.
e. Export will Not Travel through or Be Unloaded in the Prohibited
Countries
473
Contact Accounting for details on the country of ultimate destination and
shipment route of the proposed export. Compare this against the list above. File a
copy of this information in the PROJECT LICENSING FILE.
f. Not ECCN 5D002
47 4
The Engineer will have provided an ECCN on the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
FORM. If the ECCN is not 5D002, file the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM with
the PROJECT LICENSING FILE.
If your export meets all of these requirements, go to PART XIV.I.4 for further
instructions.
473. See supra Part XIV.H.2.
474. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(3).
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3. NLR Option 3 - No Country Controls for Reason Your ECCN is
Controlled
Exports that are not controlled for reasons the Commerce Department controls
exports to your country of ultimate destination can be exported under NLR status if
the following three conditions are met:
a. The combination of your ECCN and Country of ultimate destination do not
require a license.475
b. The CUSTOMER SCREENS did not specifically trigger the need for a license.476
c. The export is not going to an embargoed destination.477
d. The export is not being used in support of proliferation activities.478
e. The shipment will not travel through or be temporarily unloaded in:
Albania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Cambodia, Cuba, Estonia,
Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Laos, Latvia, Lithuania, Mongolia, North
Korea, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan or Vietnam.479
a. ECCN and Country Chart Combination
Determine whether your item or technology's ECCN is controlled for the
reasons shipment to the country of ultimate destination is controlled.48 °
" Review the ECCN details attached to the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM
from Engineering. Determine the reason(s) for control. 48 1
" Cross reference the Country Chart, at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/738spir.pdf 482 If the reason your
ECCN is controlled is not marked with an X, continue with the steps to
determine if you can make the export under NLR designation.483
b. Customer Screens Did NOT Trigger Need for License
4 84
The Coordination Team will contact you if any screens indicated the need for
a license. All departments will contact you if they have concerns about any
customer or transaction that might trigger the need for a license.
475. Id. § 738.4(a) (2004).
476. See supra Part VH.A; 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(g)-(h) (2004).
477. 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(i) (2004).
478. Id. § 732.30).
479. Id. §§ 732.3(k); 736.2 (b)(8)(ii) (2004).
480. Id. § 738.4(a).
481. Id. § 738.2(d)(2)(i) (2004).
482. Id. § 738 (Supp. I 2003), Export Administration Regulations Database, Supplement I to Part
738, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/738spir.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
483. 15 C.F.R. § 738.4(a)-(b) (2004).
484. See supra Part VII.A; 15 C.F.R. § 732.3(g)-(h).
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c. Not Going to Embargoed Destination
The Compliance Screeners screen for embargoed destinations. Contact the
Compliance Screener on the project for a copy of their INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY
SCREEN from the CUSTOMER FILE. File a copy of this the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY
SCREEN in the PROJECT LICENSING FILE.
d. Not Used in Proliferation Activities
The Sales and Engineering Departments screen for customer proliferation
activities. Contact the salesperson on the project for a copy of their
PROLIFERATION RISK CHEcklist from the CUSTOMER FILE.
e. Export will Not Travel through or Be Unloaded in the Prohibited
Countries4 8 5
Contact Accounting for details on the country of ultimate destination and
shipment route of the proposed export. Compare this against the list above. File a
copy of this information in the PROJECT LICENSING FILE.
If your export meets all of these requirements, go to PART XIV.I.4 for further
instructions.
485. See supra Part X1V.H.3.
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4. Exporting Under NLR (No License Required) Status
If the export meets the requirements of the publicly available exception, the
EAR99 exception requirements, or is not controlled for the reasons the country of
its ultimate destination is controlled, it may be exported without a license.45 6 All
invoices, bills of lading, and shipping documents must specify "NLR. ' '4 7 Inform
Accounting they may use the NLR designation in the license fields on all
paperwork. If the reason the export has NLR status is because the export is
EAR99, it should be listed on paperwork as "NLR-EAR99. ' '48  Document these
steps in the PROJECT LICENSE FILE.
5. Remember, NO NLR Status for Exports to Denied Persons
Remember, if the potential customer or employee matched on the DENIED
PERSONS LIST on the INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN, you cannot export to them
under NLR status. You must apply for a license. Go to PART XIV.L.
6. If the Export Does NOT Qualify for NLR Status
If the export does not qualify for NLR status, go to the next step, FINDING
EXCEPTIONS at PART XIV.J.
486. 15 C.F.R. § 734.3(b)(3) (2004) (not subject to the EAR because technology or software is
publicly available); id. § 732.3(d)(5) (exports classified as EAR99); id. § 738.4(a)(2)(ii)(B) (export not
controlled with respect to reason for control and destination).
487. 15 C.F.R. § 758.1(g)(3)(2004).
488. Id.
489. Id. § 736.2(b)(4) (2004).
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PART X1V.J - SELF-VALIDATED LICENSE EXCEPTIONS UNDER COMMERCE
DEPARTMENT RULES - EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER
1. Self-Validated License Exceptions
As long as your export is not further limited by the Commerce Department
Rules, you may be able to export under a SELF-VALIDATED LICENSE EXCEPTION.
Essentially, this is a license you grant to yourself.
490
2. NO Self-Validated License Exceptions for Denied Persons
If the individual matched on the DENIED PERSONS LIST on the
INDIVIDUAL/COUNTRY SCREEN, you cannot use a Self-Validated License
Exception.49 1 You need to apply for a license. Go to PART XIV.L.
3. No Express Limitation on Using Self-Validated License Exceptions
There are two lists to check for express limitation on using Self-Validated
License Exceptions. These will require you to reference the ECCN that
Engineering assigned the project on the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM.
* Section 740 of the Commerce Department rules:
492
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf 4 93 - use the binoculars in
the upper toolbar to "jump" to §740.2. If your ECCN is listed in §740.2,
contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or
jldoe@abclaw.com to determine whether you can use a Self-Validated
Exception.
" Section 742 of the Commerce Department rules:
4 94
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/742.pdf 495 - use the binoculars in
the upper toolbar to see if your ECCN is listed in §742, contact Jane L.
Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or jldoe@abclaw.com to
determine whether you can use a Self-Validated Exception.
If your ECCN is not on either list, continue to search for a Self-Validated
License Exception.
490. Id. § 740.1(a) (2004).
491. See id. §§ 736.2(b)(4)(i), 740.2(a)(2).
492. See id. § 740 (2004).
493. Id. § 740 (Supp. I 2001), Export Administration Regulations Database- License Exceptions,
available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
494. 15 C.F.R. § 742 (2004).
495. Id.; Export Administration Regulations Database, Part 742 - Control Policy - CCL Based
Controls, available at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/742.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
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PART XIV.K - SELF-VALIDATED LICENSE EXCEPTION EXAMPLE - EXPORT
COMPLIANCE OFFICER
There are many different Self-Validated License Exceptions.496 These can be
found at http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740.pdf in § §740.3-740.18.
One commonly applicable Self-Validated License Exceptions is described in
step-by-step detail below as an example. Contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at
(303)999-9999 or jldoe@abclaw.com for assistance using a Self-Validated License
Exception for the first time or if you determine that a license exception in §740 of
the Commerce Department Rules other than those described in this manual may
apply.
When reviewing the Self-Validated License Exceptions, remember that the
specific exception must be listed as an available exception under your export's
ECCN as determined by Engineering on the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION FORM.4 95
1. Example of Self-Validated License Exception - Limited Value Shipments
Self-Validated License Exception (LVS)
LVS Exception requires:
499
a. That L VS be an available License Exception for your ECCN 500
b. That the value of the shipment not exceed the LVS amounts for the individual
shipment or cause the annual value of all shipments of this particular ECCN to
exceed the LVS annual allowance for the ECCN
50 1
c. The country of ultimate destination must be on Country Group B
502
2. Consider Whether the Export Qualifies for the LVS Exception
a. Confirm that LVS is an Available Exception for your ECCN
Refer to the ECCN information attached to the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
FORM from Engineering. Confirm that under License Exceptions, LVS is an
available exception.
496. See 15 C.F.R. §§ 740.3-740.18 (2004).
497. Id.; Export Administration Regulations Database, Part 740 - License Exceptions, available at
http://www.access.gpo.govbis/ear/pdf/740.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
498. 15 C.F.R. § 738.2(d)(2)(ii) (2004).
499. See id. § 740.3.
500. See id. § 738.2(d)(2)(ii).
501. Id. § 740.3(c)-(d).
502. Id. § 740.3(b).
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b. Determine the LVS Limits for Your ECCN
Refer to the ECCN information attached to the INITIAL CLASSIFICATION
FORM. The L VS per shipment is the amount next to the LVS exception. 50 3 The
Annual L VS Limit is 12 times the amount of the LVS per shipment °4
c. Country of Ultimate Destination is on Country Group B
Go to http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740spir.pdf, and use the
binoculars to "jump" to "Country Group B."5°5 Determine whether or not your
country of ultimate destination is on Country Group B. Print a copy of Country
Group B and file in the PROJECT LICENSE FILE.
3. If You Determine the Export Qualifies for a Self-Validating License
Exception
Contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or
jldoe@abclaw.com if you would like to confirm the availability of this Self-
Validating License Exception. Document that the exception is available in the
PROJECT LICENSE FILE and notify Accounting about how to use this Self-
Validating License Exception on export documents.
4. Other Self-Validating License Exceptions to Consider
As noted above, there are many Self-Validating License Exceptions available.
All of the exceptions listed in § 740 of the Commerce Department Rules should be
considered. A few exceptions may be of particular relevance for XYZ's business:
" Technology and Software Under Restriction (TSR) - § 740.6506
" Computers (CTP) - § 740.7507
* Technology and Software Unrestricted (TSU) - § 740.13508
* Encryption Commodities and Software (ENC) - § 740.175°9
Contact Jane L. Doe, Outside Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or
jldoe@abclaw.com for questions about any of these Self-Validating License
Exceptions and assistance in walking through the specific requirements of each
exception.
503. See id. § 774 (Supp. 11998).
504. Id. § 740.3(d)(2).
505. Id. § 740 (Supp. 1 2001), Export Administration Regulations Database, available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740spir.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
506. 15 C.F.R. § 740.6 (Supp. 1 2001), Export Administration Regulations Database, available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740spir.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
507. Id. § 740.7 (Supp. I 2001), Export Administration Regulations Database, available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740spir.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
508. Id. § 740.13 (Supp. I 2001), Export Administration Regulations Database, available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740spir.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
509. Id. § 740.17 (Supp. 1 2001), Export Administration Regulations Database, available at
http://www.access.gpo.gov/bis/ear/pdf/740spir.pdf (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
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PART XIV.L - APPLYING FOR A COMMERCE DEPARTMENT LICENSE - EXPORT
COMPLIANCE OFFICER
Should you determine that your export does not qualify for NLR status or a
Self-Validating License Exception, you will need to apply for an Individual
Validated License.510 You can find information on Commerce Department
Licenses at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Licensing/factsl.htm. 51"
The Commerce Department has a user-friendly on-line license processing
system called "SNAP. ' '1  Details are available at
http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Licensing/facts5.htm." 3 Contact Jane L. Doe, Outside
Counsel, at (303)999-9999 or jldoe@abclaw.com for assistance on how to
participate in SNAP.
Once you receive an approved license, notify Accounting so they may
complete the shipping paperwork, and document this step in the PROJECT
LICENSING FILE.
510. 15 C.F.R. §§ 748.4, 748.6 (2004).
511. Id., Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Licensing Facts,
available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Licensing/factsl .htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
512. See 15 C.F.R. § 748.7(a) (2004).
513. Id.: Bureau of Industry and Security, U.S. Department of Commerce, Licensing Facts,
available at http://www.bxa.doc.gov/Licensing/facts5.htm (last visited Feb. 12, 2005).
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PART XIV.M - EXPORT COMPLIANCE FoRMs - EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER
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PROJECT LICENSING FORM -EXPORT COMPLIANCE OFFICER
NAME OF CUSTOMER
XYZ JOB NUMBER
Agency Controlling Export: State ___ Commerce
Compliance Officer Name/Initial /
Date File Opened
Date License Obtained (or exception determined, if applicable)
Date Accounting or Applicable Department Notified With Licensing Details on
How to Proceed
State Department Licenses
Munitions List Category Number
514 __
Fundamental Research Exception?515 YES_ NO
Technical Assistance Agreement SoughtReceived?51 6 YES NO
Commodity Jurisdiction Reauest Information:5 7
Predominantly Civil Application? YES - NO
Performance Equivalent in Civil Application (form, fit, and function)?
YES NO
Date Commodity Jurisdiction Request Completed/Submitted
File Copy of
CJR Application (date)
Results from State Department in Project Licensing File (date)
514. See supra Part XIV.G.
515. See supra Part XIV.F.3.
516. See supra Part XIV.F.4.
517. See supra Part XIV.G.
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Commerce Department Licenses
ECCN: 518
Individual on Denied Parties List?51 9 YES_ NO If YES, apply for
license
Eligible to ship without a license/NLR? 520 YES_ NO
If YES, list reason
Self-Validating License Exception Applies?5 21 YES NO
If YES, list applicable exception
License Required? YES NO
If YES, Date applied , Date received
518. See supra Part XV.H.2.
519. See supra Part XIV.I.5.
520. See supra Part XIV.14.
521. See supra Part X1V.J.
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